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In this study, a social-psychological analysis of injustice
will be presented, i.e., injustice will be described as an inter-
personal problem. The resulting model of interpersonal injustice
differs from other so-called social-psychological approaches in
which injustice is reduced to an intrapersonal phenomenon. First
we will describe the type of interpersonal situation in which the
problem of injustice will be analyzed ,and we will indicate the
difference between our analysis and other "social-psychological"
approaches to the study of Justice or injustice. Lastly, we will
present a brief outline of this dissertation.
The psychological study of justice and injustice has devel-
oped mainly in three directions: 1) Attention has been primarily
given to the explanation of the perception of injustice, tlie
experience of injustice, and to ways people react to unjust situ-
ations. The leading advocate  of this approach. is J.S. Adams
(Adams, 1963a; 1963b; 1965; 1968; Adams and Rosenbaum, 1962;
Adains and Jacobsen, 1964; Adams and Freedman, 1976). The numerous
studies belonging to this approach have been thoroughly reviewed
(see e.g.Weick,1966; Lawler, 1968; Pritchard, 1969; Goodman and
Friedman, 1971; von Grumbkow and Wilke, 1974). 2) At the end of
the sixties G.S. Leventhal introduced a new paradigm in the
empirical study of injustice, focusing attention on the problem
of reward allocation and on the study of the behavior of reward
allocators (see Leventhal, 1976a for a review). This methodologi-
cal shift in the study of injustice had a large impact on the
theoretical development of the field.That is, much of the actual
theoretical insights in studying unjust situations stemmed from
this approach : e.g. Lerner's Just World Hypothesis (1977),
Mikula's Motivation for Control approach (1982), and Kayser and
Schwinger's Breach of Contract Hypothesis (1982). 3) The most
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recent development differs from the afore-mentioned approaches in
that it does not study distributive justice problems which focus
on the outcomes of distributions, but analyzes instead the proce-
dures by which distributive decisions are made (Thibaut and
Wa 1 ke r , 1975)·
Our theoretical analysis and empirical research is consis-
tent with the approach adopted by Adams. That is, our attention
is aimed exclusively at the explanation of people's reactions to
or in unjust situations. The chronological development of the
psychology of injustice suggests that both the perception of
injustice and the behavior of reward allocators can or must be
explained by one theory. Provisionally, we adopt the position
that the analysis of injustice perception and the analysis of
reward allocation behavior must not lead to one theory of injus-
tice. Although the subject of both analyses share the common
label ' injustice', it is clear that the behaviors analyzed are
completely different. Moreover, both analyses imply totally dif-
ferent points of view from which the same interpersonal situation
is approached. In the analysis of the perception of injustice,
the situation is seen through the eyes of the receiver of the
resources; in the case of the reward allocation analysis, the
situation is seen through the eyes of the possessor of the re-
sources.
These   rema rks   lead   to our second introductory   note:   the
description of the type of interpersonal situation used in the
analysis of injustice. Eckhoff (1974, p. 3) makes a distinction
between two major types of interpersonal situations: reciproca-
tion and allocation. Reciprocation is described as, " a situation
of give-and-take between two parties. The point of combination
here is to be found in the fact that one transfer is conditioned
by another." (p. 3). Elsewhere,this type of exchange situation is
referred to as the direct exchange relationship. (Von Grumbkow
and Wilke, 1974). Part a. in Figurelgives a schematic represen-
tation of the direct exchange relationship between exchange part-
ners P (e.g. an employee) and J (e.g. an employer). Person P's
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contributions consist of his performance, the quality of his1)
performance, his abilities and so forth, for which, in return,
Person f- offers him a salary, a stable position, and so forth.
<                    P *0.-- P C-*-*---I p
P     f J    
   #*I 4-           /--00- J0 4---- J L--'
a                                         b                                         c
FIGURE 1, SCHEMATIC REPRESENTATION OF THE DIRECT (PARTS A AND C)
AND THE INDIRECT EXCHANGE SITUATIONS (PART B)
(           CONTRIBUTIONS;-------- OUTCOMES),
Eckhoff's 'allocation' stands for the process of apportionment,
and the connection between the transfers lies in the fact that,
"the values apportioned are considered to be or to have been,
parts of a whole", or when, "the parties involved find it rele-
vant to compare the transferred values" (1974, pp. 4-5). Von
Grumbkow and Wilke (1974) call this type, the indirect exchange
relationship. A schematic representation of the indirect exchange
relationship is given in part b of Figure 1. Examples of indirect
exchange relations are a mother dividing a pie between her chil-
dren, or the relation between employees on one side and the
employer on the other. The term 'indirect' refers to the connec-
tion between the children or between the employees through their
exchanges with their exchange partner, the mother and the employ-
er, respectively.
For the sake of conceptual clarity, we have chosen an
indirect situation for our analysis of injustice perception. Our
choice seems to be in contradiction with the fact that indirect
1)  For the sake of textual clarity we only have used the
masculin forms of nouns and pronouns. Whenever we have
written he/his/him, one should read she/her, too.
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exchange situations are far more complex than direct exchange
situations. But this very complexity permits us to make a clear
distinction between the types of relations between the parties
involved in the injustice problem, namely persons P and 0 and
their common exchange partner, Person J (see figure 1, part b).
As we mentioned earlier, the analysis of the pe rcep tion of injus-
tice is made from the point of view of the person who receives a
part of the resources, e.g., from the point of view of Person .P.
In a direct exchange situation, this person subsequently takes
the role of the receiver of resources and the role of resource
allocator, and very often the allocator benefits from his own
allocations. This kind of situation is depicted in part c of
Figure 1. The diagram shows that in one moment in time in the
direct exchange situation Person Ji allocates resources between
the other, Person J, and himself. The role of the receiver of
recources overlaps with the role of resource allocator. This
overlap is largely absent in the indirect exchange situation.
Persons P and 0 are considered to be the receivers of the
- -
resources, and Person J, the resource allocator. It is sufficient
to say now that direct exchange relations exist between Persons P
and .Q on the one hand and Person J. on the other, and that there
exists a 'social comparison' relation between Persons -P and 0. We
will return to this distinction later in our theoretical analysis
of the injustice problem.
In order to avoid confusion with respect to the use of
terms, we have decided to use the terms 'just', 'unjust' and the
substantives 'justice' and 'injustice', throughout this work. The
terms 'equity' and 'inequity'  are  used when referring to Adams'
work and his Theory of Inequity. The reader may encounter the
ad Jectives 'honest', 'fair' and the nouns 'honesty and fairness'
which are occasionally used as synonyms for 'just' and 'justice'
as figures of speech. In our analysis of injustice, we prefer the
adjective 'interpersonal' to the adjective 'social'. In thinking
and writing about injustice, the adjective 'social' seems to be
used when one refers to the problem of injustice in a broader
societal context,  e.g., when speaking about problems  of the Third
World (see e.g., Tajfel, in press). For now, we think that our
5
analysis of interpersonal injustice, which is an analysis on the
micro-level, cannot be applied simply, by mere extrapolation, to
injustice problems on the meso-level or macro-level.
This work consists of two parts. In Part I the problem of
injustice is theoretically analyzed. This analysis, given in
Chapter 3, is largely based on Adams' Theory of Inequity (Chapter
1) and Rijsman's analysis of Social Motivation (Chapter 2). We
will enter our interpersonal injustice model into the theoretical
discussion of some controversial questions about justice and
injustice, which concludes the first part (Chapter 4). Part II
consists of empirical studies in which some of the elements of
the theoretical model are tested. The complete set of empirical
studies, however, can best be seen as a detailed illustration of
our line of thought rather than as a strict test of the model.
The final chapter of part II contains a general discussion.
At the beginning of this study of injustice, we think that
it is fair to acknowledge the possible limitations of this con-
tribution to the psychology of injustice. The model we present
here is not yet a sound, highly finished theory about injustice,
but it must be considered as a heuristic framework which allows
for the integration of major contributions in the field. We hope




A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
A systematic concern by psychologists with the problem of
distributive justice is a rather recent development. In this
regard one can refer to Stouffer et al. (1949) who introduced the
explanatory concept of relative deprivation, to Heider's ideas
about Justice (1958), Jaques' work about equitable payment
(1961), Patchen's study about the choice of wage comparisons
(1961), Gouldner's (1960) norm of reciprocity analysis, Homans'
social exchange approach of distributlve justice (1961), and
Adams' Theory of Inequity (1965). From all the afore-mentioned
theoretical considerations of justice Adams' Theory of Inequity
is the most elaborate, and it has given rise to a considerable
amount of empirical research and, subsequently, to a considerable
amount of theorizing about justice and injustice.
CHAPTER I. ADAMS' THEORY OF INEQUITY
The most complete formulation of Adams'   Theo ry of Inequity
appeared in the second volume of the Advances in Experimental
Social Psychology (Berkowitz, 1965), and was built upon several
empirical studies done by Adams and his associates (Adams and
Rosenbaum, 1962; Adams, 1963b; Adams and Jacobsen, 1964). From
their kind of studies (mainly experimental) and from the examples
given by Adams in his 1965-article, it is clear that Adams has
tried to describe the problem of injustice, as observed in the
applied area of organizational psychology, in its more fundamen-
tal, social psychological aspects. Adams' analysis of inequity is
largely based upon Homans' social exchange approach of injustice
and upon the cognitive dissonance theory of Festinger (1957).
Elements of social exchange theory are incorporated into
Adams' position, and, as Gergen concludes, are used, "as an
organizer of experience and social sensitizer' (Gergen, 1980,
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p. 280). The relations between the elements, as described in his
definitions of inequity and equity, the motivational assumption
with respect to the striving toward equity and, relatedly the
description of the inequity reduction mechanisms, are all borrow-
ed by Adams from cognitive dissonance theory. In this chapter we
present the different elements of Adams' Theory of Inequity.
1. The Description of the Inequitable Situation
The analysis of inequity applies to situations in which two
persons, or two groups of persons, called Person and Other, are
in a direct or indirect exchange relation. Person is "any indi-
vidual for whom equity or inequity exists" (Adams, 1965, p. 280).
Other is another individual or Other can be the Person himself in
another social role or in a different situation from the past.
Inherent  in  eve ry  act of exchange  is  that the parties involved,
Person and Other, contribute to the exchange and, in turn, re-
ceive certain outcomes from it. Contributions are called inputs.
Examples of inputs are: education, intelligence, experience,
abilities, age, sex, ethnic background, effort and so forth.
Inputs resemble Homans' 'investments' (Homans, 1961). The use of
synonyms such as 'attribute' for input and 'possessor of an
attribute' for Person suggest that, strictly speaking, inputs
refer to personal characteristics. Adams also makes a distinction
between inputs and potential inputs: "Whether or not an attribute
having the potential of being an input is in fact an input is
contingent upon the possessor's perception of its relevance to
the exchange" (p. 277). In order to become an input the attribute
must be recognized as such, and considered to be relevant for the
exchange. This means that the individual must expect to be
rewarded for it.
The rewards or, in general, the resources an individual
expects to receive for contributing to an exchange are called
outcomes. Examples fr orn employee - employer relations are:
salary, status, a fixed position, an interesting job, having a
private parking lot, having an attractive office and so forth.
Outcomes can have a negative value as well, e.g. receiving a
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fine, being personally criticized by one's boss, etc. As is the
case for inputs, a distinction is made between outcomes and
potential outcomes.   Here,    too,   the same transformation   rul e
applies: outcomes must be recognized as such, and must be seen as
relevant for the exchange. The criterion of relevance can be
translated as 'having marginal utility' for the receiver of the
outcome, by which it is meant 'psychological utility'.  That is,
the value of an outcome depends upon the need pattern of the
person receiving the outcome.
Outcomes and inputs are only conceptually independent. The
concept of relevance implies that outcomes and inputs are   pe r-
ceived as related to each other. This perceived relation is not
perfect, and the problem of inequity stems from this impe rfec-
tion.
2. Definitions of Equity and Inequity
Adams defines a state of inequity as follows: "Inequity
exists for Person whenever he perceives that the ratio of his
outcomes to inputs and the ratio of Other's outcomes to Other's
inputs are unequal" (1965, p. 280). An individual who is in a
direct or in an indirect exchange relation with another individu-
al makes different, yet related comparisons. On the one side, he
builds up a personal outcome-input ratio. He compares his contri-
butions to the exchange with the outcomes he receives. On the
other side, this individual compares the contribution of the
other person to the exchange with the outcomes this other person
receives;  i.e., he constructs the outcome-input ratio of  the
other person. Inequity is experienced when both ratios are per-
ceived as being unequal. This entire line of thought is summa-






_2 > _a Fo rmula  2
IIPa
in which: 0 stands for the weighted sum of Outcomes
&£ stands for the weighted sum of Inputs
_Il and .;a denote Person and Other.
Formula 1 summarizes a state of underpayment. Person's out-
come to input ratio  is  smal ler  than the outcome-input ratio  of
Other. Formula 1  represents a state of overpayment. Ove rpayment
and underpayment can be attained in different ways, and conse-
quently, as will be explained later, there are different ways in
which people can restore a state of equity.
Finally, an equitable exchange situation occurs when the
Person evaluating the exchange perceives that the ratio of his
outcomes to inputs equals the ratio of the Other's outcomes to
Other's inputs. This state, and the implied intrapersonal and
interpersonal comparisons, are summarized by Formula 1: (1965,
p.281)
00-2 = _a Formula 3
IIPa
Underpayment  and ove rpayment  are not quite symmetrical
states. Adams holds the view that the threshold for overpayment
is  higher  than the threshold for underpayment. Ove rpayment  "can
be acceptably rationalized as 'good fortune' without attendant
discomfort" (1965, p. 282). We will return to the implications of
this statement later.
3. The Motivational Aspect of Inequity
The link between the Theory of Inequity and cognitive con-
sistency theory is most apparent in Adams' statements about
people's need for equity. Adams' motivational propositions and
the descriptions of the different inequity reduction mechanisms
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are almost verbatim translations of Festinger's Cognitive Disso-
nance Theory. Adams summarizes his ideas about the need for
equity  in two propositions: "First, the presence of inequity  in
Person creates tension in him. The tension is proportional to the
magnitude of inequity present. Second, the tension created in
Person will motivate him to eliminate or reduce it. The strength
of the motivation is proportional to the tension created." (1965,
p. 283). The relation between the magnitude of experienced in-
equity and the strength of the motivation to reduce the inequity
is graphically presented in Figurel (on page 11). The direction
in which this motivational force is working in a situation of
underpayment is opposite to its direction in overpayment situa-
tions. The motivational force is zero in the case of an equitable
exchange situation (see line a in Figure 1). According to both
propositions, one can state that Person experiences a motivation-
al force which enables him to eliminate fully the experience of
inequity. This relation between motivation and inequity can be
expressed in the function,
y =   Ix I                           Formula 4
in which: x represents the magnitude of experienced inequity
y represents the strength of the motivational force
The variable 1 has a negative sign in the case of underpayment, a
positive   sign in cases  of ove rpayment  and it takes the value  0  in
the equitable cases.
The Theory of Inequity, however, suggests a few alternative
functions about the relation between magnitude of experienced
inequity and the motivation to reduce inequity. Adams' second
proposition reads: " Second, the tension created in Person will
motivate him to eliminate or reduce it". (our underlining) .  This
implies that, at  least in certain situations, people are content
with a partial elimination,· i.e. with a reduction of inequity. In
other words, it is implied that individuals are able to tolerate
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FIGURE 2. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AMOUNT OF EXPERIENCED INEOUITY AND
STRENGTH OF MOTIVATION TO REDUCE INEQUITY.
this point. Either a curvilinear relation between inequity and
motivation, or a contingency model of inequity which takes into
consideration the limitations of inequity reduction imposed by
situational or personal characteristics are consistent with this
line of reasoning.
In the preceding paragraph we mentioned that the threshold
for overpayment was higher than the threshold for underpayment.
Inequity is experienced when this threshold is transgressed. Line
b. in Figure 2 represents the relation between experienced in-
equity  (x)  and the motivation to reduce inequity (y), taking  into
account the different thresholds   for unde rpayment   (du)  and  over-
payment  (do). The threshold  for unde rpayment  (du) is smaller  than
for overpayment (d ). The motivation to reduce inequity remains
zero between the values for du and _d . As a consequence of this
difference between the two thresholds, it is clear that a certain
absolute amount  of ove rpayment,   e.g., at point 32  in  Figure  2,
leads to less tension, and hence, to a smaller amount of motiva-
tion than an equal, absolute amount of underpayment, e.g., point
x1 in Figure .2.. The discontinual function, represented by line 2
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can be summarized as follows:
for x < du holds that: y = Ix 1 -du Formula 5
for x > do holds that: y = Ixl -do Formula 6
and for du<x<do holds that: y= 0 Formula 7
In the definition of inequity by Adams it is implied that the
value  of x, which denotes the magnitude of experienced inequity,
is a function of the degree of perceived inequality between one's
own outcome-input ratio and the outcome-input ratio of the Other.
Stated otherwise, the value of x is a function of the complex
ratio :
op/Ip : Oa/Ia
which,  in  the  case  of unde rpayment takes values  less  than 1  (Or,
in fact, less than ·flu), in the case of equity takes a value equal
to 1 (or values between -du and .d ) and,  in the case of overpay-
ment, takes values greater than 1 (or greater than 94).
4. Reduction of Inequity
The experience of inequity leads to tension within the indi-
vidual, and the individual is motivated to reduce this tension.
As mentioned earlier, inequity can be conceived of as a special
case of cognitive dissonance. Hence, the reduction of inequity
follows the general rules of the reduction of dissonance outlined
by Festinger (1957) in his theory of cognitive dissonance. He
says: "In general, if dissonance exists between two elements,
this dissonance can be eliminated by changing one of these
elements. (p. 18)". The elements related to the experience of
inequity are those described in the first paragraph: the outcomes
and inputs of Person and Other, and the relation between them.
Adams describes the following  set of reduction mechanisms:
a) Person Can Change His Own Inputs
A  person who feels ove rpaid will increase his contributions
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to the exchange, e.g., a worker who feels overpaid can put more
effort into his job, or take work home and so forth. Underpayment
leads to a decrease of inputs, e.g., an employee can take a long
coffee-break, can produce fewer units, or deliver work of poorer
quality and so forth. People tend to decrease their inputs more
in  the  case  of unde rpayment   than to increase  them   in  the  case  of
overpayment. The assumption underlying this hypothesis is that
people tend to minimize their costs and maximize their profits.
b) Person Can Change His Own Outcomes
Increasing  one's own outcomes in situations  of unde rpayment
and decreasing them in overpayment situations, lead toward
equity. On the basis of the own-gain maximization assumption, one
would expect that people will tend to raise their outcomes more
given a situation  of unde rpayment  than they would lower their
outcomes in the case of overpayment.
c) Person Can Cognitively Distort His Inputs and Outcomes
The direction of the distortion is the same as the direction
of the real changes of inputs and outcomes as described above. A
person can cognitively change the importance and/or the relevance
of his inputs and outcomes. Adams holds the opinion that funda-
mental cognitive changes  are very difficult to achieve.
d) Person Can Leave the Inequitable Exchange Situation
Leaving the field is, according to Adams, a very radical way
of inequity reduction which only takes place when Person experi-
ences extreme inequity. In employee-employer relations, leaving
the field can take the form of absenteeism, or resignation.
e) Person Can Act Upon Other
The different reduction mechanisms described thus far can
also be applied to Other. Person can persuade Other to change his
inputs or outcomes or Person can change his cognitions about
Other's inputs and outcomes. Person can make the Other leave the
situation. According to Adams, it is easier for Person to change
his cognitions about the inputs and outcomes of Other than his
cognitions about his own inputs and outcomes.
f) Person Can Change the Object of Comparison
Changing one's comparison' person is possible only in in-
direct exchange situations, since changing one's comparison
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person in a direct exchange situation implies, according to
Adams, the termination of the exchange itself.
Finally, Adams formulates some rules governing the prefer-
ences for some reduction mechanisms over others. These rules can
be seen as explicitly stated assumptions about men (and women):
"a) Person will maximize positively valent outcomes and the
valence of outcomes.
b)     He will minimize increasing inputs  that  are effo rtful  and
costly to change.
c)  He will resist real and cognitive changes in inputs that are
central to his self-concept and to his self-esteem. To the
extent that any of Person's outcomes are related to his self-
concept and to his self-esteem, this proposition is extended
to cover his outcomes.
d)  He will be more resisting to changing cognitions about his
own outcomes and inputs than to changing his cognitions about
Other's outcomes and inputs.
e)  Leaving the field will be resorted to only when the magnitude
of inequity experienced is high and other means of reducing
it are unava ilable. Partial withdrawal,   such as absenteeism,
will occur more frequently under conditions of lower in-
equity.
f)  Person will be highly resistant to changing the object of his
comparisons, Other, once it has stabilized over time and in
effect, has become an anchor." (1965, pp. 295-296).
5. Inequity, Social Comparison and Social Validation
In this last paragraph, we will delve further into the as-
pects of social comparison implied in inequity and injustice.
These preliminary thoughts about social comparison and inequity
lead to the insight that, besides social comparison, social vali-
dation too (Rijsman, 1980) is an essential element of an unjust
situation. Our ideas were shaped by critically analyzing Adams'
formulas of equity and inequity (see Formulas  1,  1  and  _1  on  page s
8 and 9). In this respect, we followed the same procedure as
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Walster, Berscheid and Walster (1973). However, it needs to be
stressed beforehand that our critisism of these formulas is fun-
damentally different from Walster et al.'s. Walster et al. (1973)
focused exclusively on the "mathematical" inappropriateness of
Adams' formulas to handle "negative inputs". Their publication
triggered a pseudo-mathemathical discussion about justice-
formulas (Zuckerman, 1973; Walster, 1975, 1976; Harris, 1976;
1983; Samuel 1976a,b; 1978; Romer, 1977; 1979; Moschetti, 1979;
Alessio, 1980) which diverted attention from the more fundamental
aspects of the injustice problem. Several authors tried to break
through this rather unfruitful thinking about injustice. Samuel,
for example, stated that "parsimony and utility were more crucial
considerations for equity theory than redesigning the equation so
as to cope with negative numbers." (1978, p. 136). He argued
further that this pursuit of mathematical elegance obscured the
intuitive logic of the theory. More recently, Messick replied to
Harris in the same sense, when he stated that: "What is at issue
is not the algebra but rather the identification of the terms in
Equation (5) with the concepts in a psychological theory."
(Harris, Messick and Sentis, 1981, p. 215). In our further con-
ments, attention will be directed exclusively at the psychologi-
cal processes implied in Adams' formulation of inequity and in
our reformulation.
The formulas presented in the second paragraph of this chap-
ter are not meant to be mathematical models of equity and in-
equity, but must be conceived of as short-hand notations of the
complex weighting processes of inputs and outcomes and the com-
parisons of outcome to input ratios, as implied in the defini-
tions of equity and inequity. The way these formulas are con-
structed, i.e., the way Adams summarizes these equity processes,
suggests that people first weigh their outcomes by their inputs,
and other's outcomes by other's inputs. In other words, people
construct two outcome-input ratios, which are subsequently com-
pared   to one another. A person's judgement about  the  ineq uity   of
a transaction results from connecting two rather complex cogni-
tions, in the form of "Compared to what the other person receives
for what he does, I get as much as/ too many/ too few outcomes
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for what I do"; or "Compared to what the other person does and
receives for it, I do as much as/ too much/ too little for what I
receive." The social comparison of outcomes and inputs seems to
be of less importance in Adams' model than the intrapersonal
comparison of outcomes and inputs. Nevertheless,  it is Adams'
opinion that more attention should be given to the social compar-
ison aspects of inequity: "In order for more refined predictions
to be made from the theory, theoretical, methodological, and
empirical work are also required in at least two areas related to
it. First, additional thought must be given to social comparison
processes." (Adams, 1965, P. 297). The very way in which Adams
translates his ideas into for'Inulas, however, obscures   the   impo r-
tance of these social comparison processes. The reformulation we
propose (see Formula _8., below) consists of a seemingly trivial
reordering of the elements of Formulas 1 and 1, but it accentu-
ates   the impo rtance of social comparison  in  a more distinct   way.
Let us begin by giving our short-hand notation of a just and
unjust situation, and discuss the implications of it afterwards.
0-2 & 22- Formula 8I 0a a
Person experiences a transaction with his exchange partner as
just/unjust when he perceives that the ratio of his inputs (I )
to Other's inputs (Ia) is equal/not equal to the ratio of his
outcomes (0 ) to Other's outcomes (0 ). This formulation stresses
the idea that, in the first place, Person builds up cognitions
about his relative inputs and about his relative outcomes, in
comparison with those of Other. A judgment of the justice/
injustice of the exchange is achieved by relating these two cog-
nitions, which result from two distinct comparison processes.
Judgments of injustice/justice take the form: "Compared to Other,
I contribute more/less/equally and I receive more/less/the same"
or vice versa. This formulation is much simpler than the one
postulated by Adams  (see  p.   15).   Ande rson (1976; Anderson  and
Farkas, 1975), who analyzes inequity from the point of view of
information-integration theory, concludes that a formulation
17
which stresses the interpersonal comparison of outcomes and of
inputs, is preferable over one which does not. The basic elements
of injustice are, on the one hand, the ratio of inputs of Person
and Other, and on the other hand, the ratio of outcomes of Person
and Other. It is the ratio of inputs of Person and Other, and not
the input of Person and the input of Other, each conceived
separately, which informs Person evaluating the exchange about
his relative contribution to the exchange. The input ratio
indicates the position of Person relative to Other on the input
dimension. Similarly, it is the ratio of outcomes of Person and
Other, and not the outcomes of Person and Other as such, which
informs Person about his position on the outcome
dimension,relative   to the position of Other. Information  abou t
relative contributions and about relative outcomds constitute
basic elements of Social Comparison Theory (Festinger, 1954),
assuming that relative inputs and relative outcomes can be
interpreted in terms of the relative "ability" of Person. Thus it
seems that a theory about injustice should deal explicitly with
the dynamic aspects of the social comparison of abilities.
Inequity theory and its derivates deal only with the striving
toward proportionality.
We have chosen for the analysis of injustice in an indirect
exchange situation, as we mentioned in our Introduction. In such
a situation, the outcomes of Person and Other are the products of
the behavior of their exchange partner. Hence, the ratio of the
outcomes of Person and Other (0  : Oa) reflects the value at-
tached by their exchange partner to the relative contribution of
person to the exchange. The input ratio, on the other hand, indi-
cates the relative worth Person attaches to his contributions
compared with the contributions of Other. Injustice, defined as
the perceived mismatch between the input ratio and the outcome
ratio, can easily be translated in terms of the Social Validation
Concept of Rijsman (1983). By translating the concept of justice
into social validation, the problem of injustice is incorporated
into a more general model of interpersonal behavior.
In the next chapter we will present the concepts of social
comparison and social validation. They will be used as building
blocks for our interpersonal injustice model.
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CHAPTER II. SOCIAL COMPARISON AND SOCIAL VALIDATION
Rijsman's analysis of social competition is strongly in-
fluenced by the Theory of Social Comparison Processes (Festinger,
1954). Therefore, we will begin with a description of Festinger's
ideas about social comparison, which are further elaborations
of  his thinking about opinion influences in groups (Festinger,
Schachter and Back, 1950). Next a description will be given of
Rijsman's social competition analysis (Rijsman, 1978; 1979;
1980a; 198Ob; 1983). Finally, we will discuss briefly the
relevance of this analysis for the study of injustice.
1. Festinger's Theory of Social Comparison Processes
The starting point of the Theory of Social Comparison Pro-
cesses, stated in Hypothesis 1, is that people have a need for
evaluating their opinions and abilities (Festinger, 1954, p.
117) · People need precise knowledge about their capabilities and
about the correctness of their opinions. In so far as this knowl-
edge cannot be gathered easily, or by objective reality testing,
people will compare themselves with others (Hypothesis 2, p.
118). For instance, the opinion that satiated lions are not dan-
gerous is not likely to be tested in reality. Or for a nonswimmer
it is dangerous to try and determine his performance times for
the 100 m backstroke. So, there are situations in which abilities
or opinions are very difficult to evaluate against objective
criteria, in which case a person must rely on comparing himself
with the abilities or opinions of others in order to get a
precise evaluation of his own abilities or opinions. Hypotheses 1
and 2 set the stage for social comparison theory. In the remain-
der of this chapter, we will discuss the social comparison of
abilities manifested in performances.
The core of the Social Comparison Theory, namely, the dynam-
ic aspect of social comparison, is summarized in three hypotheses
and consists of three, interrelated motivational tendencies. In
hypothesis 3, Festinger states that the tendency to compare one-
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self with another person decreases as the difference between
one's ability and the ability of the other increases (1954, p.
120). This will be called the comparison tendency. From a combi-
nation of these three hypotheses, Festinger derives that there
exists a striving toward uni formity (Derivation  D,   1954,   p.   124).
The existence within a group of persons of a discrepancy in the
abilities of its members leads to actions by the members of this
group aimed at reducing the discrepancy. Hypothesis 4 states
that, only in the case of the social comparison of abilities,
people tend toward superiority relative to others in the group
(1954, p. 124).
Additional and, in our opinion, less important dynamic as-
pects of social comparison theory are dealt with in other hypo-
theses. Corollary 3A to Hypothesis 3 specifies the locus of com-
parison: given a range of possible comparison-others, a person
will choose someone whose ability is most similar to that of the
comparer. In order to reach uniformity, people will not compare
themselves with others at extreme positions on the ability dimen-
sion. Extremely large ability differences imply incomparability,
which results in the recognition of status differentials.
Finally, Festinger mentions several factors which intensify
social comparison dynamics 'and especially influence the tendency
toward uniformity: the importance of the group for oneself (Hypo-
thesis 7), the importance of the ability f6r oneself (Corollary
to Derivation E), the degree of attraction to the group
(Corollary 7A), the relevance  of the ability  for the group
(Corollary 7B) and overall similarity. Until now, Social Com-
parison Theory has not been tested as a whole, but separate ele-
ments of the theory were the object of empirical study and
theoretical criticism (see e.g. Pettigrew, 1967; Guiot, 1978;
Suls and Miller, 1977; Rijsman and Wilke, 1980).
2. Rijsman's Social Competition Model
Social attribution, social comparison, and social validation
form the key elements of a social cbmpetition model created and
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described by Rijsman in a series of recent publications (Rijsman,
1978; 1979; 1980a; 198Ob; 1983). In general, this model describes
the processes by which an individual - or a group of individuals
- constructs a meaningful social reality in terms of Self and
Other, where Self and Other refer to individual persons or to
groups of persons. We will discuss briefly the role of attribu-
tion in the construction of social reality and then discuss more
fully the two other components, i.e., social comparison and
social validation.
2.1 Social Attribution
Social attribution, social comparison, and social validation
can only be conceptually distinguished. They form an integral
unity. The first "step" towards the construction of a meaningful
social reality, analogous to the construction of a non-social
reality, consists of the reduction of diverse stimuli into a cue
to which a person attaches a meaning (Rijsman, 198Ob, p. 14).
Labeling a complex stimulus constellation (form, size, color,
etc.) is, in fact a way of reducing these diverse stimuli to a
meaningful whole, i.e., into a subjective, meaningful unity. The
same process holds for the perception of social objects: meaning
eme rges by reducing the various stimuli   into a meaningful unity.
Since this process concerns social objects it is better to call
this process social attribution. Rijsman defines social attribu-
tion as "the fact that an individual attributes certain things or
events, which he observes in his environment
PERCEIVER (P)       (p -------= Pp
C -------* P00
FIGURE 3, DIAGRAM OF SOCIAL ATTRIBUTION
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(and also his internal environment), to a person" (1983, p. 280).
This step is presented schematically in Figure 3.
In this diagram (Figure 1) the symbols Cp and Co represent the
things or the events which the Perceiver, P, uses as cues. The
symbols Pp and Po stand for the meaning attributed to these cues:
the Self  (P )  and the other person (Po). The diagram reads  as
follows: an individual (P) observes (solid arrows) certain things
and events, related to himself (C ) and to another individual
P
(CQ) and considers these as cues to which he attributes (dotted
arrows) the meaning of persons: "I" (P ) and "Other" (Po). The
'things or events' used as cues in tli is attribution process
belong to four categories: "1) bodily characteristics, 2)
possessions, 3) group memberships and 4) actions (words and
deeds)" (Rijsman, 1983, p. 281). The rules governing this social
attribution process are described in social attribution theory
(see e.g. Shaver, 1975; Harvey, Ickes and Kidd, 1976; 1978). It
is interesting to point to a fundamental difference between the
cues that refer to oneself and the cues that refer to the other
person. It is clear that the perceiver will not be confronted to
the same degree with information concerning himself and
concerning the other person. While both P and 0 can use the four
afore-mentioned cues in attributing meaning only the person
himself has access to propriocepti4e cues. This difference in
perspective affects the attribution process (Jones and Nisbett,
1972) . Thus social attribution plays an important introductory
role in the construction of a meaningful social reality. We will
describe now, in more detail, the processes of social comparison
and social validation, which are used as building blocks in the
interpersonal model of injustice.
2.2 Social Comparison
Comparison of obJects also plays an important role in the
construction of a meaningful reality. The reduction of a complex
variety of stimuli into a meaningful whole, which finds expres-
sion in giving a name to an object, e.g. "chair", implies that
this object bears resemblance to other objects belonging to the
category 'chair'. At the same time, however, it implies that this
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chair is different from other chairs. Thus, giving a meaning to
an object implies a simultaneous process of equalization and
differentiation, which emerges through a process of comparison.
Another aspect of giving a name to an object is that the person
who gives this name expresses that certain behaviors towards that
object are more likely to occur than other behaviors. By calling
an object 'chair', the person expresses that he wants to sit on
it rather than that he wants to sleep on it. Assigning a meaning
to an object is expressing a number of action tendencies toward
that object.
In the case of constructing a meaningful social reality, the
process is called social comparison. Giving a meaning to social
objects implies a process of social comparison in which the ten-
dencies to equalize and to differentiate these objects are inter-
woven. Rijsman defines social comparison as: "the fact that an
individual, in o rder to conceive himself as a person, has to see
himself as one unique element in a set of elements which he calls
persons. This inherent property of thinking about the Self as a
person manifests itself as a tendency to discriminate and assimi-
late the Self and Other at the same time." (1983, p. 281). It is
impo rtant  to  note the resemblance between Rijsman's conception  of
the social comparison process and that of Codol (1979) who summa-
rizes his opinion about the definition of Self as follows: "En
d6finitive, processus de comparaison sociale, d6couverte de
similitudes partielles et affirmation d'une difference globale,
apparaisent comme essentiels & la ddfinition de chacurl d'entre
nous comme objet particulier." (At the end, the process of social
coinparison (which is/implies) the discovery of partial similar-
ities and the affirt:nation of a global difference, appear to be
essential in the definition of all of us as a particular object.)
(Codol, 1979, P. 449). Rijsman, as well as Codol, rephrase the
essence of Social Comparison Theory, as follows: people tend
simultaneously toward equality and toward superiority. The resul-
tant of this dualism in the Self-Other experience is the
continuous directedness at the creation and the maintenance of a
slight difference between Self and Other(s). In this act, the
Self is highly involved. Hence, a value-orientation is attached
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to this slight difference, i.e., the Person aims at the creation
and maintenance of a slight 'superiority' vis-&-vis the Other(s),
on a valued comparison dimension. The process of social compari-
son is presented schematically in Figure 4·
1+
rh
PERCEIVER  (P)                          v
. C  ------*  1
\ ri
'0 -Ir--- .9
FIGURE 4, DIAGRAM OF THE SOCIAL COMPARISON
PROCESS
In the diagram of social comparison (Figure 1!-), one recognizes
the diagram of social attribution (Figure lon page 20). In
Figure 1, the 'x' denotes the valued comparison dimension along
which the difference between the Perceiver (P ) and the OtherP
person (p ) is projected. The symbol ' >' (greater than) expresses
the idea that the Perceiver (P ) experiences the slight
difference between himself and the Other (P ) as a moderate
sugeriority. The larger loop around Persons P  and P  expresses
the similarity between those persons, while the smaller circles
around P  and Po separately denote the differentiation between
them, as implied in the act of social comparison.
A person, i.e., the Perceiver P , has different means at his
disposal to reach and maintain this positively valued difference
or, in other words, his positive self-image. Rijsman distin-
guishes five categories of means by which:"... an individual can
construe a positive image of himself:
1) by changing the comparison-dimension ( A x)
2) by changing the comparison-other ( API)
3) by changing the subjective meaning of the cues ( AC->P)
4) by changing the cues themselves ( AC)
5) by changing the observation of the cues (8*C)"
(Rijsman, 1983, P. 286). Different research paradigms in the
study of social competition reflect these five psychological
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mechanisms aimed at the construction of a positive self-image
Work done by Lemaine (1966; 1974; Lemaine and Kastersztein, 1971)
and van Knippenberg (1978) illustrate the change of comparisons
dimensions in the search for a positive self-image. Studies of
the locus of comparison (see e.g. Latan6, 1966; Gruder, 1977) are
relevant with respect to the operation of the second mechanism:
the change of the comparison-other. Studies on the self-enhance-
ment bias in social attribution (Kelley and Michela, 1980)
illustrate the third method: the change of the subjective meaning
of cues. Rijsman's work on the effect of social comparison on the
performance of persons shows the operation of the fourth mecha-
nism (changing the cues) (Rijsman, 1974). Finally, the biased
perception of the cues (the fifth mechanism) is documented in the
study of ingroup-outgroup bias (Rabbie and Horwitz, 1969).
2.3 Tendency Toward Moderate Superiority
In this section, a more detailed analysis of the assimila-
tion tendency and the differentiation tendency, and its resultant
will be presented. In this analysis, we follow Rijsman's exposi-
tion (Rijsman, 1983, pp. 283-287).
The tendency toward a moderate superiority, relative to
others, is the dynamic aspect of social comparison. Essentially,
it is the reaction of an individual to a perceived discrepancy
between one's own position and the position of the comparison-
other on the valued comparison dimension. This perceived discrep-
ancy (or distance) between oneself and the other person
(represented by the symbol .d) can be conceived of as a scale,
ranging from -1 to +1. A negative value of i reflects a perceived
difference between P  and P  which is disadvantageous for P . A
positive value of 9 refers to an advantageous perce ived differ-
ence between P  and Po. Advantageous and disadvantageous differ-
ences can be defined as the experience of relative superiority or
relative inf'eriority, respectively. The zero-point (d=0) corre-
sponds to the point of minimal subjective discriminability
between Self (P ) and Other (Po). The extreme points on the scale
(d=-1 and d=+1) stand for the limits of comparability between
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Self and Other. Values which go beyond these limits are indica-
tive of incomparability (see Derivation D3 of the Theory of
Social Comparison Processes, Festinger, 1954, p. 128). Incompara-
bility implies an impossibility of perceiving the Other as
belonging to one's own category. In a diagram such as the one
represented in Figure 4 on page 23, the concept of incompara-
bility can be materialized by drawing two large loops around
person P  and the Other P , separately.
The assimilation tendency (Festinger's tendency toward
uniformity) and the differentiation tendency (Festinger's drive
upward) are both a function of the perceived difference between
Person and Other (d). The assimilation tendency is directed  at
the reduction of any difference to zero. The relation between the
perceived difference, -i, and the assimilation tendency (a) is
depicted in Figure -5.
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FIGURE 5. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PERCEIVED DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
SELF AND OTHER (D), THE ASSIMILATION TENDENCY (A),
AND THE DIFFERENTIATION TENDENCY (S),
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The abscissa represents the perce ived difference between
Person and Other  (_d). The ordinate represents the magnitude  of
the assimilation tendency and its direction. The relation between
a and d is described in the function:
- -
a = -d Formula 9
The differentiation tendency is directed at the achievement
of maximal superiority, i.e., the creation of a perceived differ-
ence that equals the value +1. The relation between the differen-
tiation tendency and the perceived difference is represented by
line s in Figure 1 (page 25). The relation between -f and d
satisfies the equation given in Formula 10
s = -d + 1 Formula 10
Line Z in Figure.6 (page 27) represents the relation between the
perceived difference between Person and Other (d) and the
simultaneous impact of the assimilation and the differentiation
tendencies on Person. Up to this point, Rijsman's analysis
parallels Festinger's. There is, however, a third tendency expe-
rienced by Person when comparing himself with Other, and which is
a function of the perceived difference too, namely, the tendency
to compare oneself with the other. The tendency to compare one-
self with the other, which decreases with an increase of per-
ceived difference between Person and Other, gives an indication
of the relevance of Other as a comparison partner. The tendency
to compare oneself (_c.) to the other person in relation to the
difference is given by the equation:
c= 1-Idl Formula 11
and graphically represented  by  line c in Figure  6  (on page  27).
A theoretically more precise prediction about the motivational
force operating on an individual when comparing himself with
another person is obtained by weighting the sum of the assimila-




value of the comparison tendency (c). This weighted sum is re-
presented by line z in Figure 6 and is summarized in the next two
equations:
for -1 <d<  0:z= -2d - d+1 Formula 122
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An inspection of the z-curve in Figure .6 shows that an individ-
ual, when comparing his abilities with those of another person,
reaches a dynamic equilibrium when he perceives himself as
slightly superior to the other (d= +0.5). For values of d less
than +.5 the individual experiences a drive upwards, that is, a
drive towards a superior position relative to the other person (z
is positive). For values of d greater than +.5, the value of z
becomes negative. This is indicative for a tendency downward; the
individual tends to weaken his superior position, relative to the
comparison-person. When the perceived difference (d) reaches the
limits of comparability (d equals +1 or -1), the value of 1-
becomes zero. In these cases, the person stops comparing himself
with the other. The other person is no longer a relevant compar-
ison-person. From these last remarks, it follows that the rest
positions reached for values d equal to +/- 1 are qualitatively
different from the dynamic equilibrium which corresponds with d -
+.5. It seems to us that the dynamic equilibrium is not a posi-
tion of rest. On the contrary, the person, being in a comfortable
position relative to the other, needs to be very attentive to
changes in his social environment which threaten his moderate
superiority and needs to be prepared continuously to intervene
adequately in this new situation. As contrasted with the genuine
rest situations that correspond to the perception of incompara-
bility, the dynamic equilibrium at the moderate superior position
is a very unstable situation characterized by continual alertness
and preparedness of the person comparing himself with the other
individual.
2.4 Social Validation
In the discussion of the third step of the construction of
the social reality, that is, the social validation step, a
parallel can be drawn too with the construction of a non-social
reality. Non-social refers to the reality consisting of objects
without internal causation. From what follows, it will become
evident that other persons play an important role in the con-
struction of a non-social reality.
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As mentioned earlier, giving a meaning to an object implies
the reduction of various stimuli into a cue to which the person
attaches a name or a label (e.g. "chair"). Furthermore, this
name-giving implies, at the same time, the assimilation of this
object with other objects belonging to that category and the
differentiation of that object from all other objects. Finally,
by giving a meaning to an object, the person expresses thereby
his action tendency toward that object (e.g. sitting). Person's
knowledge about reality, thus constructed, has only a very
limited, idiosyncratic utility.This subjective knowledge,
indicating only a subJective action orientation toward that
object, gains in certainty if other persons perceive that object
in the same way the person does, or in other words, if consensus
exists about the meaning  of that obJect. Consensus with other
persons means that their action orientations toward that object
are the same as the action orientation of the perceiver toward
that object, and hence, that their actions can be co-ordinated.
Lack of consensus with others means that the actions of different
persons can not be coordinated. For example, if other persons
call the same object a 'bed' instead of a 'chair' the action
orientation of the perceiver (sitting on) can not be co-ordinated
with the action orientation of others (sleep on) towards the same
object. This co-ordinated moment in the construction of reality
is called 'validation'.
In sections 2.1 to 2.3, we described the processes of social
attribution and social comparison, leading to the perception of
the Self as being moderately superior to the comparison-person,
Other. The perceiver attaches a positive value to himself. This
subjective knowledge of oneself is validated if other persons
attach the same positive value to the perceiver. This validation
is called 'social validation' and is defined by Rijsman, as
follows: "By social validation we mean the fact that the individ-
ual bases the subjective validity of his positive Self-conception
on coordination with other observers. The individual must have
the feeling that other observers attach essentially the same
positive value to his person as he does, in order to be confident
that his own Self-conception is real or valid." (1983, p. 282).
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The process of social validation is schematically depicted
in Figure 1, in which the processes of social attribution and
social comparison are incorporated.
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FIGURE 7. DIAGRAM OF THE SOCIAL VALIDATION PROCESS
The individual P perceives the behavior of observer 1 as being
directed at himself and at the comparison-person. On the basis of
his perception of J's behavior towards himself and the other
person, the perceiver 2 can make a judgment about .2' s evaluation
of himself, relative to the other person. From the description of
this process by Rijsman it is not very clear what is meant by the
cues -9-'   and ('0 in the social validation part of Figure 1· We
are inclined to define these cues as being the observable
behavior of the observer L directed at the Perceiver -P and his
comparison-person 3-, from which the Perceiver I can deduct that
the Observer J treats both of them as persons belonging to the
same category or group (denoted by the large loop around 1-  and
f ) and, at the same time, as unique persons (denoted by the
small loops around Ip and fo separately).  If the Perceiver P
concludes that the observer J expresses, through his differential
behavior towards /  and -Po, that he has the same favorable con-
ception of the person 2p, (which is indicated in the lower part
of the diagram in Figure l by the sign '>') as this person -P  has
about himself, then person -P- is socially validated by the ob-
server J.
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The consequence of being validated by another person is that
the validated person has a positive attitude towards the validat-
ing source. In the opposite case, if a person is not validated by
another person, the not-validated one will reject the other. In
Figure 1, which represents a case of social validation, the
favorable attitude of the Perceiver towards the Observer is indi-
Gated by the + sign along the solid arrow.
3. Preliminary Comments
The comments on Rijsman's social competition model, given
below, are meant to be a transition to the subject of this study,
namely, the analysis of injustice.
Until now, only the social comparison phase of this model
has been thoroughly elaborated. Most of the attention has been
given to the dynamic aspects of the relation between the Per-
ceiver and his comparison-person.' The detailed description of the
five mechanisms used by the Perceiver to reach or to maintain
this comfortable, superior position is an illustration of this
dynamic process. Rijsman's recent choice of the title 'Social
Competition', referring clearly to the competitive relationship
between Perceiver and comparison-person, is another example.
Scant attention has been given to the relation between the Per-
ceiver and the validating source (J). The model predicts only
that a validating source will be liked and a not-validating
source will be disliked by the Perceiver. The model says nothing
about the relation between social comparison dynamics, on the one
hand, and social validation dynamics, on the other. Rijsman's
description suggests that a person will look for validation, or
will elicit validation, only when he has reached this moderately
superior position through his competition with the comparison-
other. This interpretation contradicts Rijsman's statement that
social attribution, social comparison, and social validation can
be distinguished only on the conceptual level.
At the end of our first chapter, we stated that injustice
can be translated easily in terms of the social validation con-
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cept (see page 17). Our preliminary remarks, however, point to
some possible difficulties in this translation process, since
they show that translating one model into another is an active
process which is more than transcribing a text about injustice in
social validation words. The translater will have to take into
account the 'idioms' of both 'fields'.
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CHAPTER III. INTERPERSONAL INJUSTICE
In this chapter we will present a theoretical framework of
interpersonal injustice in which major concepts of Inequity
Theory and Social Competition will be integrated. A few words
need to be said about the character of the translation process
from which the interpersonal injustice model was derived.
In the introduction to Temporal Comparison  Theo ry, Albert
(1977) describes conceptual translation as a"theoretical experi-
ment" and as a "theory generating device" (1977, p. 486). He
compares conceptual translation with the translation of
languages: "Thus in order for translators to do their work they
must take account of more than the exact wording of the statement
they wish to translate; they must add their knowledge of the
culture, etc." (1977, p. 486). Conceptual translation works as a
double-edged sword: "In fact, conceptual translation is an excel-
lent device for uncovering the unstated assumptions and pre-
suppositions of a theory. In addition, an attempt at conceptual
translation may be diagnostic of some of the deficiencies of the
original theory, for often when the translation is most diffi-
cult, the original theory is least clear." (Albert, 1977,
p. 486). This description of the conceptual translation process
applies here as well. In the course of translation, we will have
to add exsisting knowledge about Justice and injustice to our
view of the social validation concept. In the course of this
translation, which ends with a conceptual model about injustice,
we will encounter some problems which, by solving them, will add
to our kn owl edge of social validation   as   well. The approach   we
have chosen is not that of a rigorous word-by-word translation of
injustice in terms of social validation. We have tried to develop
a model of interpersonal injustice, using Adams' Theory of In-
equity and Rijsman's Model of Social Competition as guides.
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1. Social Competition Applied to Inequity
The problem of inequity has been used as an illustration of
the Social Competition Model (Rijsman, 1980a; 198Ob; 1982; Poppe,
1980). People's striving toward equity is seen as a particular
expression of the more fundamental need for social validation,
1.e., the need for recognition of one's relative superiority by
others. This straightforward application of social validation to
inequity is attributable perhaps to the morphological resemblance
between the structure of the inequity concept (as summarized in
Formula _8. on page 16) and the structure of the social competition
model  (see the diagram in Figure 1 on  page 30). Morphological
resemblance between two diagrams can not form a sufficient basis
i'or incorporation of one theoretical framework into another,
however. It seems   that   some impo rtant problems   have   been  ove r-
looked, but it is not clear whether these problems concern the
concept of inequi·ty or the concept of social validation, or both.
First, the Social Competition Model focuses mainly on social
validation. The model defines a situation of social validation.
In the first place, our analysis concerns the perception of in-
justice which corresponds  with a situation of 'de-validation'.
Social de-validation has not been properly defined in the Social
Competition Model. Second, inequity   has two sides: unde rpayment
and overpayment. It seems rather difficult, if not impossible, to
incorporate the notion of overpayment into the Social Competition
approach to inequity. Third, Rijsman (1980a, 198Ob) states that
the inputs of the perceiver and the comparison-person correspond
with the value attached by the perceiver to himself and the other
person (5 and Po in Figure -4 on page 23). Adams' definition of
inputs and his examples of inputs do not fully correspond with
Rijsman's interpretation. Inputs refer to observable characteris-
ties of persons (e.g.,  race,  sex, and so forth) and to non-
observable characteristics (e.g., intelligence, effort,  and  so
forth). A similar problem exists with respect to Rijsman's
incorporation of Adams' notion of outcomes into his model.
Finally, no new concepts or insights are added by the mere trans-
lation of the Theory of Inequity in terms of social competition.
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A more elaborate conceptual translation of the injustice problem
in terms of the Social Competition Model will be presented in the
remainder of this chapter.
2. A New Look at Inputs and at the Input Ratio
2.1 Inputs
The concept is vaguely defined. By enlarging the field of
application of Inequity Theory from economic exchange relations
such as employer-employee relations to all kinds of interpersonal
exchanges such as family relations, helping behavior, dating,
etc. (see Walster, Walster and Berscheid, 1978), the ambiguity of
this  concept has increased. In almost  eve ry definition of input,
the notion of outcome is implied. Moreover, it seems to be ex-
tremely difficult to distinguish a priori inputs from outcomes
(Weick, 1966). Also personality factors play an important role in
the classification of exchange elements as being inputs or out-
comes (Tornow, 1971). While this is true with respect to the
definition of the inputs of the person evaluating the exchange,
(_Ip), it applies a fortiori to the definition of inputs of the
other person with whom the former compares himself (10) · The
further specification of the conditions of relevance and recog-
nition do not contribute to the distinctiveness of these con-
cepts. Examples given in the literature about justice and in-
justice illustrate the problem. Some of the inputs, such as race,
sex, physical height, etc., are observable characteristics  of
persons. Inputs like the quantity and quality of one's perfor-
mance are observable results from one's actions. Still others,
e.g., intelligence, effort, skill and the ability to do some-
thing, are hypothetical constructs which refer to personal
characteristics. They are used by perceivers to explain some
phenomena as bringing a difficult task to a good end, working
rapidly on a task, performing a heavy task, and so forth.
The distinction made by Rijsman between cues or signs on the
one hand, and the meaning attached to them by the perceiving
36
person, on the other, is a useful one for solving the defini-
tional problem. With respect to the problem of injustice, a dis-
tinction will be made between input-cues and input-meaning. The
input-cues are the observable things or events to which the
person evaluating the exchange attributes meaning, that is,
input-meaning. Input-cues can be: 1) bodily characteristics, such
as height (Leventhal and Michaels,   1971); 2) group membe rships
(Branthwaite, Doyle and Lightbrown, 1979; Commlns and Lockwood,
1979; Ng, 1981); 3) actions and deeds (see the numerous studies
using subjects' performances and quality of performance as
inputs), and 4) possessions. The large number of perceived input-
cues is reduced  to a meaningful whole, called input-meaning.
Input-meaning must be conceived of as an evaluative statement
about a person contributing to the exchange made by the person
evaluating the exchange. This evaluation concerns ability in a
broad sense, as defined by Jones and Gerard: "We are using
ability in a very broad sense to refer to the potentialities for
action given certain environmental circumstances. Our use of the
term ability is broad enough to cover most aspects of personal-
ity." (1967, pp. 323-324). Input-meaning, being an evaluative
statement about one's overall ability formed by interpreting a
variety of input-cues recognized as being relevant in the ex-
change situation, corresponds with Adams' notion of input, which
is defined as the weighted sum of the different inputs. An
example might clarify this reasoning. An employee, evaluating an
exchange  with his employer, bases  an  ove rall judgment about  his
contribution to the exchange on cues such as his seniority, the
quality and quantity of his performance, his willingness to take
work home, his attendance, his experience on the job, his educa-
tional status, and so forth. In this overall judgment, some of
these 'input-cues' will receive a greater weight than others.
This  judgment  can  be  seen  as  an  ove rall statement about  his
ability to do his Job, or in other words, as a statement about
his  ove rall value   in the exchange. The employee  also  will
evaluate the contributions of relevant others to their exchange
with the employer. His judgment about their overall value in the
exchange (i.e. the input-meaning of others) is based on his per-
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ception and integration of input-cues produced by and/or belong-
ing to these other employees: their seniority, the quality and
quantity of their performances, their willingness to take work
home, their attendance, their experience on the job, and so
forth.
The transition from input-cues to input-meaning follows the
rules of social attribution. Within the scope of this study we
will not elaborate the attributional side of the problem. (see
Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1967; Jones and Davis, 1965, Jones and
Nisbett , 1972).
2.2 The Input-ratio
The contribution of an individual to an exchange consists of
a judgment by that individual about his value in the exchange or
about his "ability" in a broad sense. This judgment becomes rele-
vant when a person wants to evaluate his exchange relationship.
We assume that people have the need for a rather precise evalua-
tion of their exchange value and that, in the absence of an
objective standard, they depend on a comparison of their
"ability" with those of relevant others. In situations where one
tries to measure objectively the exchange values of employees,
e.g. by using job classification devices, there is a considerable
amount of dissatisfaction. Specifically, people do not agree
about the choice of elements of the job to be used or about the
rules or algorithms needed to integrate the different components
into one final judgment about the job (see e.g., Hazewinkel,
1970). And, even in the application of a job classification
model, administrators have to rely on job comparisons. For the
precise evaluation of one's own contribution to the exchange, a
person cannot escape social comparison. Hence,   he   must   form  an
impression of the contribution of relevant others in order to
evaluate his own. The input-ratio summarizes this social compar-
ison process, and it indicates that a judgment about one's own
value for the exchange is a relative judgment. The "ability" of
the comparison other(s) forms the background, while the "ability"
of the person evaluating the exchange is the figure. The compar-
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ison other(s) provides the person with information. The goal of
social comparison is self-evaluation rather than self-enhancement
(Thornton and Arrowood, 1966; Mettee and Smith, 1977). The pro-
cess followed is a proces of 'comparative appraisal' (Jones and
Gerard, 1967).
One further comment needs to be made about the contribution
aspect of the injustice problem. In Adams' conception of in-
equity, as in the other approaches to justice or injustice, the
basic elements consist of the 'contribution' of Person and Other.
It is not crucial at this point in the analysis to determine
whether the notion of 'contribution' should be replaced by 'need'
or by any other characteristic of the persons engaged in the
social comparison process. In our conception of the problem of
injustice, the basic element of the injustice problem on the
contribution side consists of the ratio of inputs of Person and
Other. This ratio is the expression of the Judgment of the Person
evaluating the exchange,   of his relative value  in the exchange.
Value in the exchange, as perceived by the person, is a social
comparison-dimension. The input-ratio indicates the relative
position   of that person   on   the dime nsion.
2.3 Effects of Social Comparison of Inputs
In the description of the social comparison phase in the
construction of a meaningful social reality (see Chapter II), we
have paid a considerable amount of attention to the dynamic
aspects of social comparison. The motivation of an individual to
modify his relative position vis-&-vis a relevant comparison-
person is a function of the perceived difference between the
individual and the other person along a valued comparison-
dimension. Hence, one can expect that the perception of differ-
ences with respect to contributions to an exchange, expressed in
the input-ratio, triggers social comparison dynamics. According
to the social comparison model (summarized in Figure 6 on page
27), a person comparing himself with another will attempt to
reach a moderately superior position on the value-in-exchange
dimension. To what extent this social comparison dynamic influ-
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ences or interferes with people's perceptions of injustice and
striving toward justice is not yet clear. In social competition
terms, this question reads: What is the link between social com-
parison and social validation ? Rijsman does not answer this
question either. He circumvents the problem by starting implic-
itly with a situation in which the Perceiver P (our person evalu-
ating the exchange) has already reached a comfortable, moderately
superior position relative to the comparison-person 2, and sub-
sequently is confronted with a validating or de-validating
Observer J (our exchange partner).  We  will  try to answer  this
question when dealing with the dynamic aspects of injustice.
3. A New Look at Outcomes and at the Outcome-Ratio
Our discussion about outcomes parallels the discussion about
inputs. First, we will present an analysis of the outcome concept
and of the outcome-ratio. Next, the dynamics of outcome-
comparison will be discussed.
3.1 Outcomes
Definitions of the outcome concept incorporate the notion of
input, and vice versa. Comparison of the outcome concept with
Homans' 'rewards' and 'costs' does not clarify the notion of
outcomes. Homans (1961) makes an important distinction between
costs which refer to 'abilities', e.g., performing a difficult
task, and costs which do not refer to any ability, e.g., doing
dirty work. Hence, speaking about outcomes in terms  of  rewa rds
and costs (Walster et al. , 1973;  1976) does not remove the ambi-
guity of the concept. While Adams (1965) has stressed that the
relevance of outcomes is a psychological concept, most of the
research on equity and inequity gives the impression that the
economical value of outcomes is seen as more important than the
psychological meaning of outcomes. Economical value refers to the
worth of outcomes outside the immediate exchange relation. By
psychological meaning we refer to the 'worth' of outcomes within
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the exchange relationship between the person who evaluates the
exchange and his exchange partner. Since the problem of injustice
arises within the exchange relationship, it seems logical to look
for the meaning of outcomes within rather than outside the ex-
change situation. The distinction we made between cues or signs
and the meaning attached to these cues on the input-side is use-
ful on the outcome-side of injustice as well. On the cue-level,
outcomes take many different forms, such as payment and other
financial rewards, material rewards, e.g., obtaining a more com-
fortable office, an official car, barter payments, and intangible
rewards, such as a "pat-on-the-back" from one's boss, promotion,
attention, a smile, approval and so forth. Negative outcomes,
sometimes called punishments, range from financial fines,
demotion, and so forth, to disapproval, criticism, lack of
attention, etc. The taxonomy of outcomes presented by Foa (1971;
Foa and Foa, 1980) is a classification of outcomes on the cue-
level. For a good understanding of the outcome-meaning, we need
to  point  to  a  very impo rtant difference between input-cues  and
outcome-cues. Input-cues are, as we have seen, the perceptual
elements of the person who evaluates the exchange and of his
comparison-person, on which basis the person forms an opinion
about his relative value  in the exchange.  In  the social competi-
tion diagram (see Figure 1, page 30) these input-cues are
equivalent to the signs .  and C . The outcomes cues are re-
presented by the signs C'  and 2' 0 in the validation part of the-P
same diagram. An essential aspect of the outcome-cues is that
they consist of the behavior of the exchange partner, J, directed
toward the person evaluating the exchange, person I (cues 2' ),
and   toward the comparison-person,  0   (cues  (' ).   Not   every   act   of
the observer-exchange partner, J, is relevant for person P. Only
the behavior of the exchange partner, 2, which refers to the
contributions of persons 11 and 0, and by which the exchange part-
ner expresses his evaluation of their contributions are outcome-
cues for person -2. The multitude of possible cues emitted by the
exchange partner toward person f and the comparison-person 0 are
reduced by f to meaningful wholes: the outcome for Self and the
outcome for Other (0  and OQ). Outcomes, thus conceived, are the
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reflected value-in-exchange of P and .0 or the reflected 'ability'
(in broader sense) of -2 and 2. An important implication of our
conception of outcomes is that intrinsically rewarding aspects of
contributing to the exchange (supplying inputs) cannot be per-
ceived as outcone-cues and, hence, can never have an outcome-
meaning in the context of exchange evaluation.
3.2 The Outcome-Ratio
The outcomes of Self and Other are the evaluations of the
contributions as they are reflected in the rewarding or punishing
behaviors of the exchange partner. In order to get an accurate
estimate of the exchange, the person evaluating the exchange is
committed  to a social comparison of his 'outcomes'  with the ' out-
comes' of the comparison-person. This means that the person
obtains a fair estimate about how the exchange partner evaluates
him, by comparing the way he and the comparison-other are treated
by their exchange partner. This differential treatment is a re-
flection of the relative exchange value of the person evaluating
the exchange. This reflected relative value-in-exchange is pre-
sented in the outcome-ratio 4:.Q . The person evaluating the
exchange is at the same time information and effect dependent
upon the exchange partner. The reflected relative value-in-
exchange contains information about how the exchange partner
perceives and evaluates the relative contributions of the person.
This information is used for self-evalation and self-enhancanent
(evaluation and validation, Thornton and Arrowood, 1966; Mettee
and Smith, 1977). The process leading to the construction of the
outcome-ratio is best described as a reflected appraisal process
(Jones and Gerard, 1967)·
3.3 Effects of Social Comparison of Outcomes
Outcomes and relative outcomes  have two functions: a reward
function and a feedback function (Lawler, 1971; Taillieu, 1975).
In the absence of information about one's contributions, a person
can derive a judgment about his contributions on the basis of the
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outcomes he gets. For example, the monthly salary tells a person
something about his worth to the organization that employs him
and about the contributions that he makes or is expected to make
to the organization. Information about relative outcomes contains
information about one's relative contributions, as perceived and
evaluated by the exchange partner. The outcome-ratio, therefore,
indicates a person's position on the reflected exchange-value
dimension, relative to the position of relevant others on that
dimension. What has been said about the effects of comparison of
inputs holds too for the comparison of outcomes in so far as
direct information of inputs is lacking. The perception of a
difference in reflected exchange-value (outcomes) motivates a
person to change his relative position vis-A-vis his relevant
comparison others. Outcome differences trigger social comparison
dynamics. The magnitude of the pressure to change one's relative
position and the direction in which this force operates has been
described in Chapter II (see Figure J- on page 27). The problem of
the relationship between the dynamical aspects of social com-
parison and social validation or, in terms of injustice, between
social comparison and the striving toward justice becomes more
relevant. In our discussion with colleagues, e.g., within differ-
ent workgroups of the Association of Social Psychological
Researchers (ASPO), the question has b#en put forward whether the
striving toward justice can be explained in terms of social com-
parison along two dimensions: the input-dirnension and  the  out-
come-dimension. Both questions will be dealt with in the next
paragraph.
4. The Perception of Interpersonal Injustice
4.1 The Perception of Injustice
In the preceding paragraphs, we presented the elements that
will be used by the person to evaluate his exchange with his
partner: the self-constructed relative value-in-exchange,
expressed in the input-ratio, and the reflected relative value-
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in-exchange, expressed in the outcome-ratio. The evaluation of
the exchange relationship consists of comparing these two ele-
ments.
A person, 2, considers an exchange with his partner, 2, to
be unjust when t perceives that his exchange partner does not
behave toward him according to the relative value-in-exchange
that P attaches to himself. An exchange is perceived as being
unjust when the exchange partner does not correctly reflect the
perceiver's self-constructed relative exchange value. An exchange
is perceived by person P to be just when the exchange partner, J,
correctly reflects the perceiver's self-constructed relative
value-in-exchange.
Our definitions of injustice and justice are broader than
Rijsman's (1983) descriptions of de-validation and validation.
Validation implies the recognition of a person's relative superi-
ority. De-validation refers to the absence of the recognition of
one's relative superiority. Hence, not recognizing onels superi-
ority and recognizing or validating one's relative equality or
inf'eriority do not represent acts of social validation.
4.2 Injustice: A Quality of an Interpersonal Relation
The perception of injustice is accompanied by emotional
reactions such as anger or guilt. In Inequity Theory these nega-
tive emotional states are attributed to the existence of an
intrapersonal, cognitive conflict. Inequity is a special fo rm of
cognitive dissonance.
In our interpersonal injustice approach, the existence of
such an intrapersonal conflict is recognized. Injustice is the
perception of a discrepancy between two cognitions about the
Self: the self-constructed value-in-exchange, resulting from a
comparative appraisal process, and the reflected value-in-
exchange, resultirig   from a reflected appraisal process.    But   we
consider this intrapersonal conflict to be the internalization of
an actually existing conflict between the exchange partners,
i.e., the person, P, evaluating the exchange  and his partner or
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evaluator, -J. The alternative interpersonal relations in the
indirect exchange situation between person P and his social com-
parison-other 2 and between this other person 0 and the exchange
partner 1 form  the ' ground' against which the relation between P
and 1 stands out as 'figure'. These alternative relations are
only indirectly related to the problem of injustice which is a
problem between the exchange partners -P and J.
The most fundamental characteristic of the interpersonal
injustice experience is the impossibility of the perceiver P to
co-ordinate his action-orientation towards himself with the ex-
change partner's action-orientation toward him. Perceiving in-
justice or putting a label 'unjust' on an exchange situation is,
in fact, attributing dishonesty, injustice, inequity, or unfair-
ness to the exchange partner. Perceiving injustice is accusing
the exchange partner of unjust behavior.
4.3 Social Comparison and Perception of Injustice
In paragraphs 2 and i in this chapter, we argued that the
perception of relative contributions and of relative outcomes
taken separately trigger the perceiver's tendency to change his
relative position on the input-dimension and the outcome-
dimension, respectively. This dynamic aspect of social comparison
is inherently present in every indirect exchange situation. The
question now is: How does this social comparison dynamic relate
to the perception of injustice and to the person's tendency to
reduce or eliminate the perceived injustice ?
In the course of our analysis of interpersonal injustice
thus far, our focus has shifted from the social comparison of
inputs and outcomes and, therefore, from the social comparison
relation between Person P and Person 0 to the evaluation of the
- -
exchange and the exchange relation between Person P and the ex-
ciiange partner J. The comparative appraisal process, leading to
the construction of relative value-for-exchange as perceived by
 , was enacted within the relation between 11 and his comparison-
other,.2. The exchange with 1 induced this comparison of inputs.
The exchange partner J took a more active role in the construc-
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tion of the reflected exchange value: person P,s judgment about
the exchange partner's evaluation of the contributions of 11 and .Q
were derived by P from the way the exchange partner behaved
toward both of them. The evaluation of the exchange, finally,
involved only the exchange partners, f. and 1, while the compar-
ison relation between P and .Q became the ground. This, however,
does not mean that all social comparison elements disappear from
the justice stage. The three dynamic components of the striving
toward a moderately superior position, i.e., the tendency toward
uniformity, toward superiority, and the tendency to compare one-
self with others, belong to two distinct categories. A distinc-
tion must be made between the locomotion and non-locomotion
tendencies. The tendency toward uniformity, the tendency toward
superiority, and the striving toward a moderately superior
position belong to the foriner groups of tendencies. The tendency
to compare oneself to others belongs to the latter group of non-
locomotion tendencies. We will adduce soine arguments to support
our opinion that only the non-locomotion tendency to compare
oneself with others interferes with the perception of injustice.
In the course of the process leading to the evaluation of the
exchange, the attention of the person evaluating the exchange
shifted from his relation with the comparison person (2) to his
relation with his exchange partner (J)· The comparison person
moved to the background. He no longer remained relevant as a
'competitor'. Hence, the person's competitive striving with the
comparison other received a lower rank order on his priority
list. In the evaluation of the exchange, the relative position of
Self compared to others is fixed. The other person - no longer
being a competitor - functions only as a standard for comparison,
which will be more relevant the smaller the perceived difference
between the person and this other. The tendency to compare is
conceived of as an indication of the relevance of the other
person as a comparison standard.
Inequity Theory states that the magnitude of perceived in-
equity is a function of the perceived difference between the
outcome-input ratios of Person and Other. We adopt the same posi-
tion by stating that the perceived injustice is a function of the
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perceived discrepancy between the self-constructed relative
value-in-exchange (I :I ) and the reflected value-in-exchange
(0 :Oo). We hold the view that the tendency to compare oneself
with another also influences the degree of perceived injustice.
A given discrepancy between the self-constructed and reflected
value-in-exchange will be perceived as more unjust, the more the
comparison person becomes relevant as a comparison standard, that
is, the more the person tends to compare himself with the other
person. We have seen that the tendency to compare oneself with
others increases as the differences between self and others
decreases. The relevant comparison dimensions in an exchange
situation are the inputs and the outcomes. Thus, a given discrep-
ancy between the values-in-exchange will be perceived as more
unjust, the more the person perceives himself as being similar to
the other with respect to inputs and/or outcomes.
There are, of course, other factors influencing the tendency
to compare oneself with others, such as external pressures to
compare oneself (Rijsman, 1974), proximity, similarity on other
dimensions (Austin, 1977), and so forth. These factors, however,
are not intrinsically related to the exchange situation and an
extensive treatment of these elements would divert our attention
from the main topic of this study: injustice perception and reac-
tions to injustice. In the next paragraph we will discuss our
point of view with respect to the reactions in or to unjust situ-
ations.
5. Reactions to/in Unjust Exchange Situations
Both Adams' Theory of Inequity and Rijsman's Social Competi-
tion Model postulate a large number of mechanisms people can use
to reach a state of equity or social validation, respectively. It
is assumed that people strive toward equity or social validation
and that this striving is a reaction to perceived inequity or de-
validation. In our study we adopt the same position,namely that
striving   towa rd Justice  is a reactive motive. Others like Lerner
(1981), Mikula (1980), and Schwinger (1980) consider it to be a
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proactive motive. In their analysis they assume that people need
justice and, therefore, will strive toward it. Here we assume
that injustice is an aversive situation and that people react to
it in order to redress or to reduce it.
The mechanisms described by Adams (see Chapter I.4) and by
Rijsman (see Chapter II.2.2) refer to the real or cognitive
changes of the elements used in the evaluation of the exchange or
in the construction of a social situation. We question the use-
fulness of these mechanisms for the reduction of injustice, which
we define as the percep tion and experience of a conflict between
the person evaluating the exchange and his exchange partner.
Rijsman's proposed mechanisms aim at the construction of a favor-
able relative position of the person compared to his comparison-
person, prior to any validating act of the observer. How a person
will react to a devalidating source, other than by disliking it,
has not been made clear in the Social Competition Model. The
reactions to inequity, as described by Adams, mainly focus on
restoring cognitive balance within the person experiencing in-
equity. This follows logically from Adams' conception of in-
equity, being a special form of cognitive dissonance. The mecha-
nisms have a clear intrapersonal character and, in so far as they
have an interpersonal orientation, they are directed at the
relation between Person and his comparison-other.
In our analysis, injustice has been defined as an inter-
personal problem between Person and his exchange partner, for
which the exchange partner is blamed. The mere reduction of cog-
nitive inconsistency, without acting upon the conflict which is
at the root of the cognitive imbalance, seems like a removal of
the symptoms without curing the disease. Reduction of injustice
implies resolving the interpersonal conflict, that is, convincing
the exchange partner that he was wrong and persuading him to
correct his wrongdoing. The reduction of injustice is essentially
an interactive one, and it can be described best as a negotiation
process between the exchange partners. This negotiation can take
place in a face-to-face contact between the person and his ex-
change partner. There are, however, situations in which such a
direct negotiation is impossible or too difficult to do. One can
48
think of situations in which the person who is responsible for
the   injustice is absent or unapproachable   (e.g.),   when  the   powe r
difference between the two parties is too large). In such situa-
tions the person who feels unJustly treated has only non-
interactive means for reducing the injustice at his disposal. But
again, these non-interactive reduction mechanisms are conceived
to be indirect attempts to persuade the unjust exchange partner
and not mere attempts to restore cognitive consistency. For
example, lowering one's inputs in the case of feeling underpaid
is an indirect way of showing the exchange partner that he did
not take into account the relative contributions of person in a
just way.
At this point, we have not analyzed yet the conditions under
which a person is more likely to negotiate in a direct or in an
indirect way with his exchange partner. We think that it is
necessary to look for factors within the person himself (e.g.,
assertive ness, locus of control), within the relation between the
conflicting parties (e.g., status and power differences), factors
connected with the social comparison structure of the exchange
situation (e.g., perception of common fate, possibilities for
coalition formation),  the  type of relationship between Person and
the exchange partner (see e.g., Lerner, 1981) and to situational
characteristics (e.g., visibility of partner, availability of
partner) and perhaps to ino re global characteristics of the larger
system to which this particular exchange situation belongs (e.g.
organizational climate, societal structure, or historical ele-
ments such as 'having the habit of participation or democracy' ).
6. Injustice: An Interpersonal Process
In the preceding paragraphs (paragraphs 2 to 5), we have
presented our interpersonal model of injustice. We have described
the elements used by a person to evaluate the exchange relation-
ship and given a definition of perceived injustice. An alterna-
tive interpretation of the injustice experience and of the reac-
tions to injustice have been given. In short, we have described a
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structural model of interpersonal injustice. In this last para-
graph, a process model of injustice will be presented.
Adams' approach to inequity suggests that people reconstruct
the antecendents of inequity at the moment they evaluate the
exchange (backward processing). Ours, in contrast, is implicitly
a forward processing approach. The person, evaluating the ex-
change, first builds up the situation through comparative and
reflected appraisal. The evaluation takes place by linking the
results of these processes. Finally, the person experiencing
injustice will decide how he will handle this unjust exchange
relation. The problem of interpersonal injustice 'develops' in
time. In the course of the injustice problem, we distinguish
three stages.
In the first stage, the person builds up the elements which
will be used in the evaluation of the exchange. A distinction
must be made between 1) the construction of the input-ratio, and
2) the construction of the outcome-ratio. The input-ratio is
constructed through a process of comparative appraisal with the
attention of the person focused on his comparison relation with
the other person. The outcome-ratio is constructed through a
process of reflected appraisal. At this moment, the exchange
partner appears more clearly in the exchange situation. We call
this the comparison stage.
The second stage is called the evaluation stage. In this
stage the person passes judgment about the justice or injustice
of the exchange. Therefore, he establishes a link between the
result of the comparative appraisal process (the self-constructed
value-in-exchange) and the result of the reflected appraisal
process (the reflected value-in-exchange). To the extent that the
person attributes responsibility for the experienced injustice to
his exchange partner, he will experience the relation with him as
an interpersonal conflict.
Finally, the person will decide whether and how he will
react in this conflict situation in order to get justice done.
His reactions must be conceived of as attempts to influence the
exchange partner and to persuade him of his wrongdoing. These
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attempts can take the form of face-to-face interactions or in-
direct influence attempts. This third stage is therefore called
the negotiation stage.
This three stage process resembles the problem solving pro-
cesses as described by Bales and Strodtbeck (1951). They distin-
guish an orientation stage, an evaluation stage, and a control
stage in which the accent is on obtaining information, the forma-
tion and expression of opinions, and actively attempting to in-
fluence the members of the group toward consensus with respect to
the chosen solution, respectively. This resemblance is, of
course, not fortuitous: injustice is a problem for which the
person experiencing it tries to find an adequate solution.
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CHAPTER IV. DISCUSSION OF SOME PROBLEMS RELATED TO INJUSTICE
In our presentation of interpersonal injustice, we have
developed our own ideas, and not referred to ones generated by
other psychologists who study justice and injustice problems.
There are, however, a number of controversial topics in the field
of justice and injustice which deserve special attention. In this
chapter we present a review of the discussions about the major
problem areas utilizing our interpersonal injustice approach.
1. Principles of Justice
The three main principles referred to in Justice research
are proportionality or equity, equality, and need. (Deutsch,
1975)· The question has been raised whether these three
principles are fundamentally different or are reducible to the
principle of proportional equality. Adams (1965), Homans (1961;
1974), Sayles (1958), Patchen (1961) and Walster et.al. (1973;
1976; 1978) define justice as the proportional equality between
outcomes and inputs. Walster et.al. defend their position by
stating that equality of outcomes obtains in the case where
people contribute equally and that 'needs' can be conceived of as
an instance of the input-category, e.g., in a helping
relationship.
Others  take  a more differentiated  view  of this problem,
defending the position that equity, equality, and need represent
fundamentally different justice principles. The different
opinions belonging to this group can be seen as 'contingency
models of justice': The relevance of a particular principle in a
given exchange situation depends on the type of the relationship
existing between the exchange partners or the goal being pursued
by the reward allocator. Sampson (1975) discusses the differences
between equality and equity. These two principles are rooted in a
different historical context. Equity has its roots in the Social-
Darwinism of the 19th century, while equality refers to the
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egalitarian attitude of the 18th century. People dividing rewards
according to the equality principle are cooperative and concerned
primarily about establishing good interpersonal relations. Equity
seems to be the dominant principle in task-oriented situations.
Deutsch (1975) relates the concepts of justice, individual wel-
fare, and societal functioning. The dominance of one principle
over another depends on the goal a person seeks to attain: equity
is related to economic productivity; equality to pleasant inter-
personal relations, and need to personal development and individ-
ual well-being. Lerner (1975; 1977; 1981; Lerner and Whitehead,
1980) elaborates further these contingency approaches to justice.
He makes a dinstinction between six types of interpersonal rela-
tions which can be ordered in a 3 X 2 matrix. The first factor is
a psychological distance factor with three levels: identity  rela-
tions, unit relations, and non-unit-relations. The second factor
can be called 'formality'. Lerner makes a distinction between
inter-personal and inter-role relations. The need principle and
the principle of entitlement obtain in identity relations (e.g.,
the mother-child relationship) between 'persons' and 'role-
occupants', respectively. In unit-relations, characterized by a
cooperative attitude of the parties involved, parity is the
dominant principle between 'persons' and equity between 'role-
occupants' . In non-unit relations, which are characterized  by
competition and obstruction, justice between 'persons' is regu-
lated by the law, and justice between 'role-occupants' takes the
form of justified self-interest. On the basis of his analyses of
the effects of distributing rewards according to different
principles on interpersonal behavior and task-oriented behavior,
Leventhal (1976a) finishes with conclusions similar to those of
Lerner, Deutsch, and Sampson. The solution he proposes with
respect to the way allocators employ the different principles in
order to make fair reward distributions differs from the afore-
mentioned ones. Leventhal (1976b) reformulates this problem of
justice based upon needs _or. eq lia li ty _or. contributions in terms of
a problem of Justice based upon needs and equality and contribu-
tions. Central to his approach is the concept of 'deservingness'.
An allocator calculates the deservingness of the exchange
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partner(s) and in this calculation the different allocation rules
are weighted and combined. The weight given to each of these
principles (contribution  need, equality, and others) is depen-
dent on the allocators's goal. The contribution-principle (equity
or proportionality) gets a higher weight in task-oriented situa-
tions in which efficiency is a dominant goal. Need will get a
higher weight in situations aimed at individual well-being.
Equality, which is, according to Leventhal, a cognitively simple
solution to the justice problem will get a higher weight in
situations where it is difficult to make accurate judgments about
contributions or needs of the partners and in situations where
conflict-avoidance is the dominant goal. By accentuating the
allocator's motives and intentions as bases for reward alloca-
tions, Leventhal abandoned the deterministic approach advocated
by Lerner. European contributions to this discussion mainly stem
from Mikula and his associates (Mikula, 1980; Schwinger, 1980;
1982), and van Kreveld (1979; 1980).
How is this problem treated in the interpersonal injustice
model ? Injustice has been defined as the perceived lack of
correspondence between the perceived and the reflected value-in-
exchange. Implicitly, we assume that proportionality is the only
justice principle. This, does not mean, however, that input needs
to be defined as 'contributions' in an economic sense or, stated
in terms of the interpersonal injustice model, it does not mean
that the perce ived value-in-exchange can only be established on
the basis of 'economical contribution' cues. Here the problem of
the principles of justices takes the form of the choice or use of
relevant comparison ditnensions in establishing the value-in-
exchange. We adopt the position that the type of relationship
between the exchange partners and, hence, the type of exchange
situation, determines which dimension will be used for compar-
ison. But, given a comparison dimension, we assume that propor-
tionality between the perceived and the reflected value-in-
exchange is the dominant justice principle.
In an exchange relation where the accent lies on task
performance and effectiveness, such as the exchange between
employees and employer or even an exchange between friends
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working on a task, the dimensions on which the exchange value
will be projected are connected with performance (e.g. ability,
effort, etc.). The use of 'need' as a justice principle implies
that the persons higher in need obtain more than those who are
lower in need and , hence, here too proportionality (according to
need) applies. At first sight, it seems contradictory to speak
about a person who is relatively highly in need as being someone
with a relatively high 'value-in-exchange' . However,  if one
examines more closely the kind of exchange situations in which
'need' is used as an allocation principle, then the concepts of
'need' and 'value-in-exchange' are no longer contradictory. Need
is a dominant principle in helping relations. For the exchange
partner who is giving help, a person higher in need is more
impo rtant  to  him  than a person lower  in  need.  One  can  see  that
institutions designed for help giving, e.g , social services, Red
Cross, develop procedures to 'measure' the needs of individuals
and develop mechanisms to check if their help is going to the
'right', that is, to the neediest, persons. People who contribute
to aid campaigns feel deceived when they find out that their help
is not going to the right persons. Help seekers are compared,
that is, evaluated by the help-6ivers on the 'need' dimension.
Need is used by help-seekers to determine their 'deservingness'
relative to others iri situations of exchange with help-giving
persons.
Equality refers to: 1) the result of an allocation and 2) an
allocation principle. Equality as a result of an allocation can
be the consequence of the application of the contribution rule or
the need rule. A person who perceives himself as being equal to
others (in need, with respect to contributions, etc.) expects
that the exchange partner will reflect this equality in his
outcome-distribution or, stated more generally, in the way he
treats the person and his comparison-other. According to the
authors previously cited, equality is not reducible to any other
justice principle. Their analyses of situations in which the
equality principle is used as the principle of justice indicate
that   these are situations characterized by mutual trust    amo ng   the
parties (Deutsch, 1975), cooperative attitudes, pleasant, and
55
friendly interpersonal relations (Lerner, 1975), with a high
concern for conflict avoidance (Leventhal, 1976a). The notion of
lin-group relations' as opposed to 'out-group relations' gives an
adequate summary of these conditions. In our opinion, equality as
a justice principle refers to intergroup comparisons rather than
interpersonal comparisons. Persons are considered to be represen-
tatives of groups, which means that 'group membership' is used as
the most relevant cue or input-sign for determining one's
relative value-in-exchange. Members of the same group (i.e., the
in-group) are equals as opposed to me: ibers of the other groups
(i.e., the out-group). A fair treatment by an exchange partner
implies that all members of the same group are treated equally
but  in a different  way  than the membe rs  of the outgroup. Justice
research done in the context of intergroup comparison are in
accordance with this line of reasoning (Branthwaite and Jones,
1975; Branthwalte, Doyle and Lightbown, 1979; Commins and
Lockwood , 1979)
The initial question about which of the justice principles
is most fundamental has been transformed in the course of this
discussion into the question: Which factors affect the use of
different types of 'input-cues' (contributions, needs, group
memberships, etc.) by persons evaluating the exchange and by
their exchange partners. A detailed elaboration of the inter-
personal injustice model has not yet been made. Our preliminary
analysis, however, indicates that the major findings of the
research done until now can easily be integrated into our model.
This integration can give more substance to the central concept
in our model: value-in-exchange.
2. The Justice Motive
A second dominant theme in theoretical discussions about
justice and injustice is summarized in the question : Is the
justice motivation pro-active or re-active or is it a strategic
means toward own-gain maximization ? The initial stat·ements about
inequity made by Adams, and later by Walster et al. are not very
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clear on this point. A state of inequity is an aversive state,
and people experiencing it feel tension and will try to reduce
it. In this sense, striving toward a state of equity is re-
active. At another point in his analysis, Adams states that
people strive pro-actively toward equity. Walster et al.'s basic
assumption   is that people strive   towa rd own-gain maximization.
Specifically in Corollary I.1. they state that, "So long as
individuals perceive that they can maximize their outcomes by
behaving equitably, they will do so. Should they perceive that
they can maximize their outcomes by behaving inequitably, they
will do so." (1976, p. 5). Thus, striving toward equity is
treated as a strategic move toward own-gain maximization.
However, Proposition III reads, "When individuals find themselves
participating in inequitable relationships, they become dis-
tressed. The more inequitable the relationship, the more distress
individuals feel" (1976, p. 6). In Proposition IV which states
that: "Individuals who discover they are in an inequitable rela-
tionship attempt to eliminate their distress by restoring equity.
The greater the inequity that exists, the more distress they
feel, and the harder they try to restore equity." , the striving
toward equity is defined as a reaction to an aversive stimulus
(1976, p.6). The equity motive is a reactive motive. The tradi-
tional research pardigm which uses the 'qualification attack
procedure', as well as research using Valenzi and Andrews' 'new
induction procedure' (1971), implies a reactive equity motive.
The introduction of the reward-(re)allocation paradigm (e.g.
Leventhal, Allen, and Kemelgor, 1969; Leventhal and Bergman,
1969) initiated the discussion about the nature of the justice
motive. Two reasons can be given. First, the allocation paradigm
implies a proactive  view of justice motive. The reasoning  unde r-
lying this paradigm is simple: If people strive toward justice,
they will - if they have the opportunity - behave Justly, that
is, they will make fair reward allocations. Second, the type of
dependent measure used in this paradigm (reward allocations)
clarified the connection between justice research and social
motivation research (Messick and McCrimmon, 1968; McClintock,
1972) thereby opening the way toward an analysis of the strategic
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use of equity considerations   (Van Ave rmaet,   1975;   1980;   Van
Avermaet, McClintock and Moskowitz, 1978).
Theoretical foundations for the pro-active approach of the
justice motive are presented by Lerner (1975; 1977; 1982), by
Mikula (1980; 1982;) and by Schwinger (1980, 1982, 1983; Kayser
and Schwinger, 1982; Schwinger, Nahrer and Kayser, 1982;
Schwinger and Nahrer, 1983). According to Lerner, the striving
toward justice is related to people's 'belief in a just world'.
This belief in a just world is functional and it makes the
envirorment controllable. This belief in a just world emanates
from the personal contract which states that a person should
obtain what he deserves. People learn to give up things that are
not immediately gratifying and to do other things that will be
rewarded afterwards. This learning  can take place  only  if  they
believe that the environment is constructed in a way to provide
these delayed rewards. It is this commitment to the personal
contract and the related belief in a just world that form the
bases for the striving toward justice. Indeed, each experience of
injustice and each act of injustice performed by the person him-
self is a threat to the personal contract.
Mikula (1982) also states that people learn the contingen-
cies between their acts and certain events which occur in their
environments. They learn to predict what will happen to them thus
gaining a sense of control over the environment. The striving
toward justice is based upon people's motivation for control.
Controlling the environment is regulated by certain beliefs about
'cause-effect' relations in certain situations. Justice forms a
set of beliefs which apply in exchange situations. So, people
learn to utilize justice rules because they provide certainty and
controllability in that type of interpersonal situation.
Kayser, Schwinger and their colleagues relate the justice
motive  to an intrapersonal contract theory. Assumptions  unde r-
lyirg this theory are: 1) that people search for satisfaction,
and 2) that people learn to perceive causal relations between
their acts and environmental events. As a consequence, people
learn to create or to attain satisfying situations and they learn
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to  avo id dissatisfying  ones. This general   type of intra personal
contract takes different concrete forms in different types of
interpersonal situations. These are called the specific intra-
personal contracts. Interpersonal situations are categorized in
terms of five classes. Each class can be described as a configu-
ration characterized by the object or purpose of the relation
(e.g. the well-being of the partner, one's own-gain, etc.), the
affective relationship (e.g. very positive, neutral, etc.), the
type of resources (e.g., particularistic, universalistic), the
direction of the transaction (e.g. give, give-and-take, etc.),
and the transaction  rule  (e.g., each according to needs,  to con-
tributions). Social coordination is achieved through negotiation
about the kind of specific contract that should apply in that
specific interpersonal situation. When a person acts contrary to
the specific contract, the other person experiences it as a
breach of the contract. Furthermore, the breach of the specific
contract by the other is experienced as being unjust if the
partner cannot explain the behavior of the other and if the
partner attributes intentionality to the other person.
The strategic interpretation of equitable or just behavior
has been put forward by Van Avermeat and McClintock (Van
Ave rmaet,   1975;   1980; Van Avermaet, McClintock and Moskowitz,
1978; McClintock and Keil, 1982). The justice motive belongs to
tlie group of social motives (McCrimmon and Messick, 1968) which
regulates the individual behaviors of people in situations of
outcome interdependency. These motives form an ordered set of
preferences for outcome distributions. The most important of
these motives are: relative-gain maximization and own-gain maxi-
mization (Poppe, 1980). These motives can be depicted graphically
in the form of indifference curves in a two-dimensional space,
defined by 'Outcomes for Self' and 'Outcomes for Other'. For the
insertion of the equity motive in this model, a third dimension
needs to be added, namely, the relative contributions of Self and
Other. The difference curves for equity are situation-specific
and curvilinear. Moreover, there is a considerable amount of
overlap between the preferential structures dictated by the
equity motive and those derived from other social motives. For
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example, in a situation where person P contributes more to the
exchange than person 9, an equitable distribution of outcomes
between I and .Q. corresponds with a distribution according to the
own-gain and relative-gain motive, from J-'s point of view. This
partial overlap between equity and other motivations creates
latitude for strategic interpretations  of the striving   towa rd
justice.
The interpersonal injustice approach deals with the percep-
tion of injustice and reactions to unJust situations, thereby
implying a reactive approach to justice motivation. The proactive
motlvational analysis implies that a state of justice can be
defined unequivocally. Lerner's analysis leads to the conclusion
that   justice   is   done   when the right.  rule is applied   in   the   righ t
interpersonal situation. Schwinger's breach-of-contract hypoth-
esis leads to the conclusion that justice is done when people
interact according to the specific contract valid in that
specific interpersonal situation. But deviations from these 'pre-
scriptions' are not necessarily experienced as unjust. For
example, a person who is supposed to take most of the available
outcomes according to a contract but who divides the outcomes
according to the contribution rule is less likely to be judged as
unfair than a person who, in the same situation, would take all
the available outcomes. It is our conviction that injustice is
the 'positive instance' (Bruner, Goodnow and Austin, 1956) of the
concept.
The concept of strategy is most relevant in the study of the
behavior of reward allocators and in the analysis of direct ex-
change situations where the roles of outcome receiver and outcome
allocator strongly overlap. The person dividing the resources
benefits himself from the decision. In that kind of situation the
probability is high that factors other than justice considera-
tions influence the allocation decision. To minimize this possi-
bility, we have chosen the indirect exchange situation from the
point of view of the outcome receiver for analysis.
At this juncture, it seems impossible to judge one of these
interpretations of the striving toward justice more favorably.
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People feel stressed when they are confronted with an unjust
situation and show behavior aimed at restoring justice or aimed
at avoiding injustice. In some situations, people use justice
considerations as means  to more important  ends.
3. Injustice and Social Attribution
The analysis of the role of social attribution processes in
the perception of injustice is a recent development. Until
recently two theoretical analyses of this problem have been
published (Utne and Kidd, 1980; Cohen, 1982), but the number of
empirical studies directly related to it is small (see e.g., Lamm
and Kayser, 1978; Kayser and Lamm, 1980; Wittig, Marks and Jones,
1981; Lamm, Kayser and Schanz, 1983).
Utne and Kidd (1980) start from direct exchange relations.
Social attribution moderates the relation between 'perceived' and
'experienced' injustice. In certain situations people do perceive
that injustice is done, but without feeling any discomfort,
anger, or guilt, depending upon the perceived cause of the in-
justice. Utne and Kidd state that, "Causal attributions do not
alter the perception that an injustice has occurred, they simply
alter the accompanying distress" (1980, p. 75). The attribution
of injustice to a particular cause Gives meaning to it for the
relationship between the partners. The commitment of an unjust
act transmits a message to the exchange partner. Utne and Kidd
make use of the attributional framework presented by Weiner,
Frieze, Kukla, Reed, Rest and Rosenbaum (1972) to explain the
diverse ways in which these meanings can be established. They
distinguish eight possible causes, classified on the basis of the
locus of the cause (internal vs. external), the stability (stable
vs. unstable), and the intentionality (intentional vs. uninten-
tional). The intentionality dimension relates the causal attribu-
tion to the attribution of responsibility. Utne and Kidd's con-
siderations about the impact of different attributions on the
relation between perceived and experienced injustice can be sum-
marized as follows: Injustice perception leads to more distress
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when the cause is internally attributed, stable, and the in-
justice is seen as being intentionally caused. Responsibility is
the key notion for explaining this moderating effect of attribu-
tion on the relation between perceived and experienced injustice.
Being responsible for the irijustice gives a feeling of 'personal
causal connection' (1980, p. 79) and the perception of 'suit-
ability to redress' the injustice (1980, p. 80), which make the
justice norm salient as a personal directive for action. They
conclude by saying that further analysis of attributional aspects
of injustice contributes to the explanation of injustice experi-
ence, to the prediction of the mode of response to injustice, and
of the way people will restore justine.
Cohen's main argument is that individuals must agree on the
cause and responsibility in order to agree on the perception of
justice or injustice (1982). This idea relatds to Adam's concept
of relevance of inputs. The basic elements in his analysis are
the attribution of causality and the attribution of responsibil-
ity. A distinction must be made between direct and indirect ex-
change situations.
His review of research on social attribution leads to the
conclusion that more responsibility is attributed in cases of
norm violation than in cases of norm respect and that the cause
of injustice and the responsibility for it are always attributed
to someone else. Cohen's further analysis concerns the actor-
observer differences with respect to attributions of cause and
responsibility in just and unjust situations. His theoretical
analysis of attributional biases (the fundamental attribution
error, ego-defensive bias, role bias and cultural bias) indicate
the importance of distinguishing situations in which the per-
ceiver of injustice is at the same time receiver of outcomes and
situations in which both 'roles' are performed separately. Much
of the conflict between exchange partners with respect to the
justice of the transaction is due to different points of view
between the participants (actor-observer, self-other), or to
power differences (role bias).
In the interpersonal injustice model, social attribution is
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referred to at two different points: first, in the definitions of
outcome-meaning and input-meaning, and second, in the analysis of
injustice perception and experience.
A number of studies has shown that inputs are taken into
account in reward allocations in so far as they are internally
attributed. Leventhal and Michaels (1971) found that individuals
who had to exert more effort than others to get the same result
were judged more deserving than these others. Greenberg (1980)
demonstrated that the equity rule (proportionality) is applied
more frequently when performances are internally attributed
(i.e., to the ability and effort of individuals) than when these
performances are attributed to luck. In another study by
Greenberg (1978) it was found that, after a fair competition,
that is, a competition from which the results were attributable
to ability and effort differences of the competitors, rewards
were allocated proportionally, while equal allocations were made
after unfair competitions, that is, a competition from which the
results were partially due to non-controllable causes. Kayser and
Lamm (1981) found   that    ,even   amo ng friends, rewards were allocat-
ed proportionally, if performance differences were attributable
to differences in the ability and effort of the exchange part-
ners. It was shown that effort was a more important contribution
than ability (Cohen, 1974; Greenberg, 1979; Larwood, Levin, Shaw
and Hurwitz, 1979). Thus it seems that an input-sign is converted
into 'value-in-exchange' in so far the occurrence of this input-
sign can be attributed to the possessor. Non-stable internal
attributions (effort) seem to be more important than stable
internal attributions (ability), suggesting that the attribution
of responsibility, which is more probable with respect to factors
under the individual's voluntary control, is important as well in
the construction of the perce ived 'value-in-exchange'.
In the discussion about justice principles (paragraph 1 in
this Chapter), the concept of need deserved special attention.
The same holds here. Lerner and Miller (1978) have shown that a
person who is in need because of his inability to deal with a
situation or because  of   his  lack  of   effo rt,   will  not be compen-
sated adequately. Thus it seems that in the case of need as a cue
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for the value-in-exchange attribution, the reverse is true as
opposed to the conversion of contribution-cue into value-in-
exchange. The more the needy state is attributable to external
factors (e.g. bad luck) the more the person who is in need will
be compensated. Need is treated as 'failure'. It might be better
perhaps to make a clear distinction between exchange situations
and helping relations.
Attributional processes implied  in the ' reflected value-in-
exchange ' concept are closely related to attributional aspects in
the explanation of perception and in the experience of injustice.
A number of studies suggests that perceived injustice leads to
injustice experience under the condition that 1) the reward
allocator is held responsible for the allocation, and 2) the
allocator intentionally disregards the relative value-in-exchange
of the person evaluating the exchange situation. In a study by
Garrett and Libby (1973) only the persons who were intentionally
underpaid were compensated afterwards. Leventhal, Weiss and Long
(1969)   found that intentionally ove rpaid subjects repaid  more  to
others than subjects who were overpaid by circumstance. Subjects
who  were ove rpaid by circumstance  did  not   show any inequity
reduction (Lawler, 1968a; Valenzi and Andrews, 1971). In an
investigation by Decl, Reis, Johnston and Smith (1977) inequity
reduction took only place under conditions where the norm-
violating intention of the employer (experimenter) was un-
ambiguous. In conditions where the persons received ambiguous
information about the correctness of their salaries, only the
justification effect (task enhancement) was found. The Lane and
Mess& study (1972) suggests that a reward allocator will behave
justly if he has the opportunity to reflect upon his and the
other person's abilities adequately.
We did not analyze the role of attribution in injustice in a
very detailed way. We have tried to show that our model of inter-
personal injustice permits a fruitful incorporation of social
attributional processes into the analysis of injustice at two
different levels.
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4. Injustice and Social Comparison
Eve ry psychologist studying problems of justice  and  in-
justice agrees that social comparison is an essential feature of
just and unjust situations. Until now, two issues have been
studied, 1) the locus of comparison, and 2) the intrapersonal
versus social comparison standard of equity and inequity. In our
analysis attention has been given to the role of social compar-
ison processes in the perception and experience of injustice.
4.1 Standards for Injustice
The discussion about the kind of 'yard-stick' people use to
'measure' the ainount of justice or injustice has been initiated
by Weick (1966) who, in his review of inequity research, conclud-
ed that people must have developed a kind of feeling of justice
or a feeling of fair outcomes against which they measure their
actual situation. This 'internal standard' must be assumed in
order to explain feelings of injustice  in the 'social isolate'.
Pritchard (1969), borrowing the concept from Weick, defines the
internal standard as "the amount of outcome Person perceives as
being commensurate with his own inputs, without regard to any
comparison. " (1969, p. 205, italics in original). Other terlns
have been used to denote the internal standard: the Self
(Goodman, 1974), the absolute amount of outcome (Donnenwerth and
Tarnblom, 1975), and own-equity and own-inequity (Weick and
Nesset, 1968; Van Kreveld and Bouwhuis, 1977). The idea of an
internal standard has been introduced by Weick as an alternative
yard-stick to the social comparison standard. Social comparison
of outcomes and inputs is the main justice standard in most of
the theoretical statements about justice (Adams, 1965; Homans,
1961; Patchen, 1961; Sayles, 1958; Walster et al., 1973). To the
same category belong comparison-equity and comparison-inequity
(Weick and Nesset, 1968; Van Kreveld and Bouwhuis, 1977), inter-
nal and external pay comparisons (Hill, 1980), Other, as pay
referent (Goodman, 1974) and referential and local comparisons
(Berger et al., 1972).
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Besides these two main categories of justice standards, some
others have been distinguished by Weick and Nesset (1968) and by
Goodman (1974). Goodman's system category refers to the way the
pay system is administered. The system as justice standard is
related to the notion of procedural justice (Thibaut and Walker,
1975)· Weick and Nesset (1968) use other-equity and other-
inequity as distinct standards for justice evaluations, which
refer to the violation of the internal standard of the comparison
person. Other-equity and other-inequity are empathic feelings of
equity and inequity, and they are reducible to a special kind of
own-equity and own-inequity. We assume hereby that empathically
experiencing equity or inequity only occurs when the Person is
highly concerned for the Other's fate, or - in Lerner's terms
-when there exists an identity relation between Person and Other.
Within the social comparison category, one can distinguish
interpersonal comparisons and intergroup comparisons (locus
versus referential comparisons, Berger et al., 1972, and individ-
ual versus categorical comparisons, Rijsman, 1974).
4.2 The Importance of Social versus the Internal Standard
Pritchard (1969) defends the thesis that the internal stan-
dard is a more important standard for equity judgments than the
actual social comparison of outcomes and inputs. Only a limited
number of studies have tackled this problem directly (Weick and
Nesset, 1968; Weick, Bougon and Maruyama, 1976; Van Kreveld and
Bouwhuis, 1977, Austin, McGinn and Susmilch, 1980, and O'Malley,
1983). In the three first mentioned studies, subjects had to
indicate which of each pair of hypothetical work situations they
preferred. Own, comparison, and other equity and inequity were
manipulated. The results can be summarized as follows: subJects
prefer own-comparison equitable situations above others. Compar-
ison equity is preferred above own-equity. With respect to in-
equitable situations, subjects feel less comfortable in compar-
ison-inequitable situations than in own-inequitable ones. Austin
et al. (1980) studied hypothetical as well as real work situa-
tions. They hypothesized that: 1) violations of the internal
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standard as well as violations of the social comparison standard
relate to feelings of satisfaction with one's outcomes, but 2)
only the social comparison of outcomes is related to equity judg-
ments. Results obtained in the hypothetical work situations
confirm these hypotheses. These results were to a large extent
replicated in a situation where subjects were actually paid for
their task performances. In the O'Malley study (1983), subjects
had to judge the overall-fairness,   the ' comparative' fairness  and
the 'internal' fairness of a hypothetical work situation in which
the subject and the confederate were paid more than, less than,
or exactly the same as the amount promised for the Job. His
results show some interesting interactions between violations of
the internal standard (the promised amount of pay) and the com-
parison standard (equality). Comparative fairness depends rnost  on
the comparative bases used in making the judgment. The internal
fairness judgments depend mainly on the difference between the
promised and obtained pay. The overall-fairness ratings show that
both standards operate simultaneously. In the case of own-
underpayment, comparisons with others who are likewise mistreated
decrease the unfairness judgment. In the case of own-equitable
pay or own-overpay, the fairness Judgment seems to be relatively
independent of the social comparison of outcomes. Some other
studies, not designed to answer this problem directly, contribute
indirectly to this discussion. In a field study by Hills (1980)
275 employees were asked to indicate the importance of different
kinds of referents used in the evaluation of the fairness of
their pay. The results showed: 1) that people do not differen-
tiate between different kinds of referent others, which indicates
that social comparison standards are seen as one category, and 2)
that the internal standard is used for ego-defensive reasons.
People who compare their actual salary with their past salary
seem   to   avo id social comparison. The importance of social compar-
ison of outcomes (and inputs) for the explanation of inequity
feelings is indirectly demonstrated in several studies (Von
Grumbkow and Wilke, 1974b; 1978; Patchen, 1961; Oldham and
Miller, 1979; Middlemist and Peterson, 1976; Brown, 1979 and
Delafield, 1979). In the so-called 'qualification attack' studies
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of inequity (Adams, 1963; Adams and Jacobson, 1964; Adams and
Rosenbaum, 1962; Anderson and Shelly, 1970; Evans and Molinari,
1970; Friedman and Goodman, 1967; Goodman and Friedman, 1969;
Kessler and Wiener, 1972; Lawler, 1968a; Lawler, Koplin, Fadem
and Young, 1968; Wilke and Steur, 1972, and Wood and Lawler,
1970) social comparison of inputs and outcomes is implicitly, and
sometimes even explicitly, introduced by the experimenter's
message to the subjects. While inducing the inability of the
subjects to perform the task, the employer often refers to the
ability of other candidates, as e.g., in the Goodman and Friedman
experiment, where the experimenter says: " . .even though you
don' t  seem  to  have, the qualifications  of the people we generally
hire ..." (1968, p. 344, our underlining). .When the employer
discusses the salary, an implicit comparison with the on-going
payment is made.
Conclusions about  the ( relative) importance  of  the  two
equity standards are not simple. The review permits us to con-
clude that the actual social comparison of contributions to the
exchange and of outcomes rece ived, is a very important aspect in
equity judgments. On the other hand, the internal standard seems
to be important as well. Austin et al.'s study suggests that the
internal standard (expected outcomes, promises and the like) is
used in determining one's attitude toward pay, while actual
social comparison of outcomes determines the fairness evaluation.
O'Malley's study indicates that actual social comparison moder-
ates the fairness evaluation in the case of underpayment, but
that it is rather irrelevant in the evaluation of overpayment
inequity.
4.3 The Choice of Comparison Persons
In  order  to  gain more insight  into the problem of inequity,
Adams proposed to spend more effort on the study of comparison
choices. In early reviews of the inequity literature, a lack of
knowledge about comparison choices is mentioned as one of the
weak aspects in that field (Welck, 1966; Pritchard,  1969) .
The choice of social comparison persons has attracted a
68
large amount of attention in experimental social psychology. The
stream of publications directly related to this topic was
initiated by Latan&'s Monograph in the Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology (Latan6, 1966), and is thoroughly reviewed by
Gruder (1977). This research line, known as the 'locus-of-
comparison' paradigm, studies the choice behavior of persons in a
unidimensional situation. Comparison persons are ordered along
one comparison dimension. In the context of injustice, comparison
others are always situated in at least a two dimensional space:
relative inputs and relative outcomes. We will discuss the rele-
vance of studies using more than one comparison dimension for the
injustice problem, after presenting the main conclusions of the
one-dimensional locus-of-comparison research.
The locus-of-comparison studies can be divided into two
groups: 1) studies in which subjects can ask for information
about the status of others in the group, and 2) studies in which
subjects can choose a partner for a subsequent task. An example
of both types is given in the study done by Wheeler, Shaver,
Jones, Goethals, Cooper, Robinson, Gruder and Butzine (1969),
which also gives an illustration of the procedure followed in
these types of research. The study of information-seeking compar-
ison choices indicates that people seek for information about the
group members occupying extreme positions in the group (range
seeking). They seem most interested in the score of the most
positively evaluated member of the group, and, next, in the most
negatively evaluated group member. Information about less certain
positions seem to be preferred over more certain ones, indicating
that the comparison choices serve uncertainty reduction needs.
However, when the range of the scores of the comparison persons
is known, people look for information about the scores of the
adjacent group members: the next better and the next worse one,
or the persons with the next higher and the next lower score than
the chooser. Hakmiller (1966) and Samuel (1973) found comparison
choices that were interpreted as being 'defensive', that is,
people seemed to avoid information about others that could be
threatening to their self-esteem. Interpretations in terms of the
motives underlying the social comparison choice behavior of
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subJects are difficult to make since linking choices to under-
lying motives implies that the researcher ktiows how the informa-
tion about others will be used. Our own research in this field
(Syroit, Rijsman and Von Grumbkow, 1980) suggests that social
motives hardly play a role in the choice behavior of these
subJects and that this behavior is indicative of a general way of
approaching a preordered reality.
The results of the partner-choice studies are different from
the information-seeking type of locus-of-comparison research.
First, range seeking appears very rarely, and factors of a social
psychological nature, which have no influence on the information-
seeking behavior, do influence the choice of a partner (Gineste,
1973; Wilson and Benner, 1971; Wheeler et al., 1969; Miller and
suls, 1977; Wilke, Kuyper, Rouwendal and Visser, 1978; Wilke,
Kuyper and Lewis, 1980; Syroit et al., 1980). The following con-
clusions can be drawn from these studies. For a cooperative task,
people dominantly prefer others who are better than themselves;
for competitive tasks, people chose others who are less cornpetent
or others who are equally competent. The preference for next-
better otliers or for next-worse others decreases as the distance
between oneself and these others increases. Defensive choices
occur more frequently when it is announced that the task perfor-
mance will be evaluated afterwards. These choice behaviors
suggest that people try to maximize or to improve their chances
of winning against another team in the case of a cooperative
setting, or against the other person, in a competitive setting.
Partner choices have a strategic component. They are useful for
goal-attainment other than the reconstruction of reality.
The choice of comparison persons in the context of justice
has been discussed by Austin (1977). Besides the instrumentality
criterion mentioned above, Austin distinguishes two other
criteria for ordering comparison choices, namely, proximity and
similarity. Proximity partially overlaps with Lerner's classifi-
cation of types of relationship. Austin mentions the choice of
family members versus friends versus colleagues. Similarity is
difficult to define adequately since there are an infinite number
of dimensions along which people can be Judged as being similar
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or dissimilar. Kuyper (1980) has shown that the relevance of
comparison dimensions is highly contingent upon the type of
situation.
Austin's discussion about the role of social comparison in
equity research must be conceived of as an introductory statement
rather than as a review of the field. The number of studies
relating the choice of comparison persons to the problem of in-
equity or injustice is very limited. Patchen's classical study
about the choice of wage comparisons (Patchen, 1961) only permits
us to draw some global conclusions about the kind of persons that
are chosen. People compare themselves more frequently with others
who earn more than with others who earn less than themselves.
However, people dominantly choose others within their own profes-
sional category. Approximately one third of Patchen' s respondents
compare themselves with family members, and approximately 1 in 6
compare themselves with persons inside the organization. Goodman
(1974) found that insiders are more frequently chosen as compar-
ison persons by high-seniority employees than by low-seniority
employees and by persons with a low-salary more than by high-
salary personnel. Goodman's study indicates, however, that social
comparison choices are made only by 50% of the group he studied;
The other half of the group compared their actual position with
their past position or paid more attention to the procedural
aspects of the salary system. Von Grumbkow made a distinction
between the individual pay information which corresponds to
Goodman's system comparison, and social information which corre-
spond with social comparison information. (Von Grumbkow, 1980;
Von Grumbkow and Tigchelaar, 1976). In line with Goodman's
results, Von Grumbkow also found that employees prefer system
itlfonnation over comparison information about their wages. The
tendency to compare with persons having higher wages than oneself
reported by Patchen, finds confirmation in the study by Von
Grunbkow (1980). However, Von Grumbkow has found that people in
low salary-positions, as opposed to persons in high salary posi-
tions, less frequently choose someone else who has better promo-
tion opportunities or better annual evaluation scores. According
to Von Grumbkow, such choices indicate defensive behavior.
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Patchen's study is the only one that gives information about
the comparison choices in the combined input-outcome space.
Choices made by his respondents are classified into favorable and
unf avorable dissonant comparisons and consonant comparisons.
Approximately 50 percent of the employees studied by Patchen made
unfavorable dissonant comparisons,  1.e., they compared themselves
with others belonging to their professional category but wlio were
paid more than they were. The number of unfavorable dissonant
comparisons decreased with an increase of the own relative wage
position within the professional category. Employees in training
made fewer dissonant comparisons than employees who were not in
training.
Our general conclusion about the locus of comparison studies
is that the findings are of rather anecdotal nature, not leading
to conclusions about the influence of important psychological
variables on the comparison choice behavior. There are some indi-
cations that people avoid information that threatens their self-
esteem. Furthermore, the large number of unfavorable dissonant
choices in the study by Patchen suggests that a large number of
people do not construct an equitable situation so that other
motives than the justice motive must be assumed to underlie com-
parison choice behavior.
4.4 Social Comparison and the Interpersonal Injustice Model
In the presentation of the interpersonal injustice model
(see Chapter III) we already have stressed the importance of
social comparison  for  the unde rstanding of injustice perception
and injustice experience. In order  to  avo id annecessary repeti-
tions we will limit ourselves here to presenting some reflections
about the way social comparison is incorporated within the
context of injustice, and to clarifying the way we think that the
study of social comparison choices might contribute more fruit-
fully  to  the unde rstanding of injustice.
We need to make a distinction between two types of compar-
ison situations, namely, the open and closed comparison situa-
tions. By an open comparison situation, we mean a situation in
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which the person has a choice regarding with whom he will compare
himself. An example of an open situation is an industrial or
other type of organization in which employees can choose their
comparison person(s). Another example is a classroom in which
students have a choice regarding with whom they will compare
their grades. A closed comparison situation is a situation in
which, for one reason or another, a specific comparison person is
thrust upon the person. Examples outside experimental settings
can be found in such activities as sports. Two athletes running
the hundred meter dash are almost forced to compare their results
mutually. The problem of social comparison choices is only rele-
vant in open comparison situations, but what do we learn by
knowing that Person X compares himself with Person 1 in a certain
situation ? What is needed in the analysis of interpersonal in-
justice is information about the relative position of the Person
evaluating the exchange as compared with others on the self-
constructed and reflected value-in-exchange dimensions. Questions
about the choice of comparison persons have the function to
reveal this kind of information in open comparison situations. In
closed comparison situations this information is already present,
by definition. Knowledge gathered in open comparison situations
(e.g.,  in field studies) in terms of the dimensions chosen for
comparison and of relative positions persons choose for
tnemselves can be used by experimenters to adequately design
closed comparison situations in the laboratory (see e.g.,
Rijsman, 1974).
The study of social comparison choices in field settings
brings us to another important problem about the relation between
locus-of-comparison and justice. It is rather difficult, and most
of the times even impossible, to give causal interpretations with
respects to the relation between social choice and justice per-
ception in field studies. The choice of a specific comparison
person can be related to perceptions of injustice or justice in
two ways: comparison choice can be an antecedent to injustice or
can be a consequence of injustice. In the former case, it con-
tributes to the explanation of injustice perceptions, while in
the latter case it is seen as a reaction to or a justification of
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a diven unjust situation. In order to get a better understanding
of the role of comparison choice behavior in unjust or just
situations, insight is needed in the instrumentality of this
behavior for the person.
Except for a brief review of Patchen's analysis of dissonant
and consonant comparisons, we have only paid attention to the
study of social comparison choices in a unidimensional situation.
There are, however, some studies done about choice behavior in
two-dimensional situations (Van Knippenberg, Wilke and De Vries,
1980; 1981). These studies are related to the research of Lemaine
and his colleagues (Lemaine, 1966; 1974;. Lemaine and
Kastersztein, 1971) demonstrating that people compare themselves
with others on a dimension on which they take relative favorable
positions. Van Knippenberg et al.(1980, 1981) found that people
look for information about others who are better than themselves
on both dimensions, but when they are asked to choose a partner
for a task, people make compensatory clioices. They select a
partner who is much bettter on the dimension on which the persons
take relative unfavorable positions and who is equal to the
persons on the other dimension. The comparison situation used in
the Lemaine studies and in Van Knippenebrg et al. studies dif fe rs
in one very important aspect from the comparison situation
implied in indirect interpersonal exchange relations, namely in
the kind of comparison dimensions used by or presented to the
persons involved. In the research by Lemaine and by Van
Knippenberg, the dimensions are perceived to be orthogonal,  i.e.,
independent  from each other. Subjects changed  from   one  dimension
to the other or they chose partners in order to compensate for
tneir (relative) weakness on one of the two dimensions. The com-
parison ditnensions which are highly relevant in exchange situa-
tions,  i.e., the perceived and the reflected value-in-exchange
dimensions (or the input- and outcome-dimensions) are perceived
as necessarily correlated. In exchange situations people strive
toward correspondence between their relative positions on both
dimensions. Compensation is in contradiction with the very nature
of the exchange situation. The problem of justice or injustice
can never be translated into a problem of social comparison on
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two orthogonal or independent dimensions. The study of social
comparison processes in two or more dimensional situations con-
tributes to a better understanding of people's choice of .'input'-
dimensions  or of ' input-cues'  used  in the construction of their
relative value-in-exchange. One can expect that people generally
prefer to compare themselves with others on dimensions on which
they take relatively favorable positions (see e.g., Cook and
Yamagishi, 1983).
5. Injustice and Interpersonal Conflict
Most of the theories about justice describe the experience
of unjustice as an uncomfortable situation accompanied by nega-
tive emotional states such as anger and guilt. Injustice refers
to the existence of an intrapersonal, cognitive conflict. In a
recent review, Greenberg (in press) defends the position that a
proactive approach to justice is preferrable to a reactive
approach that is inherently connected with the cognitive disso-
nance thinking of the sixties. In our interpersonal injustice
analysis, we adopt a reactive motivation position but we abandon
simultaneously the cognitive consistency approach to injustice.
Injustice is defined as an interpersonal conflict between ex-
change partners and reactions to injustice aim at the solution or
reduction of this conflict. There are some studies that support
our line of thinking. In two studies done by Ross, Thibaut and
Evenbeck (1971) and by Ross and McMillen (1973), it is shown that
the experience of injustice leads to social protest against those
who are considered to be responsible for it. Schwarzwald and
Goldenberg (1979) found that subordinates show less compliance to
an inequitable supervisor than to an equitable one. Lawler (1975)
and  Lawler and Thompson  ( 1978)  have  demonstrated that subordi-
nates form revolutionary coalitions against inequitable leaders
and give more severe punishment to inequitable supervisors than
to equitable ones. In a study about consumer behavior, it was
found that clients bought less, left the shop without purchasing
more frequently, and complained rnore often in shops that had
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inequitable conditions with respect to prices and service than in
shops with equitable price and service conditions (Huppertz,
Arenson and Evans, 1978). Hinton's study (Hinton, 1972) is worth
mentioning here, not because of the data he reported, but because
of the lack of data in some of the conditions in his experiment.
Hinton induced inequity by paying some of his subjects less than
was announced iIi the advertisement, while others received the
promised amount  of pay. Three  of  his unde rpaid subjects refused
to cooperate and left the experitnent. In some other groups,
subjects intensively discussed the equity problem. In one of his
conditions, the members of one group were persuaded not to accept
payment. These five subjects subsequently came to the experimen-
ter to protest their treatment and one of them made an appeal to
others in the university paper 'to help to sabotage the project'
and that 'it is time I.U. stopped using students as Guinea pigs
fo the counter-insurgency research of U.S. corporate capitalism'
(1972, p. 447). In Leventhal and Bergman's study (1969) severely
underpaid subjects refused to accept the amount given to them.   In
a study by Von Grumbkow and Wilke (1978) subjects in extremely
unde rpaid conditions wrote abusive language   to the experimenter
on the questionnaires they had to code and/or started discussions
with the experimenter about the course of things in the experi-
mental work situation (Von Grumbkow, 1978). After the experinent
at the State University of Groningen, which is reported in Wilke
and Steur (1974) was finished, an article was written in the
University paper in which the experiment and the experimenters
were criticized by the subjects.
Although these autho rs noticed these reactions of their
subjects, they did not derive any conslusions about the nature of
inequity experience. These reactions were seen as side-effects
from ,xhich they could learn to improve their experimental proce-
dures and experimental settings in order to avoid these pre-
judicial consequences. In our opinion, these protests of unjustly
treated persons against the unjustly behaving exchange partner,
i.e., the experiinenter, reveal the very nature of injustice,
namely, the perception and experience of an interpersonal
conflict.
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As we have said previously, a distinction must be made
between direct, face-to-face reactions to the conflict and the
indirect attempts to persuade or 'attack' the unjustly behaving
exchange partner. Social protest, lack of compliance to task
assignments, complaining, and discussing the inequity with the
exchange partner are examples of direct, face-to-face handling of
the conflict. Writing stories in papers, writing abusive lan-
guage, not buying goods  in ' inequitable' shops  and  the  like  are
instances of indirect attempts to resolve the conflict. The reac-
tions in terms of 'self-image as a worker' as measured in the
Andrews and Valenzi study can also be conceived of as indirect
influence attempts by the inequitable paid subjects directed at
the employer (Andrews and Valenzi, 1970). The manner in which
people react to an experienced unjust exchange partner will
depend on a large number of factors, such as the degree of
incurred injustice, the perceived power distance between both
persons (Greenberg and Cohen, 1982; Austin and Hatfield, 1980),
the personality of the individual (Major and Deaux, 1982), and
the perception of 'common fate' with other unjustly treated
persons (Webster and Smith, 1978).
In this chapter we have conducted a review of some of the
primary controversial issues in the psychological approach to
justice and injustice. We have taken part in this discussion, and
it might be considered unfair that, most of the time, we spoke
the last word. We have tried to demonstrate that a number of
recent trends in injustice theorizing can be integrated into our
interpersonal model, and that this model provides a good case for
making choices between equally speculative but equally plausible
alternatives. In our model, the problem of injustice is upgraded
from a cognitive consistency problem to an interpersonal one. We
want to conclude this chapter by citing Austin, who says that
"Tne only consolation I can offer myself, and you, is a belief





In the second part of this work nine empirical studies which
are related to different aspects of the interpersonal injustice
model will be presented. This model is not yet a finished theory,
as we mentioned earlier. We consider it, however, to be a heuris-
tic framework. Although several hypotheses will be formulated and
tested in the different chapters, we do not pretend that the
model as a whole is tested. We prefer to consider the entire
empirical work, described in this part, as a complex illustration
of the heuristic framework developed in chapter III.
The different studies vary with respect to the methods used.
Some of them (chapters V, VI, and VII) are laboratory experi-
ments. In chapter VI, data are reported on the evaluation of
justice and injustice based on studies using hypothetical situa-
tions. The experiment reported in chapter VII, which is more like
a simulation study of an actual work situation, is complemented
with a study using a kind of focused interview. The research
described in chapter VIII consists of a field study conducted in
an industrial organization. The methods and procedures will be
described for each study separately.
Some of the empirical work has been published already. Part
of the experiment on the effect of reward comparison (chapter V)
has been published as a chapter in Rijsman and Wilke (Syroit and
Rijsman, 1980). Parts of the data presented in chapter VI have
been published as an article (Syroit and Von Grumbkow, 1977). The
experiment presented in chapter VII has been published in Gedrag
(Syroit and Sleypen, 1981).
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CHAPTER V. EFFECTS OF SOCIAL COMPARISON OF REWARDS
1. Introduction
In section 3.3 in chapter III we have stated that, in the
absence of performance feedback, relative feedback about a
person's reflected exchange-value or outcomes motivates him to
change his relative position vis-A-vis his comparison person. The
direction and tlie magnitude of this motivation to change one's
relative position, which is a function of the perceived similar-
ity or dissimilarity between oneself and the comparison other,
has been described in Chapter II (section 2.3). There are good
reasons to assume that the motivational effects of outcome-
comparisons are the same as those for performance-comparisons.
Relative outcomes inform people about their relative abilities.
Lawler (1971, p. 73) states that - at least in Western society -
financial rewards constitute generally accepted means for recog-
nizing rendered services. Cook (1975) found that people who were
rewarded more than others without being informed about their
ability for the task thought of themselves as being more able and
consequently took tne larger share of a common reward. In a study
by Harrod (1980), it was demonstrated that subjects who were paid
Tnore than others evaluated themselves as being more competent for
the task. They also were less conceding in a task-oriented
discussion trian people who were paid less than others. Relative
outcomes as well as relative performances inform people about
their relative ability for the task.
The effect of performance feedback on the motivation to
ctiange one's relative position on the evaluated ability dimension
has been demonstrated by Rijsman (1974), and by Poppe and Rijsman
(1980). Their researdi inaicates an important distinction with
respect   to the motivational ef fects of different types of feed-
back. Rijsman (1974) makes a distinction between individual and
categorical feedback. Individual feedback means that persons are
informed about their individual levels of performance. Categori-
cal feedback means that people receive information about the
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performance of the average (or modal) member of the unspecified
groups to which they belong. The curvilinear relation between the
perceived difference between the individual and his comparison-
person and the motivation to change his relative position,
depicted in Figure 6 (curve I. on page 27), holds for the indivi-
dual feedback mode. Individuals in inferior positions will be
motivated to improve their performances on a task. Individuals
who perceive themselves as similar to others will show the
greatest improvements, while individuals in superior positions
will show the least improvements or even some slight performance
decrease. In a study by Martens and White (1975), each subject
received bogus feedback about the time he and a comparison person
needed to complete a maze. The pattern of the performance scores
for the different win-loss ratios follows exactly the sinusoidal
curve z. in Figure ..6 (see page 27) predicted by social comparison
theory.
The data on the effects of categorical feedback on perfor-
mance changes in Rijsman's study (1974) show a totally different
pattern. Subjects who were told that they belonged to an inferior
category showed a slight improvement in their performances.
Subjects belonging to an equally able group did not change their
performance level, while subjects belonging to a superior
category showed a very large performance improvement. The results
in the categorical feedback conditions showed that people tend to
confirm the relative status of their category (or group) in so
far as this confirmation contributed to the maintenance or the
enhancement of their positive self-identity. Rijsman's explana-
tion of the categorical feedback effects is akin to Turner's
self-identity hypothesis in studies of intergroup comparisons
(Turner, 1975; 1978).
In our experiment, subjects are paid less than, equal to, or
more than a comparison person, either on the basis of their indi-
vidual performances on a reaction time task or on the basis of
their allegedly belonging to an inferior, an equally able, or a
superior category vis-&-vis the category to which the comparison
person belongs. The motivation to change the position relative to
the comparison-person can be expressed in different ways, as we
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have seen in the analysis of social comparison (see page 23). The
experiment is designed so as to increase the likelihood that
social comparison motivation expresses itself through perfor-
mances. Subjects are compared with an unknown other person on a
simple reaction  time  task.  No  othe rs are available for compar-
ison, and the post-test measure consists again of a reaction time
measure. Since we expected that the motivational effects of out-
come-feedback are similar to those of performance-feedback, the
following predictions were made with respect to the order of mean
changes in performance in the individual and categorical feedback
modes separately.
Hypothesis 1: (Individual feedback mode)
Superior paid < Control < Inferior paid < Equally paid
Hypothesis 2: (Categorical feedback mode)
Control < Equally paid < Inferior paid < Superior paid
The control subjects only get information about the presence of a
comparison (coactive control group).
2. Method
2.1 Subjects
Sixty-three first-year psychology and economics students at
Tilburg University were randomly assigned to each of the six
experimental conditions and the control group. They participated
voluntarily in this experiment, announced to them as a 'reaction
time examination'. They were not informed in advance that they
would be paid.
2.2 Experimental Design
The experiment consisted of seven conditions resulting in a
2 x 3 factorial design and one control group. Feedback about
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relative rewards were based either on individual performances or
on belonging to an unspecified group (individual versus categori-
cal feedback). Subjects were paid less than, as much as, or more
than an unknown comparison person performing the same task at the
same time. Control subjects were only informed about the presence
of another person performing the same task.
2.3 Procedure
Subjects were invited in pairs to the laboratory. They had
no opportunity to contact each other prior to the experiment. The
experimenter escorted each subject from the waiting room to his
sound proof booth. Prerecordered instructions about the reaction
time task were given through headphones. The pre-test of the
reaction time consisted of 50 trials. During the break following
the pre-test the reward-comparison was induced. These manipula-
tions were also prerecordered on audiotapes. After the break,
another 50 reaction times were measured (post-test). Following
this post-test measure of reaction time, only the subjects in the
experimental conditions were asked to fill out a post-
experimental questionnaire. The questionnaire was recorded on a
video-tape and was shown to the subjects on the monitors in front
of their cubicles. At the end of the experimental session
subjects were paid four guilders. They also were informed about
the true nature of the experiment and sworn to secrecy.
2.4 Induction of the Reward Comparison
During the break between the pre-test and post-test periods,
the following instructions were given to the subjects in the
individual feedback conditions:
"There are two persons participating simultaneously in this
examination. One of these persons is called person 11· The other
is called person 4. In front of you, you can see a sign, indicat-ing which person you are. We decided to pay the participants in
this research on the basis of the reaction time measures. The
payment of person P is fixed at Dfl. .04 for each trial, and the
payment of person 0 is fixed at Dfl. .04 (or .08, or .02) for
each trial."
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Subjects in the categorical feedback conditions received the
following message:
"There are two persons participating simultaneously in this
examination. These persons belong to two categories. One of you
belongs to category t; the other to category 2. In front of you,
you can see a sign indicating to which category you belong. We
decided to pay the participants in this research. Beforehand it
was decided that all persons belonging to category P will be paid
Dfl .04 for each trial, and that all the persons belonging to
category .Q will be paid Dfl .04 (or .08, or .02) for each trial."
Subjects in the control condition were told that there were
two persons participating simultaneously in the examination, a
person called P, and another called 6, and that there was a sign
in front of them, indicating who they were.
The relative amount of payment (inferior, equal, and superior)
was induced by varying the amount given to the fictitious compar-
ison-person 0. The amount of money announced to the subjects, who
were all persons _P, was held constant. Inferior paid subjects
heard that the other 2 received 8 cents for each trial; equally
paid subjects heard that the other received also 4 cents, and su-
perior paid subjects heard that 0 received 2 cents for each
trial.
2.5 Measurement of the Motivation to Change One's Position
The most important dependent measure, namely, the motivation
to change one's relative position on the comparison dimension,
has been operationalized in terms of the change in performances
on the simple reaction time task from pre-test to post-test. The
simple reaction time was measured in hundredths of a second by
means of Getra's reaction time apparatus. Warnings (red lights)
and the auditory stimuli were programmed by means of B. Zak's
Programmier Gerat, with a fixed interval of 15 seconds between
the warnings and a variable interval (.Me = 224/100 seconds)
between the warnings and the stimuli. In order to correct for the
skewness of the reaction time distributions, the reaction times
were logarithmically transformed (Woodworth and Schlossberg,
1954, p. 39; Rijsman, 1974). The pre-test and post-test consisted
of 50 trials each. In order to make our results comparable to
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those obtained by Rijsman and his colleagues, who only measured
ten reaction times both in the pre-test and post-test conditions,
two distinct difference scores were calculated. The first one,
called a total difference score, consists of the difference
between the averages of all the reaction times in the post-test
and the pre-test. The second, called a partial difference score,
consists of the difference between the average of the first ten
trials  of the post-test  and  the  ave rage  of  the  last ten trials  of
the pre-test. The partial difference score is most similar to the
differences calculated by Rijsman (1974).
2.6 The Post-Experimental Questionnaire
Subjects in the experimental conditions were presented with
a videotaped post-experimental questionnaire on their monitors.
The questions provided on bipolar seven-point scales appeared one
by one on the screen. Subjects answered by writing a number
ranging from 1 to 7 for each item on their answer-sheet. The
questions, of which the exact wording is given in Appendix A,
related to:
-   the perceived effort put into the task
-  the perceived quality of the performance of self and other
(I did better than the other - I did worse than the other)
(The other did better than I - The other did worse than I)
-   the perceived fairness of the reward given to self and other
(I got too much - I got too little)
(The other got too much - The other got too little)
(fair - unfair)




The difference scores (total) were analyzed by means of an
analysis of variance according to 8 2 x 3 factorial design and
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one control group (Winer, 1971, pp. 468-473). Since the variances
of the partial scores were not homogeneous, the data of the cate-
gorical and individual feedback conditions were analyzed sepa-
rately by means of the Jonckheere-Terpstra test for ordered
alternatives (Daniel, 1978, pp. 207-210). Conditions were tested
against each other by means of the Mann-Whitney U-test (Daniel,
1978 pp. 82-86). The questionnaire data were analyzed by means of
an analysis of variance according to a 2 x 3 factorial design
(Winer, 1971, pp. 431 ff.).
3.1 Check on the Manipulations
At the end of the experiment, subjects were informed that
100 reaction times were measured and asked how much they and
their comparison person should be paid. None of the subjects gave
a wrong answer, indicating that the rewards and the reward dif-
ferences were known to them. There were no statistically signifi-
cant differences between the mean scores of the conditions for
the question of whether the subjects evaluated their own pay as
too high or too low. However, inferior paid subjects found the
reward of the comparison other too high (M = 3.89), equally paid
subjects evaluated the other's reward as neither too high nor too
low (M = 4.22), and superior paid subjects evaluated the other's
payment too low (d = 5.50) (2(2,48) = 9.44, 2 < .01). The mean
score on this question of the superior paid subjects differs sig-
nificantly from both the equally paid (K(1,48) = 5.79, 2 < .05)
and from the mean score of the inferior paid subjects (F(1,48) -
9.07, E < .01). Contrary to our expectations, we did not find any
significant differences between relative pay conditions with res-
pe ct to the perceived quality of the performances of the subjects
and their comparison-persons.
3.2 Changes in Performance
The mean differences in reaction time between the post-test




Mean Total and Partial Differences Between Pre-test
and Post-test Reaction Times in the Six Experimental
Conditions and in the Control Group
Relative Reward Position
Feedback Mode Inferior Equal Superior Control
Total differences
Individual Feedback .027 .055 .016
.007
Categorical Feedback .027 .037 .025
Partial differences
Individual Feedback .005 .023 -.005
.001
Categorical Feedback .009 .007 .036
Note. A positive value is indicative for performance
improvement; a negative value for a decline in performance.
The analysis of variance performed on the total difference scores
shows that the difference between the control group and the




Summary of the Analysis of Variance Performed 
on the
Total Difference Scores
Source SS Df MS p    P<
Control vs. Experimental
Conditions 4460.63 1 4460.63 3.06 .10
Relative Pay (Al 6372.33 2 3186.17 2.19  n.s.
Feedback Mode (B) 133.79 1 133.79 1.
n.s.
A x B 1690.04 2 845.02 1. n.s.
Error 81572.67  56   1456.65
Test of the means of the experimental conditions against the mean
of the control group (T-test of Dunnett, in: Winer, 1971, PP.
201-204) reveals that the mean change in performance of the
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equally paid subjects in the individual feedback mode is signifi-
cantly larger than the mean performance change of the control
subjects (1(7,56) = 2.67, 2 < .05) Since the variances of the
partial difference scores turned out to be heterogeneous
(Cochran's g = .4030, C crit
(7,8)
= ·3911), we analyzed the data
of the individual feedback conditions and those of the categori-
cal feedback conditions separately by means of the Jonckheere-
Terpstra Test for Ordered Alternatives. The Jonckheere-Terpstra
Test, applied to the partial difference scores of the subjects in
the individual feedback mode and in the control condition yields
an overall-value ill of 1.58. For large samples, as it is the case
here, this value equals the value of .z. This value of e only
permits us to reject the null hypothesis at the .06 level of sig-
nificance. Although the observed pattern of mean performance
changes follows exactly the predicted pattern, the overall J*
value only reaches borderline significance. The Jonckheere-
Terpstra Test, applied to the scores in the categorical feedback
mode,  yields an overall-value J*  of 1.81 which allows  for  the  re-
jection of the null-hypothesis below the .05 level of significan-
ce      (2    =       .035).
Tests of the differences between the conditions reveal that
superior paid subjects show a larger improvement in their reac-
tion time than control subjects (11(9,9) = 63, -2 = ·025).
Tests of differences between corresponding relative pay condi-
tions in the individual and categorical feedback modes show that
the categorically superior paid conditions differs significantly
from the individually superior paid condition (U(9,9) = 1,
P <.01).
3.3 Analysis of the Post-Experimental Questionnaire Data
Analyses of the data gathered by means of the post-
experimental questionnaire yield significant results only with
respect to questions related to the fairness of the pay and the
fairness of the experimenter.
A main effect for relative pay is found in the evaluation of
the fairness of the financial reward (2(2,48) = 5.27, 2 <·01).
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Tests of the differences between the three relative pay condi-
tions show that the unequally paid subjects (superior and
inferior paid subjects) find their pay less fair than the equally
paid    subjects   (.M.inferior   =    4.11;   Mequal   =    3.06,    and Msuperior
4.67); Inferior vs. Equal, F(1,48) = 8.77, 2 <.01; Superior vs.
Equal, -2(1,48) = 20.43, 12 <.01; Superior vs. Inferior , _E(1,48) =
2.43, n.s.).
The same pattern obtains with respect to the evaluation of
the fairness of the experimenter. The analysis of this rating
yields only a main effect for relative pay (.2(2,48) = 4.56, .2
<.01). Both the inferior paid subjects (ilinferior =4.39) and the
superior paid subjects (M.su = 3.83) rate the experimenterperior
less fair than the equally paid subjects (-Mequal = 5.67)
(Inferior vs. Equal, 1(1,48) = 8.41, -2 <·01; Superior vs. Equal,
2(1,48) = 17.33, 2 <·01, and Superior vs. Inferior, f.(1,48) =
1.59 n.s.
4. Conclusions
The results of this experiment do not wholly support the
hypotheses about the relation between relative amount of pay
given to an individual and his comparison person and the individ-
ual's motivation to change his relative ability position, as
measured through changes in his actual performance.
Most support comes from the data that are best comparable to
those used in Rijsman's research on the motivational effects of
performance-comparison namely, the partial difference scores. The
partial difference scores reflect the immediate effect of the
relative pay manipulation on the motivation of the subjects. The
patterns of the mean changes in performance in the individual
feedback mode as well as in the categorical feedback mode corre-
spond exactly with the predicted patterns. The overall-tests
applied to both series of data allow for the rejection of the
null-hypotheses at the .06 and the .05 levels of significance,
respectively . Although the differences between conditions are in
the predicted directions, only the difference between the cate-
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gorically superior paid condition and the control group and the
difference between the individually equally paid condition and
the individually superior paid condition reach acceptable levels
of significance. On the basis of these results conclusions must
be drawn cautiously. Information about relative rewards given to
persons by an external evaluator seems to function in the same
way as information about relative performances. The individual
transforms information about the amount of money given to him and
to his comparison person into information about his relative
position on the task-relevant comparison dimension. Furthermore,
our results show that the basis on which the rewards are awarded,
namely, individual performances or group belongingness, has a
moderating effect on the individual's motivation. The striking
difference between the changes in performance of the two superior
paid conditions and the overall dissimilarity between the pat-
terns of means in the two feedback modes support this conclusion.
As we have stated previously, conclusions should be drawn
cautiously. The total difference scores, reflecting the long-term
motivational effects of relative reward feedback, do not corre-
spond with our predictions. The lack of agreement between the
short-term effects (partial difference scores) and the long-term
effects (total difference scores) of relative reward feedback
suggest that social comparison motivation is only a matter of an
instantaneous reflex-type reaction. No other data than these on
long-term effects are known to us.
The significant effects of relative pay position on the
fairness evaluations indicate that information about relative pay
is not solely converted into information about relative ability.
Unequal pay, although reflecting unequal abilities, is Judged as
less fair than equal pay, and the Judge awarding unequal pay is
seen as less fair than the judge awarding equal pay to the parti-
cipants. There is no marked experience of unfairness about the
pay or about the behavior of the experimenter since the mean rat-
ings hardly differ from the middle-point of the scales (which is
4). It is, however, striking that people in superior positions
make more pronounced judgments about the unfairness of the situa-
tion.
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CHAPTER VI. SOCIAL COMPARISON AND THE PERCEPTION OF INJUSTICE
1. Introduction
The relation between social comparison processes and the
perception of injustice is one of the central themes of the model
of interpersonal injustice. In this chapter, five studies related
to this topic will be reported.
In Chapter III, it has been argued that only the tendency to
compare oneself with others influences the perception and experi-
ence of injustice. The other tendencies, i.e. the tendency toward
uni formity  and the tendency toward superiority, manifest   them-
selves only when the social comparison relation between the
person evaluating the exchange (-P) and his comparison person (2)
is the dominant feature of the (indirect exchange) situation.
They are overruled by the striving toward justice (or the
striving to avoid injustice) as soon as the exchange relation
between person P and his exchange partner, J., becomes the figure,
through which simultaneously the relation between _11 and .0 becomes
the ground. We have argued further that a given disproportion-
alit  between the perceived value-in-exchange (or perceived
ability), at the one hand, and the reflected value-in-exchange
(or reflected ability), on the other, will be perceived and
experienced as more unjust the more the comparison person becomes
relevant as a standard for injustice. The relevance of the com-
parison other is expressed by the tendency to compare oneself
with the other which increases as the difference between Self and
Other on a relevant comparison dimension decreases. The relevant
comparison dimensions in an exchange situation are the perceived
and reflected value-in-exchange dimensions (input- and outcome-
dimension). The input-ratio and the outcome-ratio inform the
Person Z about his relative position on these dimensions, i.e.,
about the perceived degree of similarity between himself and the
comparison person. One can expect that a person tends to compare
himself more, the more his inputs equal those of his comparison
person. The tendency to compare is thus an essential feature of
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the exchange relation. Unfortunately this tendency has not been
taken into account yet in any study about the perception and
experience of injustice. That is, most or all of the theories of
inequity (Adams, 1965; Walster et al., 1973) and the tests of
these theories are only concerned with the effect of the degree
of correspondence between the input-ratio and the outcome-ratio
on the perception and experience of inequity. The investigator
attempts to discover how persons experience situations and how
they react to them for different degrees of correspondence
between the input-ratio and the outcome-ratio. One of the central
hypotheses under examination in such studies is that the more the
input-ratio deviates from the outcome-ratio, the more a person
will experience inequity. The degree of correspondence between
the input-ratio and the outcome-ratio can be expressed in the
fo r·m of an end-ratio, obtained by 'dividing' the outcome-ratio by
the input-ratio. This end-ratio takes the value of 1 in the case
of equity, and is smaller or greater than 1 in the case of under-
or overpayment, respectively. The basic assumption in most of the
inequity studies is that, when end-ratios have equal values, an
equal degree of inequity will be experienced. The correctness of
this assumption is questioned in the interpersonal model of in-
justice.
We state that situations with equal end-ratios will be
experienced as more just or unjust, the more the inputs of self
and other are similar. The assumptions are 1) that the tendency
to compare oneself with another person increases as the similar-
ity between one's inputs and the other's inputs increases; 2)
that an increasing tendency to compare oneself with another
person is indicative of an increasing relevance of this other
person as a justice standard. This general hypothesis and its
underlying assumptions lead to the following more specific
hypotheses which are tested in the experiments to be reported:
Hypothesis 1: The closer the input-ratio is  to 1,  the more the
tendency to compare oneself with another increases.
Hypothesis 2: A given state of injustice will be experienced as
more unjust, the more the input-ratio approaches 1.
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Hypothesis 3: A given state of justice will be experienced as
more just, the more the input-ratio approaches 1·
The first study (Experiment 1.A) examines hypothesis 1. In Experi-
ments lB and 1C, hypotheses 2 and 1 are tested by asking subjects
to rate hypothetical situations according to felt inequity or
felt discomfort, respectively. Weick and Nesset (1968) equate the
experience of equity with feeling comfortable. Van Kreveld and
Bouwhuis (1977) indicate a high, positive correlation between the
two feelings but ascribe this to characteristics of their experi-
mental design (within-subjects design). We have no f priori
reasons for expecting differences between experiences of inequity
and of comfort. Our experiments, however, enable us to examine
how and to what extent the experiences of equity and comfort
differ from one another.
The pattern of results expected on theoretical grounds, as
formulated in hypotheses J  and 1, is expressed graphically in
Figure _8· Figure _ - shows the pattern of results which can be
expected from the the standpoint of the traditional model of
inequity, taking into account the profit maximization tendency
frequently found (Adams' model). Moreover, both models include
the higher threshold for overpayment as expressed in the slightly
higher position of the overpayment curve in relation to that of
underpayment.
In the second study (Experiment 2), the experience of
comfort and discomfort is further explored. In this study,
subjects were asked to give a rank order of the hypothetical work
situations according to felt comfort or discomfort.
In the third study (Experiment 1), subjects were actually
justly paid, overpaid, or underpaid and their behavioral
reactions were observed.
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2.  Studies lA, 1B and 1C: Tendency to Compare, Perceived
Injustice, and Perceived Discomfort in Hypothetical
Situations
2.1 Method
The subjects for the three experiments were first- and
second-year psychology students at Tilburg University. They
volunteered to take part in an assessment task that lasted
approximately 25 minutes. They were rewarded with points for
experimental participation, in fulfillment of a course require-
ment. The task was carried out individually. After reading an
instruction booklet, the subject arranged the situations to be
assessed on an assessment board. During their assessment of the
situations their behavior was not monitored. When the task was
completed, the subjects were informed about the purposes of the
study.
Materials: In order to perform the task, subjects were
provided with an instruction booklet, a number of cards, and a
board with the assessment scale. The instruction booklet
contained information about a person, P, with whom the subjects
were asked to identify themselves, and a person _A· The person -P
had to assume that he was very similar to person .A. Toward this
end, the same terminology was used as in the study by Weick and
Nesset (1968). The instruction booklet also presented the task of
arranging a number of cards according to the following criteria:
the tendency to compare oneself with A (Experiment -1&), equity
(Experiment _18) and feeling comfortable (Experiment 1.C)·
Cards and assessment board were virtually identical to the
materials used by Leventhal and Whiteside (1973). The assessment
scale was drawn on a board of 100 x 80 cm and ranged from 0 to 20
(Experiment -lA) or from 0 to 100 (Experiments 1.8 and 12)· There
were 15 cards, each of which provided information about the
performances and rewards of person P and the other. The 15 cards
constituted a 3 (equity) x 5 (input-ratio) design. The five
input-ratios were as follows: P very inferior to A (Ip/Ia =
33/67), f inferior to A (Ip/Ia = 45/55), t. equal to A (Ip/Ia =
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50/50), f superior to A (Ip/Ia = 55/45) and 12 very superior to A
(Ip/Ia = 67/33). The three levels of equity were: underpayment,
with a constant end-ratio of 0.5, equity with a constant end-
ratio of 1.0 and overpayment with a constant end-ratio of 2.0.
The end-ratios were attained by adapting the outcome-ratios to
the input-ratios.
Experiment lA: Comparison Tendency (N=30 : 18 male and 12female subjects).The subjects were asked to assess 5 cards
according to the degree to which they compared themselves. withperson A. These 5 cards were either the underpaid (N=10), or thefairlypaid (N=10), or the overpaid (N=10) situations. Subjectswere asked to assess the extent to which they found it difficultto canpare themselves with A. The instructions were: "A compar-ison is difficult when you perceive your own situation as less
comparable with that of your colleague. A comparison is easy whenyou perceive your own situation as highly comparable to that ofyour  colleague. "
Experiment 13: Equity (N=28 : 18 male and 10 femalesubjects). The subjects assessed 15 cards according to the degreeto which they saw the situation as equitable or inequitable. Theinstructions were: "As you read a card, do your best to imaginehow you would feel in this situation - in terms of how far youwould experience it as equitable or inequitable. Your task is toassess these 15 work situations according to the extent to whichyou experience them as equitable or inequitable. By 'equitable'
we mean: honest, fair, just, etc."
Experiment 1C: Feeling Comfortable (N=28 : 16 male and 12female subjects).  The same 15 cards  were used here as  in the twoother experiments. The instructions were: "As you read a card, doyour best to imagine how comfortable or uncomfortable you wouldfeel in this situation. 'Comfortable' here means: relaxed, atease, pleasant, etc."
2.2 Results
Experiment -1.A (Tendency to Compare) was analyzed according
to a 3 (equity) x 5 (input-ratio) design with repeated measures
on the latter factor. In experiment _18 (Equity) and experiment 1.1
(Comfort) the under- and overpayment conditions were analyzed
separately from the equity conditions in order to reduce the
effect of heterogeneity of variances (Winer, 1971, p. 444). Both
experiments were analyzed according to a 2 x 5 design with
repeated measures on both factors. The degrees of freedom for
simple effects were calculated using the Satterthwaite approxima-
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tion (Winer, 1971, p. 545). The differences between the equity
conditions were analyzed by means of two-tailed t-tests for
correlated means (summaries of the analyses are given in Appendix
B).
Experiment lA: Comparison Tendency. The mean scores are
given in Figure -10· An inspection of Figure 1.0 (see below) and of
the 1-tests for simple effects shows that the expected pattern of
results (Hypothesis 1) is clearly obtained when a person is equi-
tably   paid,    with the exception   of    the ma rginally significant
difference between the equal (-3 = 19.7) and the superior (M =
16.1) performance conditions (2 < .10). All the'other expected
differences are significant at the .05 level at least (very
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Within the overpayment condition, the pattern is roughly
similar to the expected pattern: the difference between the equal
(_M = 12.1) and the inferior conditions (fl = 9.1) and between the
superior (M = 12.1) and very superior (M = 8.4) conditions is
significant or reaches borderline significance (P < ·10 and -2
<.05, respectively).
The results for the underpayment conditions are the least
similar to the expected pattern. Within this situation, the very
superior condition (M = 11.1) differs from the superior condition
(M = 7.6; 2 <·05) and from the equal condition (M = 8.7 ; .2 <·05).
Furthermore, subjects tended to compare themselves more with the
other person in the equitable situations than in the inequitable
situations. However, the differences are significant only within
the inferior, equal, and superior performance levels (11 < ·01).
Experiment lB: Equity. Figure -11 (on the next page) shows
the means per condition. The results of the inequitable condition
are sufficient confirmation of Hypothesis -2. The very inferior (M
= 33.39) and very superior conditions (21= 32.64), which did not
differ from one another, were experienced as significantly less
inequitable than the inferior and superior conditions (_M = 15.91
and   = 16.71, respectively) which were also virtually identical.
The differences between the inferior and superior conditions, on
the one hand, and the equal condition, on the other (-M = 11.59),
both show a trend in the expected direction (11 < ·10).
The equitable condition also follows the expected pattern
(Hypothesis 1). All the differences here are significant (2<·01),
with a single exception. Only the equal (11 = 99.04) and the
superior (M = 85.18) performance conditions fail to differ from
one another. The results largely confirm hypothesis 3.
Moreover, it appeared that the overpayment situations (-M =
23·01) were experienced as less inequitable than the underpayment
situations (M = 21.08; p <.05), which indicates that the thresh-- -
old for overpayment is higher than that for underpayment.
Experiment 1C: Feeling Comfortable. The mean scores of the
comfort ratings are shown in Figure 12  (on the next  page).
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Within the inequitable conditions, the very superior condition (M
= 44.89) is experienced as less uncomfortable than all the other
conditions (2 <·01) and there is also a significant difference
between the superior and the inferior conditions (M = 36.66 and M
-         -
= 28.41, respectively; 2 < ·01). These results provide no support
for hypothesis 1. On the other hand, the pattern of results for
the equitable situations does provide support for hypothesis i.
The very inferior condition (M = 63.21) is experienced as less
comfortable than the inferior condition (fl = 76.04) and the very
superior condition (3 = 78.79) as less comfortable than the
superior condition (M = 84.86) (both differences are significant
at_2 <·01). The inferior and superior condition differ (almost)
significantly from the equal condition (.3.= 90.54)(2 <.01 and
p <.08, respectively).
Equity vs. Comfort. The differences between equity and
comfort ratings were tested with the aid of two-tailed 1-tests.
As can be seen by comparing Figures 11 and 12, practically all
the mean equity scores occupy more extreme positions on the scale
than the mean comfort scores. There are significant differences
(2  <·05)  between the corresponding  unde r- and overpayment condi-
tions, with the exception of the very inferior conditions. The
equity and comfort ratirig for the five equitable situations
differ significantly only at the very iriferior, inferior, and
equal performance levels (all at 2 <.05).
Interpersonal Model versus Adams' Model. On the basis of the
two theoretical models (see Figures 8 and 9 on page 93) the
expected rank orders were drawn up for the 15 hypothetical situa-
tions. Our equity results (Experiment _18) correlate .96
(Spear'man-rank correlation) with the interpersonal model ranking
and .70 with Adams' model. The comfort ratings (Experiment 12)
correlate .76 with the interpersonal model and .92 with the
Adams' model (all rhos are significant at the .01 level). The
equity ratings, therefore, are more in line with our inter-
personal model than with Adams' model of inequity. The reverse is
true of the comfort scores.
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3. Study 2: A Further Analysis of the Experience of Comfort
3.1 Introduction
The experience of inequity is not the same as the experierice
of discomfort. The results of Experiments l B and 1C show some
differences between the two ratings which were intended to be
different operationalizations of the experience of injustice.
Feelings of discomfort in inequitable situations are independent
of the tendency to compare with others. People experience less
discomfort in situations where they contribute less and earn less
than others. Our findings suggest that own-gain maximization
considerations play a more important role in the evalations of
comfort and discomfort than in equity evaluations. Furthermore,
we found that the overall variance of the comfort ra'ting is
significantly larger than the variance of the equity rating
(2(279,279) = 1.31, 2 <·05), suggesting that people do agree less
about the experience of comfort and discomfort in these situa-
tions than about the experience of equity and inequity. Finally,
we have seen that the equity and inequity ratings occupy more
extreme positions on the rating scale than the comfort and dis-
comfort ratings. These findings might indicate that important
individual differences exist in the evaluations of comfort and
discomfort in exchange situations. We hypothesize that these
differences originate from differences with respect to the use of
available information in the situation and from differences with
respect to the way this information is combined by the subjects.
The purpose of this study is to explore whether these indi-
vidual differences indeed exist, and to explore the way individ-
uals combine the available information. Toward this end, subjects
were asked to rank the fifteen hypothetical work situations used
in experiments 1.1, 111, and 12, according to the amount of comfort
experienced. The subjects were then classified according to
similarities in their rankings by means of a cluster analysis
(Everitt, 1974; Wishart, 1978). Besides a clinical inspection of
the mean rankings of each cluster a conjoint measurement analysis
was performed on the mean rankings in order to gain insight in
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the type of combination rule applied by the different clusters.
As described before, the fifteen situations formed a 3 (equity)
by 5 (relative inputs) factorial design. Two major types of
combination rules can be distinguished: the additive rule and the
multiplicative rule. We will describe briefly the conjoint
measurement analysis, and indicate which criteria are used for
determining the type of combination rule. A 3 X 3 design,
represented in Figure 11, serves as an example for our descrip-
tion. The symbols used are those given in Figure 13.
FACTOR B
bj     bl    bm




k Zkj Zkl    Zkm0
R
A  an Znj Znl znm-
Figure 13. Symbols Used in the Description of the
Conjoint Measurement Analysis
The purpose of a conjoint measurement analysis is the simultane-
ous construction of measurement scales for the dependent as well
as for the independent variables. Only the ordinal aspects of the
data are required to be compatible with the proposed composition
rule, thus implying less far reaching assumptions about the level
of measurement. In an additive model, the cell values (as e.g.,
Zij) are the result of the additive composition of their
corresponding row- and column values, thus:
Zij = ai + bj
so that: if ZiJ < Zkl
then ai + bj< ak + bl
An additive model is found if the data fulfill two conditions,
namely, the independence and the double cancellation criteria.
The independence criterion is met, if:
Zij < Zil < Zim
then: Zkj < Zkl < Zkm
and: Znj < Znl < Znm
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The double cancellation criterion is met, if:
Zkm < Z and Z < Zkjil nl
then: Znm < Zij
In a multiplicative model the cell values, as e.g., Zij, are the
result of the multiplicative composition of their corresponding
row- and column values, thus:
Zij = ai · bj
so that: if Zij < Zkl
then: aibj < akbl
The above mentioned axioms are only valid when the composition
rules are restricted to postively valued scales. A multiplicative
model is found when the double cancellation axiom holds for all
the homogeneous pairs in the data matrix and when the data comply
with the sign dependency axiom. If some treatment combinations
have a positive effect and others have a negative effect, the
independence axiom is violated. The sign dependency axiom is
satisfied if a variable, e.g., f, can be partitioned into a posi-
tive and a negative (and a neutral) set, such that the positive
set induces an opposite order of the negative set:
Suppose that, bj is the positive set, bl the negative one, and bm
the neutral set,
if: Zij < Zkj < Znj and Zim = Zkm = Znm
then: Zil > Zkl > Znl
(Coombs, Dawes,   and  Tve rsky, 1970; Krantz and Tversky,   1971).
3.2 Different Hypothetical Rank Orders
Although the examination of individual differences with
respect to the way people combine the available information for
judging exchange situations according to felt comfort or dis-
comfort is an exploratory study, we have tried to describe
beforehand some theoretically relevant models from a conjoint
measurement analysis perspective. The symbols used are those
given in Figure -14 representing the 15 hypothetical work situa-
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tions arranged in terms of a 3 X 5 factorial design.
a) Adams' model of inequity: The experienced discomfort  in  a
situation is a function of the perceived disssimilarity between
the outcome-input ratio of the person and the outcome-input ratio
of the comparison other. The threshold for overpayment is higher
than the threshold for underpayment. The predicted order of the
15 situations can be reproduced by means of an additive model
wherein the row- and column parameters have the following order:
al = 82 = a3 = a4 = a5
b2 < b3 < bl
Under- Equit- Over-
paid abl paid
bl     b2     b3
Very al    Zll    Z12    213
Inferior
Inferior a2 %21    Z22    023
Equal  83    Z31    232    Z33
84    Z41    Z42    Z43
Superior
Very     as    Z 51    Z 52    Z 53
Superior
Figure 14. Experimental Design: Symbols Used in the
Conjoint Measurement Analysis
b) The Interpersonal Model of Injustice: This model, already
summarized in Hypotheses -2 and 1 (see page 91), can be reproduced
by means of a multiplicative combination of the row and column
parameters whereby: al =a 5>a 2=a 4>a 3 and b  <b  <b2    3    1'
c) Own-gain maximization: According to the own-gain maximization
hypothesis, experienced comfort is only a function of the amount
of outcomes received by the person evaluating the situation. The
hypothetical ranking of the situations can be reproduced by means
of an additive model which holds that:
al > a2 > a3 > a4 > a5  and  b  > b2 > b3
d) Equality: Equality is one of the major justice principles
(Deutsch, 1975; Sampson, 1975). The rank order of the fifteen
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situations according to the degree of equality between the out-
comes given to the person and his comparison other cannot be
reproduced by means of an additive nor a multiplicative model.
These theoretical models will be used as guides in our
explanatory examination of the mean rankings given by the di f fe r-
ent subgroups classified by means of the cluster analysis (Ward's
Error Sum of Squares method, Ward, 1963. In: Clustan II, Wishart,
1978).
3.3 Method
Subjects were 72 second-year psychology students at Tilburg
Unive rsity who participated voluntarily  in this study (19 women
and 53 men). They were rewarded with points for experimental
participation in fulfillment of a course requirement.
The materials used in this study are the same as those used
in experiments 1.A, 18, and 1 C.
Task: The subjects were asked to make a complete rank order
of the 15 situations according to their experienced levels of
comfort or discomfort. In order to standardize the ranking proce-
dure and to render the task easier, the students were asked to
sort the 15 cards into three groups: a comfortable one, an un-
comfortable one, and an intermediate group. Then they were asked
to rank the cards within each group. No ties were allowed. The
subjects reco rded their orders on an answer sheet. The most com-
fortable situation was given rank number 1; the least comfortable
situation was given rank number 11 (disutilities).
3.4 Results and Comments
3.4.1 Classification of the subjects
Figure 15 illustrates the classification dendogram obtained
by Ward's method, fusing from 20 clusters to one. The length of
the vertical lines indicate the range of fusions over which the
cluster was stable. The two-, four-, five-, six- and seven-group


















28         fl  [-1o· 1 IA,l,An








----3                    /              /                                          / -
-                     i                                                                      :                             0 --<.----t
.:.i..,
-        1-0 / '.''.---- I ..   .      K- -'
..
I   .i«
.
- I*
VI    I E S VS VII E S VS VI   I E S  VS
PART A PART B PART C
CLUSTER i CLUSTER II CLUSTER III
+-
I.-C-             I-   i  /,-  \\              ;                 /                      r-1\     \\//     /1,/'-- r-...\ 1/                     \1    1.    ..           I.. -2->L J -/1-
,
VII E S VS VI IE S VS VI   I E S  VS
PART D PART E PART F
CLUSTER IV CLUSTER V CLUSTER VI
FIGURE 16, MEAN RANK NUMBERS OF THE 15 HYPOTHETICAL WORK SITUATIONS
(Mi :VERY INFERIOR;1:TNFERIOR,E :EQUAL ;S :SUPERIOR;
MS :VERY SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE OF P
:EQUITABLY PAID;----- :UNDERPAID;-- -:OVERPAID)
105
For the sake of exploration, the six-group level was inspected.
The mean ranks of each cluster are plotted in the parts a to I in
Figure -16· (The cluster analysis is presented in more detail in
Appendix C).
3.4.2 Conjoint Measurement Analysis
The mean rank numbers of each cluster were tested against
the three criteria: the independence criterion, the double
cancellation criterion, and the sign dependence criterion. The
results of these tests are summarized in Table -1 (colums 4, 5,
and 6). In Table 1 (colums 7 and 9) the ordinal relations between
the different relative input levels (aj) and between the three
equity levels (bk) are given.
Table 3
Summary of the Conjoint feasurement Analysis on the Mean Ranks of the Six Clusters
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Clusters N g Indep. D.C. S.D. Relative Input Level Mcdel Equity Level
I         12     16.7     N       - Y al>al=/4>83=a5 X b33>bl>b2
II         6      8.3 Y Y- al> 82> al> 84 > as
+ b3>b2>bl
III 11 15.3 N-Y as=al>a4>a2=a3 X        bj >bl> t2
IV        20     27.8     N       - Y 85 =al>a4 > a2 >a)
X b3>bl>b2
V         10      13.9 N 7        al = a2 > a4 > as > a3 ?        bl> t3> b2
VI         13     18.0 Y Y- a3 -a4>/2 =as> /1 + bl,>bl>b2
Note. Indep.: Independency Axiom; D.C.: Double Cancellation Axiom; S.D.: SignDependency Axiom.
The symbols ai and b refer to those used in Figure 14.
These scale values for the two independent variables were calcu-
lated by means of the conjoint measurement program 'MULTI' devel-
oped by M. Croon of the Mathematical Psychology Department at
Tilburg University. Column 8 in Table 1 contains the signs '+'
and 'X' which stand for an additive and a multiplicative model,
respectively. The calculated values for the two independent
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variables of each cluster are given in Appendix C.
By applying the conjoint measurement analysis on the cluster
means, it became clear that our subjects did not behave in accor-
dance with pure mathematical models. None of the data sets, with
the exception of Cluster II, complied fully with the criteria.
Hence, the indications 'Y' for 'yes' and 'N' for 'no' in Table 1
must be interpreted as 'to a very large extent complying with the
criterion' and 'to a very small extent complying with the crite-
rion', respectively. The indication '+' for an additive model
means that the subjects in that cluster behave more in accordance
with an additive than with a multiplicative model. The 'X'-sign
means 'more in accordance with a multiplicative than with an
additive combination  rule'.  We will now examine the results of
each cluster more closely.
Cluster I. The rank order of the means of this cluster bears some
resemblance to the interpersonal model of injustice. The conjoint
measurement analysis reveals that the mean preferences of the
subjects belonging to this group are predicted better by a multi-
plicative than by an additive model. The order of the relative
input parameters (ai) parallel to a large extent the predicted
order of the parameters of the interpersonal model. Only the
position of the parameter a5 (very superior inputs) is deviant.
Subjects belonging to this cluster do not make a large difference
between the overpaid and underpaid situations.
Cluster II. The subjects belonging to Cluster II behave complete-
ly according to an own-gain maximization strategy. The rank order
of the cluster means can be reproduced by an additive combination
of the row and column parameters, the order of which parallels
completely the predicted order according to the own-gain maxi-
mization model.
Cluster III. The eleven subjects in this cluster behave - on the
average - in a rather atypical way. The relative input level has
no effect on the comfort preferences in the overpaid condition.
The opposite effect of relative inputs on the preferences for
underpayment situations and equitably paid situations indicates
that a multiplicative model is better than an additive one. The
most atypical aspect of these data is the reversal in preferences
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for the two inequitable paid conditions: subjects feel more com-
fortable   in unde rpaid   than in overpaid situations.
Cluster IV. The mean ranks of this cluster are in line with the
order predicted by the interpersonal model. The only discrepancy
between the parameters (ai and bj) of Cluster IV and those
predicted by the interpersonal model indicates that these
subjects prefer superior input situations to inferior input
situations if paid equitably, and vice versa if paid inequitably
Ca4 > a2 in stead of a# = a2)·
Cluster V. The order of the mean comfort ratings of this cluster
resemble the order predicted by Adams' model. The differential
effect of the relative input variable on the preferences for
equitably paid as opposed to the overpaid situations, however, is
not in accordance with the Adams' model. The conjoint measurement
analysis is not conclusive with respect to the type of composi-
tion rule used by the subjects in this cluster.
Cluster VI. The conjoint measurement analysis performed on the
order of means of Cluster VI indicate that these data are best
reconstructed by an additive model. The order of the parameters
parallel the order predicted by the interpersonal model. These
subjects feel more comfortable in equitable paid than in overpaid
and than in underpaid situations, and they prefer the superior
input situations to the inferior input situations.
People differ in the way they judge the experienced comfort
in exchange situations. There are, however, similarities too. All
subjects, except those of Cluster II, feel more comfortable in
equitably paid than in inequitably paid situations. In general,
subjects do not make large differences between the two inequita-
bly paid conditions. The differences between the clusters are
largely attributable to differences in the way people combine the
available information. Subjects in Clusters II and VI behave
according to an additive model. Clusters I, III, and IV behave
more according to a multiplicative model.
This study is introduced as an exploratory examination of
individual differences with respect to comfort ratings of hypoth-
etical work situations. It illustrates the usefulness of distin-
guishing theoretical models as guides in this exploration.
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Theoretical models, in which not only the proportionality of
inputs and outcomes (1.e. the equity variable) are used as
predictors for experienced comfort, seem more adequate for
explaining comfort feelings than the simple, unidimensional
model.
Second, this study illustrates the usefulness of scaling
methods such as the conjoint measurement analysis for the explo-
ration of the justice concept. These methods are extremely
adequate for the analysis of ordinal data. Our observations of
the students carrying out the ranking task has convinced us that
ordinal meas urement is closer   to  the way people think about  in-
justice problems - and perhaps psychological phenomena in general
- than are evaluations based on higher levels of measurement
(e.g., interval or ratio).
4. Study 3: Social Comparison, Perception of Injustice, and
Motivational Effects of Injustice: A Laboratory Experiment
4.1 Introduction
In this study we return to the main topic of this chapter,
the effect of the comparison tendency on the experience of
justice and injustice. Hypotheses .2. and -1 (stated on page 90)
have been examined in studies using hypothetical situations. The
same hypotheses will be tested now in a laboratory experiment
where the participants receive relative performance feedback and
are underpaid, overpaid, or equitably paid in comparison with
another participant. The initial question about the effect of the
tendency to compare on the perception and experience of injustice
has been complemented with the question about the motivational
effects of injustice experience. The interpersonal model of in-
justice borrows Adams' assumption that the motivation to reduce
or to eliminate injustice is a direct function of the 1njustice
experienced. In a large number of studies, the motivation to
reduce injustice (or inequity) has been derived from the effort
exerted by people to bring their contributions to the exchange in
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line with their (relative) outcomes. (see reviews by Weick, 1966;
Lawler, 1968; Pritchard, 1969; Goodman and Friedman,  1971 ; Von
Grumbkow and Wilke, 1974). Before pursuing the motivational
effects of injustice, as measured through changes in perfor-
mances, it is useful to compare our study with these other equity
experiments.
In the equity experiments, a distinction is made between
piece-rate studies and hourly pay studies (see e.g., Goodman and
Friedman, 1968 and 1969). The actual reduction of injustice takes
different forms in the two types of pay situations. In hourly pay
conditions,   it is predicted and often found  that ove rpaid workers
produce more and underpaid workers produce less than equitably
paid workers. In piece-rate conditions, however, overpaid workers
produce fewer pieces, while underpaid employees produce more
pieces than justly paid employees, but overpayment leads to
higher quality production and underpayment leads to lower quality
work. It is difficult to interpret these findings unequivocally
in  te rms   of the effects of injustice on the motivation of
workers. Some researchers (e.g., Lawler and O'Gara (1967))
consider the behavior of piece-rate, underpaid workers as an
attempt to reach an equitable hourly wage. Von Grumbkow and Wilke
(1978) focus mainly on the qualitative aspects of the output,
adopting the position that the decrease in quality under piece-
rate, underpayment conditions is an expression of a decrease in
effort, and, hence, an expression of a decrease in contributions
to the exchange. Their interpretation is attractive because it
reconciles in a plausible way the apparent contradictory results
in the hourly pay and piece-rate situations: underpayment results
in demotivation and overpayment leads to an increase in motiva-
tion independent of the pay-system. The task performance of the
participants in our experiment is considered as the operational-
ization of their motivation. We expect that underpaid subjects
will show a decrease in motivation and, thus, in their task
performance, and that overpaid subjects will show an increase in
motivation and, thus, an improvement in their task performance,
as compared with justly paid subjects. Specifically, Hypothesis
J, is that the more people feel overpaid (underpaid), the more
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they will show an increase (a decrease) in their task perfor-
mance. Hence, we expect a larger increas'e (decrease) in condi-
tions where the participants have similar performances than in
conditions where the participants have dissimilar performances
(Hypothesis 5). Changes in performances, as indications of
motivational changes, are only one of the possible ways in which
the effects of injustices can manifest themselves. Weick (1964;
1966) suggests that underpaid persons will look for intrinsically
motivating aspects of the task in order to justify their task
performance  (task enhancement hypothesis).  In a post-experimental
questionnaire, we measured the participants' perception of the
task and  the  task-environment ( interest  in  the task, importance
of the task and of the experiment, their preparedness to take




One hundred students of a high school in Turnhout (Belgium)
participated voluntarily in this ex perirnent, which was announced
as a reaction time experiment. They we re informed about being
paid prior to the examination. These subjects were randomly











Performance 1:2 1:1 2:1
I :I =1:1P  0
Superior
Performance 1:1 2:1 4:1
Ip:Io=2:1
Figure 17. Experimental Design of Study 3.
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4.2.2 Experimental Design
The 9 experimental conditions form a 3X3 design. The inde-
pendent variables are: relative performance and (in)justice (see
Figure 17). The cell entries indicate the outcome ratio which, in
combination with the relative performance level, yields the (in)-
justice ratio.
4.2.3. Procedure.
The subjects participated in pairs. The subjects within each
pair belonged to different classes and were escorted separately
to the experimental room, so that they did not know who their
partners were. Two cubicles were installed in the experimental
room (the school's waiting-room) . Instructions were given through
headphones. The performance- and (in)equity feedback was given on
a blackboard in front of the cubicles.
The subjects received instructions for the simple reaction
time task, previously recorded on audio-tape. After the measure-
ment of 30 reaction times (pre-test), the induction of the inde-
pendent variables took place. The subjects received the following
message, recorded on audlo-tape too:
"We'll have a break now. Don't remove the reaction time
apparatus, so that we can continue later on in the same way as we
started the reaction time measurement. I will give you some more
information about the examination. There are two students partic-
ipating simultaneously in tki is examination. To make it easy for
ourselves, we have called one student, 'P' and the other '0'. In
front of you, you see a sign indicating which student you are.
Each of you has the same task: you have both the same apparatus,
and you receive both the light signal at exactly the same moment.
This enables us to see which one of both of you is the fastest on
each trial, that is, which of you has the best reaction time on
each trial. I have noted this here, and I will show you now the
results". (The experimenter went to the blackboard and wrote:
Student P Student 0
Number of times
the fastest               X                 Y
Then the experimenter (on tape) continued as follows:
"There is still another topic that I have to arrange with you
now. When you were asked to participate in this examaination, you
were promised to be paid for it. At that time, however, it was
impossible to tell you how much you would receive, because we do
not pay a fixed amount of money. The compensation is not given
for your participation as such, but will be based on your results
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in the reaction time task. I will now calculate how much each of
you will be paid at the end of the examination (Pause). O.K.!
I'll write it down on the blackboard".
The experimenter went to the blackboard and wrote under the per-
formances   of the students the number   of   Bel gian Francs (adding  up
to 100 BFr) apparently earned by them in the pretest period. At
the end, the task instructions were briefly repeated. After
another 30 reaction time measures (post-test), the students had
to fill out the post-experimental questionnaire. They were
informed about the purpose of the study and were given some
information which they were allowed to tell other students upon
their request. On leaving the room, the students were given 100
BFr which they could divide as they wished.
4.2.4 The Independent Variables
The relative performance feedback and the degree of inequity
were induced by means of an oral and written message about the
participants' performances and earnings.
Pe r fo rmance levels: In the inferior performance condition,
the subjects were told that they were the fastest of the two in
10 out of the 30 trials and that the other student was the
fastest in 20 out of the 30 trials. In the equal performance
condition and the superior performance condition these numbers
were 15 - 15 and 20 - 10, respectively.
Inequity: The inequity variable had three levels: under-
payment, equitable payment,   and ove rpayment, with outcome - input
ratios equal to 1/2, 1/1 and 2/1 respectively. These ratios were
obtained by adapting the outcomes of P and 0 to the respective- -
relative performance levels, as shown in the experimental design
on page 110.
SubJects in the control condition were informed only about
the presence of another student (coactive control condition).
4.2.5 Dependent Variables.
The main dependent variable in this study consisted of the
change in reaction time from pre-test to post-test, which was
considered as a valid operationalization of the change in the
subject's motivation. The simple reaction times and the differ-
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ence scores were measured and calculated in the same way as in
the experiment on the effects of reward comparison (see Chapter
V, on page 82-83). There were, however, a few differences. The
pre-test and the post-test measure consisted of 30 trials each.
The signal was a red light, and the warning consisted of the
message, 'Ready?' . Again two difference scores were calculated,
in the same way as in the first experiment (Chapter V) : a total
and a partial difference score.
Post-experimental Questionnaire. In a short questionnaire, filled
out at the end of each session, the following variables were
measured on 7-point scales:
Perceived Fairness of Pay:
I  find   the   rewa rd allocation dishonest:   (1) - honest  (7).
- The payment I receive is, compared to that of my partner: too
low (1) - too high (7).
Task Perception:
- The reaction time task is boring: (1) - interesting (7).
- This examination is: unimportant (1) - important (7).
Preparedness to Participate:
-  Are you still prepared to participate in this kind of examina-
tion ?: never again (1) - as often as possible (7).
- Would you recommend or discourage your friends to participate
in thls examination? : discourage (1) - recommend (7).
Embarassment About Own Task Performance:
- Would you allow us to inform others about your exact reaction
time?: I would certainly not allow this (1) - I insist that
you do it (7).
Curiosity About the Task Performance of the Other Student:
- To what extent do you want to know the other's exact reaction




-  How did you feel when the experimenter told you how much you
and the other student deserved?: not at ease (1) - at ease(7).
4.3. Results
The data were analyzed by means of an analysis of variance
according to a 3 x 3 factorial design and one control group. The
questionnaire  data were analy zed according  to a 3 x 3 factorial
design.
4.3.1. Perception of Fairness.
The analysis of variance performed on the perceived fairness
of the reward allocation (summarized in Table 4) reveals a
significant main effect for relative performance level. Tests of
the differences between the three means show that subjects in the
inferior performance condition (21 = 5.90) find the allocation
significantly more fair than subjects in het superior performance
condition (M - 4.12) (F (1,80) = 7.44, -2 <.01). The mean fairness
rating of the equal performance condition (M = 5.07) does not
differ significantly from the two other mean fairness ratings.
Table 4
Summary of the Analysis of Variance on the Fairness
of the Reward Allocation Ratings (3 x 3 design)
Source SS Df  MS F P<
Injustice (A) 13.04 2 6.52 2.03  n.s
Relative Performance (B) 47.29 2 23.64 7.36 .01
A x B 10.13 4 2.53 .79  n.s.
Error 257.02 80 3.21
4.3.2. The Perceived Rightness of the Rewards
The analysis of the perceived rightness of the rewards allo-
cated to the subjects shows a significant main effect for (in)-
justice (see Table 5). Tests for differences between the mean
ratings reveal that all the differences are significant. Under-
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paid subjects (3 = 3.47) rate their pay as 'low'. Equitably paid
subjects  (M  =  4.20) find their pay 'sufficient',   and ove rpaid
subjects (M = 5.20) find their pay 'high' (Underpaid vs.
Equitably  Paid,  72  (1,77)  =  2.99,  12  <·06;   Underpaid ..vs. Overpaid,
1 (1,77) = 16.74, 11 < ·01, and Equitably Paid vs. Overpaid,
F (1,77) = 5.58, 2 < .01).
Table 5
Summary of the 8nalysis of Variance on the
Perceived Rightness of the Rewards
Source SS Df  MS     F     p<
Injustice (A) 42.79 2 21.40 16.03 .01
Relative Performance (B) 4.84 2 2.42 1.81  n.s.
A x B 8.50 4 2.12 1.59  n.s.
Error 102.78 77 1.33a)
a)Three subjects did not fill out this question.
The analysis of the perceived rightness of the rewards
indicate that our manipulation of (in)justice worked. However,
according to hypotheses -2 and -3, we would expect that subjects in
the inferior and superior performance conditions would perceive
their pay as less dishonest and less unjust if paid inequitably
than subjects in the equal performance condition and as more
honest and more fair if paid equitably. The injustice X relative
performance interaction, however, was not significant. Although
these data lack significance, it is worthwhile to look at the
pattern of mean rightness ratings of the 9 conditions. This
pattern (given  in  Table 6) follows exactly the predicted   one.
Furthe rmore, one should expect that inequitably  paid
subjects would feel less at ease than equitably paid ones. The
analysis of the easiness ratings did not yield any significant
results. The subjects did not experience discomfort or comfort
(overall M = 4.86).
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Table 6






Performance 3.4 3.8 4.7
Equal
Performance 3.1 4.6 5.9
Superior
Performance 3.9 4.2 5.0
4.3.3. Motivational Effects
The analysis of variance performed on the total and on the
partial differences between the pre-test and post-test reaction
time measures are summarized in Table 7.
Table 7
Summaries of the Analyses of Variance on the Total and
Partial Reaction Time Differences (3x3 + 1 design)
Total Partial
Scores Scores
Source Df Msa)   F      p<    MSa) F P<
Control vs. All Other 1 .26 1. n.s. .23 1. n.s.
Injustice (A) 2 1.28 2.12 n.s. 1.97 1.92  n.s.
Relative Performance (B) 2 .23 1. n.s. .93 1. n.s.
A x B 4    .09 1. n.s. .21 1. n.s.
Error 90 .60 1.03
a) x 10
Hypotheses .4 and 1 about the motivational effects of unjust
payment are not supported by our data.
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4.3.4. Perception of the Task and Preparedness for Further
Participation. Curiosity about Other's Performance and
Embarassment
The subjects in our experiment rated the task as interesting
(overall -M = 5.86) ; they found the experiment important (M =
5.54); they were prepared to participate in further examinations
(M = 6.03); and they would highly recommend participation to
their fellow-students (M = 6.22) . Furthermore, our subjects are
(on the average) curious about the reaction times of their fellow
students (-M = 5.32) and wanted thelr reaction times to be made
known to their partners (M = 5.28). None of the analyses perform-
ed on these ratings yielded significant results..
These subjects seemed to have a very positive attitude
toward the experiment. Neither their relative performance nor the
unjust payment seemed to have any effect.
4.4.  Comments
The results of this experiment do not support our hypoth-
eses. The finding that underpaid subjects rated their pay as low,
equitably paid ones as sufficient, and overpaid subjects as high
indicates that the manipulation did work. However, the ratings of
the fairness of the reward allocation showed only a main ef fe ct
for relative performance level. Subjects with superior perfor-
mances rated   the  rewa rd allocation  less  fair than subjects  with
inferior performances.
The questionnaire data indicated that the subjects had a
positive attitude toward the experiment. The predicted motiva-
tional effects of injustice in combination with relative perfor-
mance are completely lacking. This lack of significant effects
required a critical inspection of the experiment and of the situ-
ation in whicli the experiment was run. The technical aspects of
this study (design and execution of the experiment) could not be
held responsible for the lack of significant results. Therefore,
we tried to examine critically the situation in which the experi-
ment took place and to analyze what it meant to the students of
this school to participate in this type of experiment. As far as
we knew, this was the very first experiment in which these stu-
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dents participated. For them, it must have been a totally new ex-
perience. In our conversations with the students, it became clear
that they were highly interested in the reaction time task and
that they were highly motivated to perform to the maximum of
their abilities. It was the first time, too, that they were paid
for doing things during school hours, and for some of them it
might have been the first 'salary' earned. Furthermore, the ex-
periment itself was a very notable event in the school. The stu-
dents had to leave the courses and returned to the class one hour
later. The fact that the experiment was run by members of a Dutch
University in a Belgian school (in the borderland) only accentu-
ated the markedness of this event. All this leads to the concl-
usion that - at least for the time the experiment ran - this
study was the most important subject for conversation among the
students. They were allowed to tell others that their reaction
time was measured and that they were paid for participating. They
were not allowed to inform others about the amount of money that
was promised or about the way the money was allocated. Hence, we
assume that over time 'something' changed in our population which
might have affected the results of our experiment. We can only
guess now about the kind of change that took place. It is reason-
able to believe that subjects who participated during the second
week of the examination - in contrast with those participating in
the first week - had built up some expectancies about the pay-
participation relation. The kind of information that participants
were  allowed  to  give,  and  the  fact  that  at  the  end  of  each
session the students distributed their earnings equally make us
assume that the future participants expected to receive an equal
amount of money. We hypotheslzed that conducting this experiment
in this situation altered the social context in which the experi-
ment took place, and as a consequence, altered the meaning of the
manipulations.
Since the experiment was conducted in a two-week period, and
all the conditions were evenly filled up over time, we were able
to perfor'm some post-hoc analyses on the data gathered during the
second week, in order to explore the effects of this changed
climate.
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4.5 Post-Hoc Analyses on the Second Half of the Subject Group.
4.5.1 Perception of Fairness of the Allocation and the Rewards.
The ratings of the fairness of the reward allocation shows a
significant main ef feet for relative.performance level (F (2,36)= 4.76, p <·05)· Subjects in the inferior performance condition
(M = 5.93) found the reward allocation fairer than the subjects
in the superior performance condition (M = 3.80) (F (1,36) -
4.75, 2 <.05). The differences between tliese two conditions and
the equal performance condition (11 = 4.80) were not significant.
Underpaid subjects found their pay rather low (-M = 3.87);
equitably paid and overpaid subjects found their pay sufficiently
high (respective means, .El = 4.58 and M = 4.87) (Overall F (2,34)
= 5.99, 12 <·01). Only the difference between the overpaid and
underpaid conditions is significant (F (1,34) = 6.33, -2 <.01).
The experienced comfort ratings show a significant (in)-
justice x relative performance interaction (F (4,36) = 2.63,
12 <.05). This interaction ls due to a significant difference in
experienced comfort between  the unde rpaid   and ove rpaid subjects
within the inferior performance level (1 (1,36) = 9.45, -2 <·01)
and a lack of differences within the equal and superior perfor-
mance levels. Underpaid subjects with inferior performance feel
significantly   less   at   ease  than ove rpaid subjects with inferior
performance (respective means, M = 3.0 and M = 6.8). Within the
overpayment level, the difference between the inferior perfor-
mance subjects and the superior performance subjects is signifi-
cant, too, the inferior group feeling more at ease than the
superior one (Kinferior = 6.8 and lisuperior = 4.2) (1(1,36) =
4.42 , 2 <·05)·
4.5.2. Motivational Effects
The analyses of variance performed on the total and the
partial differences in reaction times from pre-test to post-test
reveal borderline significant main effects for the (in)justice
factor (see Table 8).
Further exploration of the differences between the three
injustice levels sliowed that underpaid subjects differ signifi-
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cantly from the equitably paid subjects on both measures (total
scores: 1(1,40) = 6.0, 2 <.05, and partial difference scores;
2(1,40) = 6.04, 2 <.05) (see table 9).
Table 8
Summaries of the Analysis of Variance on the Tota] and Partial
Reaction Time Differences of the Last Half of the Subjects
Total Partial
Scores Scores
Source Df MS F P. MS F          F
Control vs. All Other 1   31524.0 1. n.s. 4910.7 1. n.s.
InJustice (A) 2 157491.8 3.20 .06 308688.5 3.02 .06
Relative Performance (B) 2 3168.8   1. n.s. 52224.8 1. n.s.
A x B 4   10857.0   1. n.s 59802.8 1. n.s.
Error 40 49260.2 102070.1
4Note. Differences were multiplied by 10 .
Table 9
Mean Differences Between Pre-test and Post-test Reaction
Times for Underpaid, Equital,ly Paid and Overpaid Subjects.
Total Scores Partial Scores
LInderpayment -51.20 -69.73
Equitable payment 147.27 217.00
Overpayment 92.27 82.33
Underpaid subjects showed a marked decrease in reaction time
after injustice had been induced, while overpaid and, especially
the equitably paid subjects showed an increase in reaction time
performance. The overall differences between the pre-test and
post-test reaction times were very small. This can be attributed
to  the  ve ry high initial motivation level  of our subject popula-
tion.
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4.5.3 Post-experimental Questionnaire Data
The ratings of interest in the reaction time task show a
significant injustice x relative performance interaction effect
(F (4,36) = 5.47 2 <·01). The mean ratings are given in Table 10.
Underpaid subjects with inferior performances find the task
significantly less interesting  than unde rpaid subjects  at  the
equal and superior performance levels (F (1,36) - 18.41 and
11.78,   respectively,  both 12  <0.1).   The unde rpaid inferior perfor-
mance condition differs also significantly from the equitabily
paid and overpaid inferior performance conditions (1 (1,36) =
5.24 and 13.83, 12 <.05 and f <·01, respectively). At the equal
performance level  is the difference between overpaid  and  unde r-
paid sub Jects significant (F - 6.63, 2 <.05)·(1,36)
Table 10
Mean Interest Ratings and Mean Importance Ratings of the Last
Five Subjects in Each Experimental Condition.
Interest in Task Importance of Examination
Under Equitably Over Under Equitably Over
paid paid paid paid paid paid
Inferior 3.8 5.4 6.4 4.0 5.0 6.6
Performance
Equal 6.6 4.8 5.06.8 6.4 5.0Performance
Superior 6.2 5.6 6.2 5.8 5.4 5.8
Performance
The mean ratings of the importance of the examination are
given in Table 10. The injustice x relative performance interac-
tion is significant (f (4,36) = 3.10, 11 < 0.5). The inferior
performance subjects at the underpaid level find the examination
less important than the subjects in the equal and superior per-
formance conditions (1 (1,36) = 4.29 and 8.95, 72 < 0.5 and 11
<.01, respectively). The difference between the underpaid inferi-
or performance condition and the overpaid inferior performance
condition is also significant (F (1,36) = 8.95, 2 <·01).
We asked students whether they liked or disliked the fact
that their reaction times were made public. The analysis of
variance performed on the answers to this question shows a trend
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for the relative performance factor (f (2,36) = 2.55, p <.10).
Subjects with inferior performances are less prepared to show
their reaction times to their partners than subjects in the
superior performance condition (F (1,36) = 5.34, -2 <.05)
(Minferior = 4.40; Mqual = 4.80 andEsuperior = 5.60)'
5. Conclusions
The results of the studies using hypothetical situations
(l A, 1B and 1C) largely support the hypotheses about the tendency
to  compare  and  the mode rating effects  of this tendency  on  the
perception of justice and injustice. The inore a person becomes
salient for the comparison, the more a given state of justice and
injustice will be perceived as just and unjust, respectively.
These hypotheses, however, are not supported by the data of the
experiment, in which the subjects were informed about their rela-
tive performances and were actually underpaid, overpaid, or equi-
tably paid in comparison with another, highly co:nparable person.
We only found  that unde rpaid persons rated tlle amount of their
pay as rather low, equitably paid persons as sufficient, and
overpaid ones as rather high, indicating that the manipulation of
injustice had worked to some extent. This almost complete lack of
significant differences in perception and in motivational effects
argued for a critical inspection of the global situation in which
the experiment took place, which led to the post-hoc analyses on
the data of the second half of the subjects. It is noteworthy
that these analyses reveal many differences between conditions
with respect to the perception of the situation and the changes
in performance motivation. The underpaid persons show a marked
decrease in their motivation as compared to equitably paid ones,
immediately following the manipulations as well as in the course
of the whole experiment. Our data suggest further that overpay-
ment does not lead to an increase in motivation (as canpared with
equitable payment). All our subjects found the task interesting
and the experiment important, with the exception of those who
heard that they had peri'ormed poor].y on the task and were under-
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paid as compared to their fellow-students. For them the task was
rather boring, and the experiment least important. These persons
did not feel at ease when they heard about their poor performance
and   their poor payment.   Amo ng the second   half   of our subject
group, we found defensive reactions: persons who performed poorly
on the reaction time task were less inclined to show their
results to others than persons who did well on the task. Although
the hypotheses were not supported either by the data of all the
subjects nor by the data of the second half of the group, the
latter results confirm to some extent the validity of our
reasoning leading to the post-hoc analyses. It is worthwile to
comment on the relevance of this reasoning for the problem of
interpersonal injustice. We hypothesized earlier that conducting
this experiment in the closed school community gave rise to
rumors and discussions    amo ng the students about    the   task   and   the
payment, which resulted in generating some expectations about
being fairly and equally paid for participating in the study. In
more general terms, one can say that conducting this experiment
itself changed the social context wherein the study was done. The
relevant social context of injustice must be defined in terms of
expectations, beliefs about the relation between 'outcomes' and
'inputs'. These have been called by others 'the internal stan-
dard' (Pritchard, 1969; Weick, 1966) or 'referential comparisons'
(Berger et al.,1972). It seems to us, now, that experimental
manipulations of justice and injustice that are not linked with
the reality outside the laboratory, relevant for the injustice
problem, will not be successful. It might even be true for every
social-psychological experiment. One can only imagine how the
tests of dissonance theory would have appeared if the researchers
had not chosen attitude objects such as the Rose Bowl competition
or the examination system at the University of Leuven. We can
conclude by stating that our experiment started - so to speak -
in a 'vacuum' but created for itself the relevant social context.
In our second study, we have deviated slightly from the main
topic by making an exploratory trip into the realm of comfort
experiences. This study shows that individual differences with
respect to comfort judgments exist, but it shows also that these
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differences can be described in terms of the information used and
the  way this information is combined  into a comfort judgment.
With this study, we have tried to promote the use of scaling
techniques as an exploratory device in the field of injustice. At
the same time, however, the suggestion is implicitly given that
an analysis regarding the content of the problem might not be
replaced by a discussion about techniques.
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CHAPTER VII. THE ROLE OF THE INTERNAL STANDARD AND SOCIAL
COMPARISON OF OUTCOMES   IN INJ USTICE EXPERIENCE
1. Introduction
The results of some studies contradict Pritchard's thesis
that the intrapersonal comparison of contributions and outcomes
is  the most important injustice standard  (1969) . Weick and Nesset
(1968), Weick, Bougon, and Maruyama (1976) and Van Kreveld and
Bouwhuis (1977) have shown that the interpersonal or social
comparison of outcomes is at least as important as the intra-
personal weighting for the explanation of injustice perception.
A more recent study by Austin, McGinn, and Susmilch (1980) shows
that the violation of an internal justice standard influences
feelings of satisfaction, while the violation of a social compar-
ison standard affects the experience of injustice. In the
previous chapter, however, we have seen that the experience of
injustice occurred only after subjects established for themselves
a belief about fair payment for their participation. This belief
about fair treatment, developed in the course of the research in
the school, can be considered as an internal standard. Thus, it
seems that an internal standard about justice needs to be estab-
lished by the person evaluating the exchange as a prerequisite
for experiences of injustice to occur.
In the first study in this chapter, we examined the effect
of the violation of an internal standard of justice and of an
interpersonal justice standard on the perception of injustice and
on reactions of people in that situation. In most of the afore-
mentioned studies, persons were asked to judge hypothetical work
situations. In our experiment, students were hired for a regular
student's job (coding questionnaires), but they all agreed to be
paid in credit points for experimental participation, in accord-
ance with faculty regulations, after the assistant had explained
to them that he had no more research funds available for this
unforseen job. This 'outcome' (credit points) is highly relevant
and very useful for these students. They are highly in need of
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these points in order to get permission to pass their examina-
tions. Moreover, faculty regulations prescribe exactly the
relation between 'inputs' and 'outcomes': the input is the time
that students spend on a job and the regulations state that 1
credit point must be given for each one half hour of experimental
participation. This relation between inputs (time) and outcomes
(credit points)  as pre scribed  by the faculty constituted  the
operationalization of the internal standard. Equal payment for
equal worktime constituted the operationalization of the social
comparison standard of justice. The students were paid either
according to the faculty regulations (Own Equity) or received 1
credit point  less (Own Inequity) . The subject received  the same
number of credit points as his colleague (Comparison Equity) or 1
credit point less than his work partner (Comparison Inequity).
Inequity or injustice consisted of absolute and/or relative
unde rpayment  on a hourly basis. The hypothesis tested   in  this
experiment reads in its most general form: Persons that are
underpaid on a hourly basis will contribute less to the exchange
than equitably paid persons. If the internal standard is the most
dominant justice norm. the above mentioned effect will aDDear as
a main effect for the Own factor. If the actual social comoarison
of outcomes is the dominant justice norm, then this effect will
appear as a ina in effect for the Comparison factor. On the basis
of studies with hypothetical situations, we expect an additive
effect of the violations of both standards which will yield a
main effect for the Own and for the Comparison factor.
What are the contributions that people can adapt to their
absolute or relative outcome level ? It has been stressed repeat-
edly that injustice reduction can take many forms (Adams, 1965;
Weick, 1964; 1966). In most of the research in which the depen-
dent variable(s) consisted of changes in contributions only'one
(or very few) modes of injustice reduction have been systemati-
cally examined. In our experiment we have measured changes in
four potential contributions: 1) the time spent on the task; 2)
the productivity of the subjects; 3) the quality of their work,
and 4) their attention to the task. We expect that the injustice
effect will show itself primarily in the time spent on the task.
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This contribution is the most relevant one, since the students
are only paid for being present. But, since these students are
hired to do a job, it seems plausible to expect injustice effects
in areas directly related to the job, such as the quantity and
quality of the performance, and the attention devoted to the
task.
We hired male and female students. Some reviews of the rela-
tion between sex and injustice suggest that men are more directed
at own-gain maximization, and hence on the attainment of a favor-
able input-outcome ratio, while women are more interpersonally
oriented. (Calahan-L&vy and Mess&, 1979; Mikula, 1980). Hence we
expect that male subjects will be influenced more by violations
of the internal standard and that female subjects will be more
affected by the violation of the social comparison standard.
2. The Experimental Study
2.1 Subjects
The subjects were 32 first-year psychology students (16
males and 16 females). They reacted to an advertisement asking
for urgent assistance in a research project of the Organizational
psychology section. After it was explained to them that no funds
were available for payment, they fully agreed about being 'paid'
in credit points for experimental participation. The 16 male and
1 b female students were randomly assigned to each of the four
experimental conditions, so that the design consisted of a 2 x 2 x 2
factorial design: own x comparison x sex.
2.2 Experirnental Procedure
When the students reported to the assistant, they were
scheduled for a two-hour work period, and they were told that the
job consisted of transcribing questionnaire data on optical
reader forms. The demand for a large number of job students and
the two-hour period of work were justified by stating that the
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job needed continuous attention and that, on a similar job in the
past, the number of errors drastically increased after two hours
of coding. Subjects who asked for another two-hour period were
scheduled for a later time in order to avoid suspicion.
Then it was explained that research funds were lacking and
the assistant proposed to 'pay' them in credit points for experl-
mental participation. The assistant added that, although this was
no experiment, he received permission from the dean's office to
'pay' students this way. All students agreed with this proposal,
and some of them even said they could use these points better
than the few guilders they could earn otherwise.
All subjects were scheduled in the morning so that leaving
the experiment earlier was equally attractive   for eve ryone.
The day that the subject came to work, he met with a fellow-
student from the sarne year who arrived a few minutes later than
the subject. This colleague an accomplice of the experimentere
was always of the same sex as the subject. The accomplice always
came a few minutes later than the subject in order not to create
the impression that this 'other worker' was already waiting for
the subject. The experimenter (assistant) conducted both students
to a room and gave them the written coding instructions. Then the
assistant apologized under the pretext that he had forgotten the
optical reader forms at the computer center. In the mean time,
the accomplice had to check unobtrusively whether the subject
understood the task instructions by asking him some details. The
accomplice was instructed further to initiate coriversation about
topics unrelated to the job such as the first-year examination
system and the work-group organization. Then the assistant
returned, asked if everything was understood, and installed the
subject in the same room, while conducting the accomplice to
another working place. The subject was left alone so that his
decision to leave the roan earlier would not be affected by the
presence of another person (Stephenson and Fielding, 1971). A
clock in the room gave the subject a possibility to check the
time. The subject worked for 30 minutes before the accomplice
returned.
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On entering the subject's room, the accomplice told him the
following story:
"The assistant just came to my room telling me that he had to go
to an urgent meeting and that he would not return today. He asked
me to inform you about this, and to give you these two envelopes.
One of these contains a short questionnaire that we have to fill
out whenever we think we are ready with our job. The other one
contains our subject-card. The assistant already filled out the
credit points."
The accanplice handed over the two envelopes, and was about to
leave the roan as he turned his head and said:
"By the way, the assistant filled out 3 (or 4, or 5) credit
points on my card. Just take a look at yours."
(This message constituted the inequity induction, which was only
successful if the subject indeed looked at his card). The small
envelope was closed, so that the accomplice had some time to
'disappear' while the subject opened it.
When the subject left the room, he was met by the experimen-
ter who asked why he left the room at that moment. Then, the
experimenter informed the subject about the true nature of the
experiment, corrected the number of credit points (if necessary),
and asked the subject not to talk about it for the next two
weeks.
2.3 Experimental Manipulation
The manipulation of inequity took place by means of a
passirig remark about the number of credit points received by the
accomplice and an invitation to the subject to examine his card.
Prior to leaving the room, the accomplice looked at the coding
forms of the subject and he said that he had finished almost the
same number of questionnaires. This message was inserted in order
to create an impression of equal contributions.
The manipulation was actually completed when the subject
looked at his credit-point card. All subjects did so. Table 11
shows the experimental design and the number of points given to







Self Other Self Other
Own Equity(OE)    4        4       4        5
Own Inequity(OI)    3        3       3        4
2.4 Dependent Variables
The main dependent variables - work-time, change in produc-
tivity, change in quality, and change in attention to the task -
were measured unobt rusively  with  the  aid of video  came ras  and
with the help of the accomplice.
The work-time was measured from the moment the accomplice
left the subject's room until the subject left the room.
Change in productivity: During the accomplice's visit to  the
subject, the accomplice had to note the serial number of the
questionnaires the subject was coding at that moment. Since the
questionnaires were put in a previously established order, the
subject's productivity in the pre-test phase could be easily
calculated. The change in productivity was calculated by sub-
tracting the post-test productivity (i.e., number of question-
naires coded per minute times 100) from the pre-test productiv-
ity.
Change in quality of performance: Each questionnaire
contained 21 questions to be coded. The number of errors in each
phase of the experiment could add up to 21 X the number of ques-
tionnaires coded by the subject. The number of errors made is
expressed as a percentage of the total number of errors possible.
The difference between the pre-test and post-test error percent-
ages indicate the change in quality.
Attention to the task: During the experiment, the subjects
were continuously observed by an assistant to the experlmenter.
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Eve ry three minutes this observer  gave' a score  on a five-point
scale based upon the physical posture of the subject. A score of
1 was given when the subject did not work at all (e.g., walking
around) and a score of 5 was given when the subject leant forward
over the working table. The mean score of the post-test observa-
tions was subtracted from the mean pre-test score.
The post-experimental questionnaire given to the subjects by
the accomplice contained the following questions:
- How fair did you find the treatment ? (1= very fair; 9= very
unfair)
-  Did you receive sufficient credit points for your work ? (1=
sufficient; 9= far too little)
- How interesting did you find the task ? (1= very boring; 9=
very interesting)
- How important did you find the job ? (1= very important; 9=
very unimportant)
How difficult was the job ? (1= very easy; 9= very difficult)
-  Did you work hard on the job ? (1= very hard; 9= very slowly)
-  Did you concentrate on your work ? (1= very concentrated; 9=
 not concentrated)
-  What is your impression about the duration of the work ? (1=
it was long; 9= it was short).
3. Results
The main dependent measures were analyzed by means of a
multivariate analysis of variance according to a 2 x 2 x2 design
with 4 dependent variables, by means of the program MULVAR of
ICL2900. T'he univariate analyses were inspected only when the
multivariate effect was significant at the .05 level (Finn, 1974;
Finn and Mateson, 1978). The questionnaire data were analyzed by
means of univariate analyses of variance.
3.1 The Perception of Injustice
The mean fairness-ratings of all eight conditions are lower
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than 5 on the nine-point scale. Subjects in each condition judged
the situation as fair. All subjects - on the average - judge
their pay as sufficient. There are no significant differences
between the conditions.
3.2 Changes in Productivity, Quality, and Attention to the
Task and Work-time
The multivariate and univariate analyses of variances are
summarized in Table 12.
Table 12
Multivariate and Univariate Analyses of Variance on
Work-tjme, and Changes in Productivitv, in
Quality, and in Attention to the Task.
Multivariate test Univariate tests
Dependent
Source F(4,21) P< Variables F(1,24) P<
Own 3.91 .02 time .11 .74
(A) productivity 2.91 .10
quality .32 .59
attention 10.38 .01
Comparison 4.72 .01 time .65 .57
(B) productivity .18 .68
quality .07 .80
attention 9.06 .01
Sex 4.43 .01 time 3.42 .08
(C) productivity .11 .74
quality .05 .82
attention 4.24 .05




A x C .34 .85
B x C 1.80 .17
A x B x C 1.84 .16
The multivariate tests show significant effects for the Own,
Comparison and Sex factors and a significant Own x Comparison
effect. The univariate analyses reveal significant main effects
for the Own, Comparison and Sex factor only for the change in
attention to the task. Attention for the task drops significantly
more in own equity (M = -8.31) than in the own inequity condi-
tion, and significantly more in the comparison inequity (11 =
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-8.06) than in the comparison equity condition (M = -0.94).
Furthermore, it is found that male subjects (M =.-2.06) stay more
attentive than female subjects (M = -6.94). The main effects for
the Own and Comparison factors have to be interpreted in the
light of the significant interaction effect on attention change.
There is also a significant Own x Comparison interaction on work-
time and change in quality of performance. The relevant means are
given in Table 13.
Table 13
Mean Work-time, Change in Quality and Change
in Attention (A x B interaction)
Condition Work-time Quality Attention
a                  a
OE-CE 42.758 -.96 -.75
b            ab            bOE-CI 24.75 .48 -15.86
OI-CE 27.75b 97b -1.13/
ab           a             aOI-CI 37.00 -.78 -.25
Note. Means with different subscripts differ at least
at the .05 level.
The mean work-time in the OE-CI and in the OI-CE condition
is significantly smaller than in the OE-CE condition (2(1,24) =
6.39 and 4.82, 71 <·0·1 and 12 <·05, respectively). The difference
between OE-CI condition and the OI-CI reaches borderline signifi-
cance (F(1.24) = 2.96, P < ·10). With respect to changes in
quality of performance only the differences between the OE-CE
condition and the OI-CE condition (1(1,24) = 5.33, -2 < ·05) and
the OI-CE and OI-CI condition (f_(1,24)  = 4.38, 2 < .05) are
significant. Again, the difference between OE-CE and OE-CI condi-
tion shows a trend (l(1,24) = 2.98, 12 <·10). The significant
interaction effect for attention is attributable to the drastic
drop in attention in the OFr-CI condition, which differs from all
other conditions (all 2 <.01).
3.3 Questionnaire Data
The interest in task-ratings show a b-orderline significant
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Own x Comparison interaction (F(1,24) = 3·93, -2 <·06)(see Table
ill) ·  Tests  of the differences between the condition means  show
only that subjects in the OI-CI condition find the job less
boring than subjects in the OI-CE condition (F(1,24) = 5.15, -2
<.01).
Table 14
Mean Interest Ratings (AxB)
Comparison
Equity Inequity
Own Equity 3.1 2.6
Own Inequity 2.0 4.1
The ratings of the importance of the job show a significant
Own x Comparison x Sex interaction (y.(1,24) = 4.35, 12 <·05). The






Own Equity 6.5 4.3
Own Inequity 4.8 4.0
Female
Own Equity 4.0 5.3
Own Inequity 5.8 3.5
Within the male group, the differences between the OE-CI and
the OI-CI on the one side, and the OE-CE condition on the other
are (marginally) significant (1(1,24) = 3.52 and 4.35, .2 <·10 and
2 <·05) .  Within the female group,  only  the di fference between OI-
CE and the OI-CI condition reaches borderline significance
(F(1,24) = 3.52, 2 <·10). Tests of differences between the corre-
sponding conditions in the male and female subject groups reveal
that only the difference between the two OE-CE conditions is
significant.
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Female subjects judged the time they spent on the Job as
significantly longer than male subjects (-M.female = 2.75; Mmale -
4.31; 2(1,24) = 5.56, 12 <·05). This judgment corresponds with the
time actually spent on the job. Female subjects stayed on the
average approximately 10 minutes longer in the room than male
subjects. This difference, however, is not significant.
4. Discussion
The data (work-time, quality, attention, productivity) can
neither be explained be referring to the violations of the inter-
nal standard, nor by referring to the violation of the comparison
standard, nor by the additive effect of violations of both stan-
, dards. But before examining the data further the question needs
to be answered whether the differences between the conditions are
related to differences in justice perception and experience. The
check on the manipulation indicates that the manipulation of
injustice was not successful. The subjects found that they were
justly treated and that they received a sufficient amount of
credit points. These verbal reports about the perceived justice
in the work situations (given at the end of the work-time)
contrast sharply with the actual behavior of the subjects immedi-
ately following the experimental manipulation. As we mentioned in
the procedure section, the subjects were continuously observed by
means of videocameras in order to record the work-time and to
gather the attention data. We were surprised by the way subjects
reacted spontaneously after they had looked at their credit point
card, so that our observations of these behavioral reactions are
far from systematic. The way the experiment was scheduled did not
allow for the construction of an observational schema. We think,
however, that a non-systematic review of what happened, is very
instructive. Subjects in the just condition (OE-CE) started work
almost immediately. Nothing special happened, as it was meant
that way. In the three unjust conditions, however, most of our
subjects showed excitement after they had looked at their card
(and knowillg what their colleague received).  Most of the subjects
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looked several times at their credit point card and at the door
through which the accomplice had disappeared. It took much longer
for them to go back to work. A number of subjects went out into
the corridor, looked around, and returned after a while into
their room. Still others ran into the corridor and addressed
persons who passed by, apparently asking information. A few sub-
jects. after running into the corridor, knocked at the doors of
the adjacent rooms, presumably looking for their fellow-student.
One of the subjects took his card and went straight to the
student's secretary, asking for an extra credit point. Another
student took his bag and his coat and left. These reactions show
that the manipulation brought about some excitement in the unjust
situations, while the answers of the subjects on the question-
naire lack any sign of anger, puzzlement, embarassment and so
forth. This discrepancy might be explained by assuming that at
the end of the work-period the experienced injustice was ade-
quately reduced. The subjects' answers to the question of the
experimenter about their leaving the situation at that particular
moment are in line with this assumption. Eleven out of the 24
unjust paid subjects answered that they were justly paid for the
time spent on the job. The remaining subjects all referred to
reasons they quit the Job which related to the manipulation of
injustice. Those in the OI-CE condition told the experimenter
that they received less than expected. Those in the OE-CI condi-
tion referred to the fact that they received less than their
colleague, and those in the OI-CI condition remarked that they
were insufficiently paid. Their answers indicated that they
adapted the work-time to the absolute and/or relative amount of
their payment.
On the one hand, it seems plausible to assume that the
manipulation of injustice gave rise to injustice experience. The
systematically observed changes in quality and attention, and
work-time, on the other, show a pattern that can not be explained
by the proposed injustice models and that even contradicts the
stated hypotheses. People that are paid less than agreed upon and
less than their colleagues work as long as justly paid persons;
they remain as attentive and show the same decrease in quality as
137
the justly paid ones. Persons who are only paid one credit point
less than their colleague leave the situation half an hour too
early and show a drastic decrease in attention for the task. If,
the experience of injustice has been adequately reduced in the
post-test period, as we assumed, the pattern of our data forces
the conclusion that this reduction took place through other
mechanisms than the ones that were systematically measured. The
explanation put forward on the next paragraph is in line with the
interpersonal conflict interpretation of injustice and accounts
for a large part of the data. This explanation is tested in our
second study.
5. Injustice and Interpersonal Conflict
Under the assumption that injustice reduction took place in
the course of the period following the manipulation of injustice,
it was concluded that channels other than the ones measured were
used by the subjects. By asking ourselves what types of actions
could have been considered by the subjects as adequate coping
reactions, it is implied that we define an unjust situation as a
problematic situation for the subjects. Injustice is a problem
that demands a solution. This solution does not come forward
automatically . The immediate reactions of our subjects indicate a
need for information. But our subjects were thrown upon their own
resources to handle the problem. We assume that the subjects
considered alternative strategies to solve or to react to this
problem situation and compared the different outcomes of these
alternative actions, such as leaving the situation, slowing down
the  production,  etc.  One of these alternative actions  that  we  did
not forsee, and hence that we did not 'measure', is simply decid-
ing to contact the source of the injustice, i.e., the assistant
at a later point in time in order to ask him for information
and/or to correct the injustice done. In fact, the assistant is
the only person who can give this information and who is formally
allowed to give additional credit points. The four conditions in
the previous study differ with respect to the probability that
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the decision to contact the assistant is made. The probability is
lowest in the just condition (OE-CE) where nothing special hap-
pened. In the OI-CI condition, the subjects were paid one point
less than determined by the faculty regulations and one point
less than their colleagues. These subjects had a strong case
against the assistant, and hence we expect that in this OI-CI
condition the probability of deciding to contact the source of
the injustice is higher than in the other conditions. In the OI-
CE condition, where both workers were equally underpaid, the
social comparison argument is lacking. Negotiating with the
assistant is most succesful if the two workers are able to
coordinate their actions. We expect that the probability to
contact the assistant in this condition is lower than in the OI-
CI condition. Finally, the subjects in the OE-CI condition were
only paid one point less than their colleague, but they were paid
according to the faculty regulations. So, in their negotiation
with the assistant, the subjects in this condition only can use
the socially undesirable argument that they are paid less than
another worker. We expect that in this condition the probability
to decide to see the assistant is lowest. Summarizing, we hypoth-
esize the following order of conditions with respect to the
probability that a decision is made to see the assistant:
OE-CE < OE-CI < OI-CE < OI-CI
How does this hypothesis fit with the observed reactions in
the unjust situations ? For a person who has decided to go to the
assistant e.g., on the next day, the injustice problem is solved
for the moment. A person who decides not to contact the assistant
has to consider other ways of solving the injustice problem, such
as leaving, producing less, etc. So, the less probable it is that
subjects decide to go to the assistant, the more they will make
use of other reduction mechanisms. The work-time data and the
change in attention (see Table 11 on page 133) are in accordance
with this reasoning. The drastic decline in attention in the OE-
CI condition could also indicate that the subjects were pre-
occupied with solving the injustice problem.
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The hypothesis about the probability to contact the assis-
tant was tested in an interview study. The respondents were all
psychology students who knew the faculty regulations about the
credit point system. They were given a written description of the
procedure of the previous experiment. They were asked to identify
themselves with the subject. In order to facilitate this identi-
fication they were asked some open-ended questions about how they
would feel in that situation and how they would react immediately
after hearing what they were paid and so forth. Finally, they
were asked to rate the fairness of the treatment by the assistant
and to indicate whether they would decide to see the assistant
and/or the co-worker or not, on five-point scales.
6. The Interview Study
6.1 Method
The respondents were 70 first- and second-year psychology
students at Tilburg University who had not participated in the
experiment (33 male and 37 female students).
Table 16





Male     6           7
Female     6           9
Own Inequity
Male     9           10
Female    10          13
They were interviewed by other students who had just finished the
workshop on interviewing. The interviewers were ignorant of the
hypothesis. Table 16 contains the number of respondents in each
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of the four experimental conditions.
The interview: The respondents were given a written descrip-
tion of the experimental procedure of the previous experiments
fran the point of view of the subject. They were asked to read
the story carefully (The story is given in Appendix D). After
reading  it, the interviewer asked following open-ended questions:
- What would you feel in that situation ?
- What would you do ?
- What do you think about the way the assistant behaved ?
The answers were recorded (An analysis of these answers is
given in Appendix D).
The respondent was then asked to answer the following three
questions, using the alternatives given to him:
1)  Would  you  feel  the  need to contact the other student after  you
took a look at your card ?
0      ve ry  high need (5)
0   high need (4)
0  moderate need (3)
0   low need (2)
0      ve ry  low need (1)
2) Would you decide to contact the assistant on a later point in
t ime   ?
0   I certainly would (5)
0   I think I would do it (4)
0   I don't know (3)
0   I think I would not do it (2)
0   I certainly would not (1)
3) How fair is the way you were treated ?
0  very fair (5)
0 fair (4)
0         norma 1 (3)
0 unfair (2)
0      ve ry unfair (1)
6.2 Results
The ratings were analyzed by means of analyses of variances
according to a 2 x 2 x 2 design with unequal cell frequencies
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(unweighted means solution).
Fairness of the Treatment: The fairness ratings show signi-
ficant main effects for the Own and the Comparison factors. Sub-
jects who are paid less than prescribed by the faculty and sub-
jects that are paid less than their colleague rate the treatment
more unfair than the others (Own: 1( 1,61) = 6.47, -2 <.05) ; Com-





Own Equity 2.8 2.2 2.5
Own Inequity 2.1 1.9 2.0
Total 2.5 2.1
The order of the condition means sugest that violations of
both standards affect the fairness ratings in an additive way.
Probability of Contacting the Assistant: The mean scores on
question 2 are presented in Table 18· According to our hypoth-
esis, we expect main effects for the Own and Comparison factor.
The analysis of variance indeed yield these main effects (Own:
-&(1,62) = 17.55, -2 <.01 and Comparison: 1(1,62) = 6.47, -2 <.05).
Table 18
Probability of Meeting with the Assistant
Comparison
Equity Inequity Total
Own Equity 2.4 3.6 3.0
Own Inequity 4.1 4.5 4.3
Total 3.2 4.0 3.8
The order of the condition means corresponds perfectly with
the predicted order, thus supporting the hypothesis.




The results of the interview study support the hypothesis
that the conditions differ with respect to the probability of
looking for the assistant, and hence, they give support to our
post-hoc analysis of what happened in the experimental work
situation. The data indicate further that both standards of in-
justice are important for explaining injustice experiences.
Our experiment and the qualitative material gathered in the
interviews (see Appendix D for a review) lead to some interesting
but preliminary conclusions about the nature of injustice and the
way people react to or in unjust situations. We will mention
these conclusions briefly here, but Will come back to them in our
final discussion.
First, it seems to us that injustice provokes uncertainty.
and that persons experiencing it are in need for informatiori
about 'what is going on' . Second, persons' reactions in unjust
situations are not automatic responses. Persons assimilate the
situation cognitively: they are searching for an explanation that
will make sense of the situation. It is not clear whether the
persons' actions must be conceived of as 'reactions' to the un-
just situation or that their actions are giving meaning to the
situation (enactment, Weick, 1979, p. 130-131). Thirdly, it seems
important to take into consideration what we will call the
'social comparison structure' of the unjust situation in order to
make more precise predictions about the actions unjustly treated
persons undertake. For example, the perception of common fate can
lead to coalition formation among the unjustly treated partners
against the source of the injustice.
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CHAPTER VIII. SOCIAL COMPARISON, INJUSTICE EXPERIENCE AND
REDUCTION:     A   FIELD   STUDY
1. Introduction
A field study is reported in which different aspects of the
interpersonal injustice model are examined. First, we will
examine the social choice behavior of employees within the
context of the evaluation of the exchange (with the employer).
Second, the relation betw6en the social comparison of contribu-
tions and of outcomes, on the one hand, and the experience of
(in)justice and satisfaction on the other is examined. Finally,
we study the relation between injustice perception and reduction.
1.1 Social Comparison of Inputs and Outcomes
The basic elements which are brought into the evaluation of
an exchange are the relative contributions of the person to the
exchange and his relative outcomes. The input-cues used by mem-
bers of an organization to determine their relative value-in-
exchange are those elements on wliich payment is based, such as
length of service, age, education, job level, etc. These cues are
utilized by employers  to make judgements about the employees'
ability to perform the task, their experience, knowledge and
skill.   The  most impo rtant outcome-cue, reflecting the employee's
value-in-exchange, is his pay. In our discussion about the rela-
tion of social comparison and injustice, we have made the
distinction between an open and closed comparison situation (see
pages 71-72). Insight into the relative contributions and rela-
tive outcomes of persons in an open comparison situation can be
achieved only by studying the social comparison choices of these
persons, defined in terms of comparison dimensions which are
relevant  for the exchange. Therefore,  we have asked the employees
who participated in this study to indicate their relative posi-
tion vis-&-vis a freely choosen comparison person on the dimen-
sion, 'pay', and on dimensions related to pay (age, length of
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service, educational level and job level).
A number of studies indicate that people choose others for
comparison who have superior positions on the given comparison
dimensions (Von Grumbkow, 1980; Gruder, 1977; Patchen, 1961).
These comparisons are called 'upward comparisons'. Hence, we
expect that the largest number of comparison choices will be
upward comparisons. Or, stated otherwise: A larger number of
people will choose a comparison person who occupies a superior
position on the input- and on the outcome dimension, than an
inferior position (Hypothesis 1).
Patchen (1961) makes a distinction between 'consonant' and
'dissonant' comparisons. Consonant comparisons are comparisons
with others that involve corresponding relative positions on the
pay-dimension and the dimensions related to pay. Dissonant com-
parisons are comparisons with others that involve non-
corresponding relative positions on both types of dimensions.
Within the category of dissonant comparisons a distinction is
made between 'favorable' and 'unfavorable' comparisons. A person
makes a favorable dissonant comparison if he chooses someone who
takes an non-corresponding inferior pay-position relative to a
given contribution-position. A comparison is unfavorable if the
comparison other has a non-corresponding high pay-position for a
given position on dimensions related to pay. Although Patchen's
terms refer to an internal consistency approach to injustice, we
will use his terminology. Consonant and dissonant comparisons
refer to comparisons with others that take corresponding and non-
corresponding relative positions on the perceived and reflected
value-in-exchange dimensions, respectively.
The motivational assumption, underlying most of the psycho-
logical approaches to justice and injustice, states that people
strive toward justice (or that they try to avoid injustice). In
open comparison situations, people have - so to speak - the
occasion to construct their own exchange situation. Hence, we
expect that people will build a just exchange situation by making
consonant comparisons, and that there will be more consonant than
dissonant comparison choices (Hypothesis 2).
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1.2 Social Comparison  Cho ice, Experience of Injustice  and
Satisfaction
An exchange is considered to be unjust when the exchange
partner, which is, in this case, the employer, does not correctly
reflect the perceiver's self-constructed relative exchange value.
The perceiver is here the employee. Or, stated in more operation-
al  terms, an exchange   is cons idered  to be unjust  by an employee
when his perceived relative position on the pay-dimension does
not correspond with his perceived relative position on dimensions
related to pay. Hence, we expect that employees who make conso-
nant comparisons will judge the situation as fairer than
emplo yees who make dissonant comparisons. (Hypothesis 1).
Austin, Susmilch and MeGinn (1980) found that the violation
of the social comparison standard of justice did not affect
feelings of satisfaction. On the other hand, Patchen (1961) found
a significant relation between the dissonance of the comparison
and the satisfaction of employees with pay. Satisfaction with pay
is measured by Patchen by asking his respondents explicitly about
their feelings 'about the way (their) earnings compare to (the
comparison person's) earnings'. This interpersonal aspect of pay
satisfaction is in other satisfaction measures used in organiza-
tional surveys, such as the Job Descriptive Index (Smith,
Kendall, and Hulin, 1969; Bollen, 1970), and it brings Patchen's
satisfaction concept more in line with the concept of fairness.
We expect that satisfaction with pay and with other aspects of
the work and work situation, conceived of as a personal attitude
towa rd  the  work  and  the work situation,  does not relate  to   the
consonance  of the social comparison (Hypothesis _4) ·
1.3 Injustice Experience and Reduction
In this field study, too, we test the hypothesis that a
given disproportionality or proportionality between the perceived
and reflected value-in-exchange will be perceived as more unJust
or more just, respectively, the more the comparison person
becomes relevant  as a standard for injustice. (Hypothesis -5) ·
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Hence, we expect that, within the unfavorably dissonant compar-
ison group, persons scoring high on the tendency to compare will
feel more underpaid than persons scoring low on the tendency to
compare (Hypothesis -SA)· Within the favorably dissonant compar-
ison group, people with a high tendency to compare will feel more
overpaid than persons with a low tendency to compare (Hypothesis
58). Consonant comparers showing a high tendency to judge their
situation as more just than low tendency to compare respondents
(Hypothesis  5g).
Persons who experience injustice, or who perceive that they
are unjustly treated by their exchange partner, will take action
to reduce or eliminate the experienced injustice. The mechanisms
described by Adams (1965) can be ordered in three groups: 1)
those related to own contributions and outcomes; 2) those related
to other person's contributions and outcomes; and 3) leaving. the
unjust exchange situation. We have argued, that interpersonal
injustice refers to the existence of a conflict between the
person and his exchange partner and that injustice reduction
consists   of   solving the interpersonal conflict. Therefore,   we
expect that the relation between injustice experience and in-
justice reduction tendencies will show only with respect to
mechanisms related to own contributions and outcomes and leaving
the field, and not with respect to mechanisms related to other's
contributions and outcomes. We hypothesize that there is only a
significant correlation between the degree of experienced justice
and injustice reduction through changes of own contributions and
outcomes, and leavi ng-the-field (Hypothesis  _6.).
2. Method
The study to be reported forms part of a large organiza-
tional survey done by the Organizational Psychology Section at
Tilburg University in 1976. The respondents were employees in a
Dutch multiple-store chain. Besides the part about injustice,
this survey contained questionnaires about pay perceptions (Von
Grumbkow, 1980), perceptions of functions and tasks (Taillieu)
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perceptions of employees' positions and the organizational
stratification (F. van Dooren), and organizational decision
making (Bagchus).
2.1 Participants
The organization employs approximately 2500 people. About
two hundred work in the head-office, while the others are
employed in the different stores all over the country. A random
sample of 120 employees was drawn from the head-office workers.
Out of the 47 affiliations, 15 were randomly chosen. Four hundred
and ninety-six questionnaires were returned (70% response rate).
Table 19 summarizes the characteristics of the sample.
Table 19
Characteristics of the Sample








College     46
Internal Courses 82
Mean SD
;.ge 35.9 years 11.4
Periodical Pay 1609.0 HF 1 113.0
Seniority 5.5 years   5
.1
2.2 Questionnaire
Besides a number of questions about demographical factors
and characteristics of the respondents' job, the questionnaire
contained questions about the choice of comparison person, the
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tendency to compare oneself with the chosen other, the perceived
justice of pay, the satisfaction with work and the work situa-
tion, and injustice reduction tendencies. The part of the ques-
tionnaire related to this study is given in Appendix E.
2.2.1 The Relative Input Scale
Respondents were asked to indicate the comparison person's
relative position vis-A-vis themselves on the following dimen-
sions related to pay: age, seniority, educational level and job
level. The questions had the format:
much higher
h ighe r
The job level of this person's job is the same as (than) mine
lower
much lower
The answers to these four questions were summed and reduced by
dividing by four to a score ranging from 1 to 5. The internal
consistency of this scale is rather low (alpha =.56). The    i t em-
rest-total correlations vary from .26 to .44. The split-half
reliability (Spearman Brown Correction) is .66. The mean score is
3.56 with a S.D.=0.66 (N=418).
2.2.2 The Relative Outcome
Respondents were asked to indicate the relative wage posi-
tion of the comparison person on a five-point scale (M- 4.08,
S.D.=.82, N=428). The single item was:
much higher
h ighe r
The pay of this person is the same as (than) mine
lower
much lower.
2.2.3 The Tendency to Compare
The tendency to compare oneself with the comparison person
was measured by asking the respondents to indicate how frequently
they compared their situation with his' on a five-point scale
ranging from seldom (1) to very often (5).
2.2.4. Perception of Justice
Perceived justice was measured by means of a 16-item scale.
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Respondents had to indicate on 5-point scales whether they judged
their pay as 'too low' or 'too high' compared with the other's
pay, and taking into account different 'inputs' or 'costs'.
The items had the following fo rina t :
What do you think about your pay if you compare your age with
that of the chosen other ?





The scale is highly internal consistent (alpha =.95; split-half
reliability coefficient, corrected =.93). Item-rest correlations
vary between .64 and .80. The mean score is 37.4 (minimum = 16;
maximum = 80), with a S.D .=10.13 (N=361).
2.2.5. Satisfaction
Satisfaction was measured by asking the respondents to indi-
cate on 5-point scales how satisfied they were with the pay, the
job, the work situation, their mobility opportunities, their
colleagues and the supervision. Overall satisfaction consisted of
the sum of the item scores. The scale is fairly internally
consistent (alpha =.76; split-half reliability =.75). The item-
rest correlations vary between .36 and .69. The scale-mean is
22.1, S.D.=4.2 (N=388).
2.2.6 Reduction Tendencies
It was extremely difficult to ask respondents about in-
justice reduction in a very direct way, first because of the
threatening character of this kind of questions (thereby evoking
social desirability tendencies), and second, because some of the
mechanisms might not have been actually 'used' but only been
taken into consideration   such as changi ng   jobs or leaving   the
organization. Therefore, we decided to ask the respondent how
often they had been thinking about things like 'going to the
supervisor to ask for a pay raise, etc... The respondents indi-
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cated this frequency on 5-Point scales ranging from 'very often'
to 'never'. The list of reduction mechanisms is given in Appendix
E.
2.2.7 Dissonance and Consonance of Comparison
Insight into the consonance and dissonance of social compar-
ison is achieved by relating the relative position of the compar-
ison person vis-&-vis the respondent on the input-dimension to
his relative position on the outcome-ditnension. A consonant com-
parison is found if the two relative positions correspond. If
they do not, the comparison is called 'dissonant'.
The relative positions on the input-dimension and outcome-
dimension were measured on flve-point scales, ranging from 'much
lower' to 'much higher'. As is shown in Table 20, there exist 25
theoretically possible combinations.
Table 20
Consonant and Dissonant Social Comparison Choices
Relative Position of Respondent
on the Outcome Dimension
C
w                very low low equal high very high'0                                                -     - - -C
i g
0 :  very low Favorably./ \
Dissonant
3 : low    .
U
-
-1 1  equal
i«     0.
H C «III  »I1111 s
2       I
high Unfavorably 04*
I » Dissonant
   c  very high Comparisons   10.-




The diagonal cells in Table .20 represent 'consonant comparisons'.
The cells above the diagonal are 'favorably dissonant compar-




The data of this study were analyzed by means of the SPSS
package (Nie, Hull, Jenkins, Steinbrenner and Bent, 1975; Hull
and Nie, 1981) on ICL 2900. Missing data were not included, which
explains the different N's in the analyses.
3.1 The Choice of a Comparison Person
Table -21 presents the frequencies (and percentages) with
which others at different relative positions are chosen at each
of the input-dimensions and the outcome-dimension, separately. It
was expected that the respondents would choose others at superior
positions relative to their own (higher and much higher).
Table 21
Frequencies with Which Others at Different Relative Positions are Chosen
as Comparison Persons for Each Dimension
Comparison DimensionsRelative
Position of Age 2ducatior Job Level Seniority Pay
other vis-a-vii
Respondent N% N % N% N% N%
ruch lower 15 3.4 2    .5      1    .2     19 4.4 2    .5
lower 106 24.3 35 8.2 23 5.3 101 23.3 19   4.4
the same 144 32.9 200 47.1 143 33.1      82 18.9 61 14.3
higher 154 35.2 147 34.6 205 47.5 150 34.6 208 48.6
much higher 18 4.1 41 9.7 60 13.9     81 18.7 138 32.2
Total N 437 425 432 433 428
Chi-square(4) 206.4 334.1 338.9 102.2 347.6
The frequency distributions were tested against the uniform
random distribution by means of Chi2-tests. All distributions
differ significantly from the uniform one (p <.01). Others at
extreme inferior and extreme superior positions are less
frequently chosen for comparison than expected, except on the
pay-dimension.
About one third of the respondents choose someone who takes
a much higher position on the pay-dimension than themselves.
Similar others are more frequently chosen than randomly expected,
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except on the dimensions, seniority and pay.
In order to test Hypothesis 1, we compared the percentage of
persons chosing someone on a higher and much higher position with
the percentage of persons chosing someone on a lower and a much
lower position, by means of a z-test for correlated percentages
on each comparison-dimension, separately. A summa ry of these
tests is given in Table .2-2.
Table 22
Upward vs. Downward Comparisons on
Each Dimension
Dimension % Upward % Downward      Z
Age 39.3 27.7 2.99
Education 44.3 8.7 11.56
Job Level 61.4 5.5 19.46
Seniority 53.3 27.7 6.17
Pay 80.8 4.9 29.63
Hypothesis 1 is supported by the data. There are, however,
striking differences among the comparison dimensions with respect
to the upward comparison percentages, ranging from 39.3 % on the
dimension age to 80.8%  on the pay-dimension. The general tenden-
cy to compare with similars or with others at moderate superior
positions coresponds with social comparison theory predictions.
Factors, such as the importance of the comparison dimension, may
enhance these social comparison tendencies. The relevance of
dimensions related to pay is determined by the contribution of
the dimensions for the explanation of pay diffe rentials. A stan-
dard regression analysis using age, educational level, job level
and seniority as predictors and pay as the dependent measure (see
Table 23) reveals that these four variables explain 83% of the
variance in pay. In Table 23, it is shown that the percentage of
upward comparisons for each dimension corresponds with the rele-
vance of the dimension as expressed by its contribution in the
explanation of pay (beta's), indicating that upward comparison
increases with an increasing relevance of the comparison dimen-
sion in the exchange.
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Table 23
Summary of the Standard Regression Analysis of Pay on
Age, Education, Job Level and Seniority
Predictor r R F(1,447) beta b     % Upward
Job Level .88 .88 1076.22 .7801 4.694 61.4
Seniority .49 .90 33.68 .1483 .756 53.3
Education .41 .91 21.11 .1001 2.359 44.3
Age .24 .91 12.71 .0837 .471 39.3
Constant (a) -6.558
3.2 Consonant and Dissonant Comparisons
Hypothesis 2 states that there will be more consonant than
dissonant comparisons. The consonant vs. dissonant character of
the comparison choices   was ins pected by relating the choices   on
each input-dimension to the choices on the outcome-dimension, and
by relating the total input choice to the choice on the outcome-
dimension. The number (and percentages) of favorable and unfavor-
able dissonant comparisons and consonant comparisons are given in
Table 24.
Table 24
Numbers and Expected :gulnbers of Dissonant and Consonant Comparisons
Input - Outcome Ratios
Age Education Seniority Job Level Input Sum
Pay Pay Pay Pay Pay
Comparisons Fo Fe Fo Fe Fo Fe Fo Fe Fo   Fe
Favorably
Dissonant 29   49.1     33   63.7     33 86.6 58 86.2    
 32   61.6
Consonant 148 105.0 156 112.9 235 113.3 161 138.5 177 130.
5
Unfavorably
Dissonant 249 271.9 229 241.4 157 225.1 206 200.3 20
4 220.9
N 426 418 425 425 413
Chi-square(2) 27.83 31.93 184.45
13.02 32.03




The frequency distributions were tested against the expected ones
by means of Chi2-tests. The expected frequencies were calculated
on the basis of the row- and column totals in the original 5 X 5
contingency tables. These tables, however, contained too many
empty cells, which forced us to group the data into three
categories. Every observed frequency distribution differs
significantly (p <.01) from the expected one. There are fewer
than expected favorably dissonant comparisons, and more than
expected consonant comparisons. Hypothesis 1, read in its more
conservative meaning, is not supported by the data: the actual
number of consonant choices does not exceed the actual number of
dissonant choices (with the exception of the seniority-pay
combination). Since the allocation of respondents to these three
categories is conditioned by their choices made on each dimension
separately, we think that the Chi2-analyses constitute a fairer
test of Hypothesis 2 than just comparing the absolute frequencies
of consonant and dissonant choices. In addition to the Chi2-
analyses, we tested the single proportions of consonant choices
for each input-outcome combination separately against the
expected proportion of consonant choices, by means of z-tests
(Hays, 1972, p.723-724). The obtained z-values are given in the
last row of Table 24, and all but the z-value for the job level -
pay combination are significant beyond the .01 level. The
proportion of consonant choices for the Job level - pay
combination is significantly larger than the expected one at the
.05 level.
3.3 Relation between Social Comparison Type, Tendency to Compare
and Injustice Experience and Satisfaction
According to Hypothesis i, we expected a significant posi-
tive relation between the degree of consonance of the comparison
and the respondents' scores on the justice scale. This hypothesis
was tested by solving the regression equation of justice experi-
ence on the degree of consonance of the social comparison choice.
We expect a significant positive slope of the regression line.
The regression analysis is summarized in Table -25·
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Table 25
Linear Regression of Justice and Satisfactlon on
Consonance of Comparison
Dependent
Variable            a       b      SEb F Df     p.
Justice 14.378 5.110 .654 60.952 1,301 .01
Satisfaction 19.640 .535 .303 3.129 1,301 .10
Feelings of justice (or injustice) are predicted by the
following equation:
(In)Justice = 14.378 + 5.110 Degree of Consonance
The multiple correlation equals f=.410, which means that only
16.84 % of the variance in the injustice scores is explained by
the degree of consonance of the comparison. The slope of the
regression line is positive and significant (2 <.01).
The regression of satisfaction (total score) on degree of
consonance (R=.101), summarized in Table -25, does not permit us
to reject the nullhypothesis. The slope of the regression line is
positive, but not significant, as expected.
According to Hypothesis _5, we expected a negative relation
between the persons' tendency to compare and the justice score
within the group of unfavorably dissonant comparers, and a posi-
tive relation between these two variables within the group of
favorably dissonant comparers. Within the group of consonant
comparers we expected that the scores of those who highly tend to
compare themselves with others were closer to the 'just' point of
the scale than the scores of those persons showing a low tendency
to compare themselves. These hypotheses (5A, 5B and 5C) are
tested by calculating the regression equation of justice on the
tendency to compare within each of these subgroups separately.
These analyses are summarized in Table -26·
The relation between tendency to compare and injustice is
significant within the unfavorably dissonant comparison group
(R=.275), giving support to Hypothesis 1&.
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Table 26
Linear Regression of Justice on the Tendency to Compare within
Each Type of Comparison
Type of Comparison        a        b     SEb F M      p.
Unfavorably Dissonant 43.698 -3.039 .854 12.658 1,155 .01
Consonant 44.809 -1.417 .790 3.217 1,127 .10
Favorably Dissonant 46.455 -1.376 1.301 1.119 1,22 .50
The predicted significant positive relation between tendency to
compare and injustice does not show within the favorably
dissonant comparison group (11=.220). The regression line for the
consonant comparisons group does not approach the 'Just' point of
the scale with an increasing tendency to compare, but on the
contrary, there is a trend in the opposite direction (R=.157).
Thus, hypotheses 58 and -12 are not supported by our data. This
lack of support for Hypotheses 58 and 5-Q is largely attribu.table
to the fact that the three groups of respondents, i.e. the
unf avorably and favorably dissonant comparison groups   and   the
consonant comparison group, differ with respect to experienced
'underpayment'. The mean justice scores of these three groups on
the justice scale indicate that favorably dissonant comparers
feel less underpaid than consonant comparers who, in turn, feel
less underpaid than unfavorably dissonant comparers (-MFavo rably
MDissonant = 42.04; EConsonant = 40.43 and -Munfavorably Dissonant
= 34.02). Only 6.4% of the total sample received a justice score
higher than 48, indicative of feelings of overpayment. And only
12.5% of the subjects felt 'Justly' paid. The other 81.2%
reported feelings of underpayment.
3.4 Relation between Injustice and Injustice Reduction Tendencies
Hypothesis 6 states that there is a significant correlation
between the experience of injustice and the tendency to reduce
injustice feelings through changes in one's own situation, and no
relation between injustice experience and the tendency to reduce
it by changing the situation of the comparison other(s). In order
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to test this hypothesis partial correlation coefficients were
calculated between the scores on the justice scale and the sepa-
rate reduction items, controlling for satisfaction (which corre-
lates significant positively with justice: 11(311)= ·375 -2 <·01).
Since some of the mechanisms function in the direction of over-
payment reduction (e.g. lowering one's outcomes, increasing one's
contributions) and others function in the direction of under-
payment reduction (e.g. increasing one's outcomes and decreasing
one's inputs), and still other mechanisms are not directional
(e.g. complaining, leaving the field) Hypothesis 6 needs further
specification. With respect to underpayment reduction mechanisms,
we expect a negative correlation between experienced justice and
the reduction tendency (Hypothesis 6.A). With respect to the over-
payment reduction mechanism, we expect a positive correlation
between experienced justice and these tendencies (Hypothesis  68).
Taking into account that a large majority of the respondents
reported feeling underpaid, we would predict a negative
correlation to exist between experienced justice and the not-
directional reduction mechanisms (Hypothesis 6C). The results of
the correlational analysis are given in Table 27· The
underpayment reduction mechanisms are indicated by '(U)'; the
ove rpayment reduction mechanisms  by  '(0)',  and  the  not-
directional ones by '(N)'. The last column shows the partial
correlation coefficients between justice and reduction tendency,
with satisfaction being partialled out.
Most of the correlation coefficients are not significant. We
find only that the more a person feels underpaid, the more he
tends to raise his outcomes (wants more pay: r- -.41, f <·01)
asks for pay raise: I= -.35, 11 <·01), and the more he has
considered looking for another job (r= -.25, 12 <.01).
Hypothesis -tA is only supported for 'increasing outcomes' and
Hypothesis .€g  only  for ' leaving-the-field' .  Only two correlation
coefficients are significant with respect to considering changes
in another person's situation:   The more persons   feel unde rpald,
the more they are inclined to say that their colleagues are paid
too little, and the more they want their colleagues to ask for a
pay-increase (r- -·20 and r- -·22, respectively, both£<.01).
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Table 27
Correlations and Partial Correlations Between Justice (J)and Injustice Reduction Tendencies (R) Controlling for
Satisfaction (S)
Reduction Mechanisms                    r
RJ /RJ.S
Complaining about work (N) -.20 -.03
Interest in own job (N) .05 -.07
Staying at home (N) -.02 .02
Taking another job (N) -.38* -.25 *
Absenteeism (N) .00 .07
Own Situatior
Working less hard (U) -.10 -.05
Working harder (O) .01 .05
Wanting more pay (U) -.49* -.41 *
Doing the same for less pay (O) .10 .07
Asking for a pay-increase (U) -.432 -.35*
Other's Situation
Making others work harder (U) -.07 -.06
!!aving the impression that others -.08 -.05
work less (U)
Making others work less (0) -.02 .00
Having the impression that others -.22* -.20*
earn too little (0)
Having the impression that others -.14* -.10
earn much (U)
Making others ask for a pay-increase(U)-.25*   -.22*
Making others look for another job (N) -.11 -.09
+ p<.05
* P<.01
Increasing another person's pay is considered to be a reaction to
own overpayment. Hence, we would have expected here a positive
relation, or at least a non-significant correlation. In general,
we have to conclude that our correlational data do not support
the hypotheses about the relation between injustice and the
tendency to reduce it. The mean scores on each of these reduction
tendencies are given in Appendix E. All of these means, except
one, are less than 3, i.e., the midpoint of the five-point
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scales, indicating that the respondents on the average seldomly
took into consideration the different modes of responding to
injustice. The small standard deviations show that the sample is
rather homogeneous, and this lack of variability in the sample
might account for the lack of significant relations. Indeed, the
items correlating significantly, have the largest variances.
Therefore we decided to take another look at the reduction
tendencies. For each respondent we constructed four indices,
namely, two indices for reduction of underpayment and two indices
for the reduction of overpayment. One of the underpayment reduc-
tion indices and one of the overpayment reduction indices
involves 'changing the own situation' (SEUN, SEOV), the other
relates to 'changing the other persons' situation'  (OTUN,  OTOV) .
These indices were constructed by counting the number of under-
payment reduction items on which the subject scored highly
(scores 4 or 5) and the number of overpayment reduction items on
which the respondent got a low score (scores 1 or 2) and vice
versa, and these countings were separately done for items related
to the respondents' own situation and for items related to
changes in their colleagues' situation. These indices were
correlated with the justice scores.
Table 29
Table 28
Correlations and Partial Correlations
Intercorrelations Between the Four
Between Justice (J) and Injustice
Indices of Injustice Reduction Reduction Indices (I) Controlling for
Own Situation Other's Situation Satisfaction (S) and Injustice Reduction
Under Over Under Over JI JI.S rJI.SI'
Indices     r        r
(SEUN) (SEOV) (OTUN) (OTOV)
SEUN -.401 -.312 -.25*
SEUN -- -.512 -.05 .0 7                                                                              *                      *                      *SEOV .42 .28 .20
SEOV n=449 -- .18* .01 OTUN .06 .03 .03
OTUN n=436 n=436 -- -.14* OTOV -.03 -.00 -.00
OTOV n=436 n=436 n=469     --
1  p < .01
2 p<.01
The construction of these indices makes clear that they are not
independent from each other (Table 28 gives the intercorrelations
between the four indices). The correlations between justice and
the four indices, presented in Table 29 consist of partial
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correlation coefficients, controlling for the second index within
the 'own' and 'other' category.
The correlations in Table 29- show that the more people feel
underpaid, the more they make use of underpayment reduction
mechanisms   (SEUN),   and   the  less  they  make   use  of ove rpayment
reduction mechanisms (SEOV), aimed at changing different aspects
of their own situation. Moreover, it is shown that feelings of
justice are unrelated to the frequency in which mechanisms are
used that are aimed at changing aspects of the situation of
colleagues (OTUN, OTOV). These data fully support Hypothesis .6.
4. Discussion
We have tried to examine some aspects of the interpersonal
inJustice model in a field situation. These aspects are: the
choice of a relative input- and outcome position (by means of
social comparison choice), the relation between the choice of a
comparison person and experienced injustice and satisfaction, and
the relation between experienced injustice and injustice reduc-
tion.
The choice of a comparison person reveals the two tendencies
postulated by Festinger (1954): the tendency toward uniformity
showing itself in the preference for similar others, and the
upward tendency, showing itself in the preference for others who
occupy superior positions on the input- and the outcome- dimen-
sion. The preference for superior others is related to the
(objective) importance of the comparison dimension for the deter-
mination of pay. We found that the upward tendency correlates
with the relevance of the dimension for pay. Within the context
of the problem of injustice, it seems more important to look at
the relative positions people choose for themselves in the input-
outcome space, rather than looking at the relative positions on
each dimension separately. We used Patchen's terminology to
describe the different types of comparison choices: unfavorably
and favorably dissonant comparisons and consonant comparisons.
These terms are used only in a descriptive way without reference
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to the cognitive dissonance approach to injustice. Approximately
50% of the employees compare themselves in an unfavorably disso-
nant manner, i.e. they compare themselves with persons who occupy
a superior position on the pay-dimension taking into account
their relative input-positions. Approximately 45% of the group
compares in a consonant way, 1.e. they compare themselves with
others who occupy corresponding relative positions on the input-
and outcome-dimension. The former group of employees constructs,
so to speak an unjust exchange situation (underpayment), while
tlie latter group constructs a just exchange situation. The un-
favorably dissonant comparers compare themselves with someone who
is relatively favored by the employer. The consonant comparers
choose someone who is (proportionality) equally treated by the
employer. Only a small number of employees compare in a favorably
dissonant way, i.e. they compare themselves with someone who is
relatively disfavored by the employer. As expected, we found a
significant relation between the consonance of the comparison and
the experienced justice: the more dissonantly people compared
themselves, the more they felt unjustly paid. That injustice is
largely connected with the perceived dissonance of the comparison
and not by the absolute amount of pay is demonstrated by the non-
significant correlation between feelings of injustice and pay (11
= .073, Df = 349). It is striking that these employees only
expressed different degrees of feeling underpaid. Only a very
small number of them expressed that they were justly or overpaid.
This finding might suggest that at least the overt expres-
sion of injustice - in a study that would be reported to the
direction of the firm - has a strategic component. Feelings of
satisfaction are correlated with experience of justice (1 - ·375,
Df=311, 2 <.01). There is, however, a non-significant relation
between satisfaction and the degree of consonance of the social
comparison, indicating that satisfaction is rather an accompa-
nying feeling, that goes together with being justly treated in
the exchange.
The moderating effect of the relevance of the other for
social comparison (tendency to compare) has only been partially
demonstrated in this field study. It is shown that favorably
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dissonant comparers feel more underpaid the more they tend to
compare themselves with the other person. Among the persons
comparing themselves in a consonant way, we find the same trend:
persons feel less justly treated as the tendency to compare them-
selves with the other person increases. This relation, opposite
to what we expected, is due to the fact that we only deal with
'underpayment'.
Finally we found some relations between experience of in-
justice and injustice reduction tendencies, namely the more
people feel underpaid the more they want an increase in their
pay, and the more they considered looking for another job. Some
of our results indicate that there exists a kind of solidarity
feeling   amo ng these employees: Contrary to expectations, we found
a significant negative relation between feelings of justice and
the tendency to raise the pay of others. The more people feel
underpaid, the more they considered encouraging others to ask for
a pay-increase. In line with our view on injustice, i.e. in-
justice as a characteristic of the relation between the person
and his exchange partner, we found that feelings of injustice are
only significantly related to the reduction indices relating to
changing one's own situation. The more persons feel underpaid,
the  more unde rpayment reduction mechanisms   and   the   less   ove r-
payment reduction mechanism they take into consideration.
In our final discussion, we will delve more deeply into
these topics.
163
CHAPTER IX. GENERAL DISCUSSION
The interpersonal injustice model consists of three main
elements: 1) the construction of the (exchange) situation; 2) the
evaluation of the exchange, and 3) reactions in or to an unjust
exchange situation. Our discussion of the studies, described in
Chapters V to VIII, is ordered in terms of these three elements.
In the course of this discussion, it might turn out that more
questions are raised than answered. We will try, at least, to
suggest directions in which answers to these questions can be
found.
1. The Construction of the Exchange Situation
Social comparison plays an important role in the process
leading to the construction of the exchange situation. A distinc-
tion is made between two types of social comparison situations:
open and closed comparison situations. The social comparison
dynamic manifests itself in different ways in the two types of
situations and hence, is examined through different paradigms.
Knowledge about social comparison processes in open situations is
gained through the study of comparison choice behavior. In a
closed situation, social comparison processes are studied through
the examination of person's (competitive) reactions in a given
social comparison structure. Both types of research have been
reported.
1.1 Social Comparison Choice in the Context of Injustice
The choice of a comparison person gives information about
the relative position on a relevant comparison dimension a person
attributes to himself. In Chapter VIII, the comparison choice is
studied in a field situation, using pay and pay-related factors
as the relevant comparison dimensions. In line with results
obtained in laboratory experiments, we found that the majority of
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people choose someone who is relatively superior or similar to
oneself (Suls and Miller,1977). Only a small group compared down-
wardly. Downward comparison is mainly interpreted as defensive
(Hakmiller,1966; Samuel,1973; von Grumbkow,1980). This kind of
interpretation of comparison choice behavior refers to the use
people make of it. The question about the instrumentality of
comparison choices,    has been answered    in very speculative    way s
(Gruder,1977; Austin,1977). We will come back to this point after
we have treated the choice on the combined contribution-outcome
dimension.
For describing the contribution-outcome combinations, we
have borrowed Patchen's terms. We made a distinction between
consonant, unfavorably dissonant, and favorably dissonant
choices, and we found that most of the comparisons made were
consonant or unfavorably dissonant. What does this mean ? First,
the way we asked people to indicate a comparison person might
suggest that our respondents really compared themselves with only
one other employee. It is possible, however, that people had more
than one person in mind while answering these comparison ques-
tions. We think that this aspect of social comparison is rather
irrelevant.  What  is impo rtant, however,   is  that the choice  of  one
or more comparison persons reflects the way people construct
their own relevant social exchange situation. Choosing in a con-
sonant way means that people construct a just or fair situation
for themselves. Their attention is focused mainly on others who
are treated in a similar way by their mutual or respective ex-
change partners. Those who made dissonant choices (unfavorably
dissonant choices) see in their environment others who are
favored by their exchange partners, compared to the way they are
treated by theirs. Only a few are focused on other persons who
are relatively disfavored. The respondents in our study were
asked explicitly to choose someone in the context of the evalua-
tion of their own situation. In order to find an answer to the
question about the usefulness of the comparison, we have to
examine its instrumentality within this evaluative context.
Goodman (1974) states that people make comparisons that
satisfy their needs. Two major motives have been distinguished:
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the need for accurate self-evaluation and -need for self-
enhancement (Gruder, 1977; Latan6, 1966; Mettee and Smith, 1977).
This distinction corresponds with the distinction made by Wilke
(1980) between information-accentuation and reward-accentuation,
and one made by Syroit et al. (1980) between cognitive and social
utility. It is still very unclear which type of comparison is
more self-enhancing or more self-evaluating. It has been argued
that downward comparisons and favorably dissonant comparisons
are, in fact, defensive ones, i.e. that these comparisons accen-
tuate the person's own relatively favorable position vis-A-vis
relevant others. Upward and unfavorably dissonant comparisons
accentuate persons' relatively inferior positions and, hence,
would impair their self-esteem. Our data suggest that more people
prefer to accentuate their relatively inferior position than
their relatively superior position. These upward and unfavorably
dissonant comparisons, on the other hand, indicate persons' wish
to identify with those who are in better positions. In locus-of-
comparison research this comparison with superior persons has
been interpreted in terms of the self-evaluation motive (Gruder,
1977) ·  Assuming that people strive toward justice, one would
expect people to choose consonantly. Indeed, more persons than
expected made consonant choices on each dimension separately. A
large group, however, compared themselves in an unfavorably dis-
sonant way. Austin (1977) suggests that the choice of a compar-
ison person reflects the conflicting needs for justice and own-
gain-maximization. The simultaneous impact of both tendencies on
people's behavior has been shown in a study by Messick and Sentis
(1979)· Unfavorable comparisons are made by those persons who
want to accentuate the injustice of their own relative outcomes.
Favorable comparisons are made to protect a relatively favorable
position. The choice of a particular comparison person has,
according to Austin's suggestion, at least partly, a strategic
character and provides arguments to defend a favorable position
or to highlight the injustice of an unfavorable one. In a strate-
gic interpretation of social choice behavior, it is implied that
people have Judged the exchange prior to making the comparison
choice, thereby justifying or supporting their injustice judg-
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ment. Opposite to this backward-processing view on social compar-
ison, we have proposed a forward processing approach in our
interpersonal injustice model. In our view, people need to make
comparisons of inputs, i.e. deter,nining their relative value-in-
exchange, and of outcomes, i.e. determining their relative value-
in exchange as reflected by the exchange partner, before judging
the exchange situation. Social comparison supplies the informa-
tion that is needed for maki rig an evaluative statement about the
exchange. We think now that both approaches are worthwhile to
examine more closely, i.e. to study social choice behavior in
exchange situations both as an antecedent to and as a consequence
of injustice perception. In our explanation of the 'lack of
expected results' in the study on the role of an internal stan-
dard and of social comparison (Chapter VII) we stated that being
unequally paid served both as a factor explaining the injustice
experience and - in one of the two comparison inequity conditions
- as an argument in the negotiation with the reward allocator.
More conclusive evidence about the role of social comparison
choices can only be gained through studies that allow for causal
interpretations. Neither the field study, reported in Chapter
VIII, nor the experiment described in Chapter VII provide
adequate answers to this problem.
1.2 Motivational Effects of Social Comparison of Inputs and
Outcomes
The experiment described in Chapter V, is an example of the
study of social comparison processes in a closed comparison
situation. We have tried to demonstrate that information about
relative rewards in the absence of information about relative
performances is interpreted by a person in terms of relative
ability for a given task. It was expected that persons would
react in a similar way to relative reward feedback as to relative
performance feedback. The effects of social comparison of perfor-
mance on subsequent performance has been sufficiently demonstrat-
ed (Rijsman, 1974; Martens and White, 1975; Poppe and Rijsman,
1980). Two aspects  of the comparative feedback constitute  impo r-
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tant factors determining the motivational effect, namely: 1) the
content of the feedback, i.e. the relative position given to the
person on the comparison dimension, and 2) the feedback-mode,
i.e. whether the difference in performances refer to differences
between individual abilities or to status differences of groups.
The motivational effects of individual performance comparison are
adequately explained by Rijsman's social comparison model (see
Chapter II). The motivational effects in the categorical feedback
mode are totally different and are partially explained within the
framework of intergroup comparison: persons tend to confirm the
(relative) status of their group, in so far as this confirmation
contributes to the attainment or maintainance of a positive self-
identity. The disconfirmation of the (relative) inferior status
has not been clearly demonstrated. The intergroup comparison
explanation does not provide a basis for making predictions in
the equal· status situations.
The patterns of the results in our study on reward compar-
ison parallel those obtained by Rijsman and his colleagues in
studies of performance comparison. Thus is seems that persons
interpret relative reward feedback in a similar way as relative
performance feedback. The evidence is, however, not conclusive.
First, some of the expected differences between conditions were
not significant. Second, the patterns of data reflecting the long
term effects of reward comparison are not in accordance with the
expected pattern . Third, the performance differences are much
smaller in our study than in Rijsman's (1974). Reward comparison
effects seem to be a weakened version of performance comparison
effects. It is almost certain that relative rewards are not
exclusively translated into relative abilities to perform a task.
Besides this informational aspect, rewards have a controlling
function as well  (Deci,  1980) .  We also plausibly assume that the
transition from rewards to abilities leaves more room for defen-
sive attribution (Shaver, 1975) than the performance - ability
transition. The fact that unequally paid subjects perceive the
reward allocation as less fair than equally paid subjects indi-
cates that they do not perceive a perfect relation between
rewards and performances. This evaluative connotation is largely
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absent in the case of performance comparisons.
It has been shown that people behave in accordance with
social comparison theory predictions in situations where the
relation with the comparison person constitutes the dominant
feature, i.e. when the attention is focused on the comparison of
contributions, performances or abilities and on rewards, or out-
comes, separately. Although perceptions of injustice occur, as in
the case of reward comparisons, they do not largely influence the
comparison dynamics. In the next paragraph we will treat the
situation in which persons receive simultaneously information
about their contributions and outcomes and in which their atten-
tion will be focused on their relation with the exchange partner.
2. Evaluation of the Exchange
Peoples' striving toward a comfortably superior position or
toward the confirmation of the ego-enhancing status of their
group are expressions of the dynamic aspect of their relation
with a social comparison person. When persons are informed about
their relative position between similar others on a contribution-
and an outcoine-dimension, simultaneously, their attention will
shift from the social comparison to the social exchange relation.
Injustice and justice relate to the social exchange and not to
the social comparison.
2.1 Social Comparison of Inputs and Outcomes and Internal
Standard as Injustice Standards
In our interpersonal model of injustice we have stressed the
importance of the social comparison standard for the explanation
of perceptions of injustice. Some of our results support this
view. Hypothetical work situations in which the proportionality
between person's own inputs and other's inputs and own and
other's contributions was not respected were judged less fair and
less comfortable than situations in which the proportionality
rule obtained. (Chapter VI). Overpayment was perce ived as less
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unfair than underpayment. Actually overpaid, justly paid and
underpaid students judged their pay as low, sufficient and high,
respectively. The results of the field study show a clear
relation between employees' relative position in the combined
input-outcome space and their fairness judgment. Our results,
taken together with those of other studies already mentioned
(Chapter  IV) , justify the conclusion that justice perception and
experience are - at least· partially - determined by the actual
social comparison of inputs and outcomes. The injustice model
that we defend states further that the very elements used in the
evaluation of an exchange are not the inputs of the person and
his comparison person and the outcomes of both, but the relative
inputs and relative outcomes of the person which stands for the
perceived and the reflected value-in-exchange. At this point, we
have to reconsider our implicit view on the role of the internal
standard in justice perception and experience. By stressing the
importance of social comparison in the perception and experience
of injustice, we implicitly underestimated the role of an
internal standard. In one of the experiments (Chapter VII), we
manipulated the violation of an internal standard, namely, by
rewarding the subjects in accordance with faculty regulations or
by not doing so. The concept of internal standard was
operationalized as the prescribed number of credit points for a
given worktime. This operationalization corresponds with other,
such as the one used by Weick and Nesset (1968) and by O'Malley
(1983). These 'working definitions' of internal standard are far
from Pritchard's original definition, but they seem to be the
best possible ones. The concept itself is vague. Before going
into a conceptual analysis, we will briefly review some of our
data relevant to this discussion. Neither a violation of the
comparison standard, nor a violation of the internal standard had
any effect on the fairness judgment measured in the questionnaire
in the experiment in Chapter VII. In the interview study,
however, we found that deviations from both types of justice
standards affected the fairness judgement. Persons that received
less reward than expected on the basis.of a generally accepted
rule perceived that situation as unfair, while those who were
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paid according to this rule perce ived the situation as normal. In
the critical analysis of what might have happened in the high
school while the experiment (described in Chapter VI) was in
progress we implicitly referred to the role of an internal
standard in injustice perception. We hypothesized that in the
course of running the experiment, the high school students
developed expectations about a fair reward for their
participation, thereby setting the stage for injustice to occur.
It seems to us now that the concept of internal standards refers
to peoples' beliefs about justice in a particular situation,
which we have to assume to be present for injustice to be
salient. This belief can be based on (or find its concrete shape
in) a rule, such as a faculty regulation about experimental
participation, or it can be developed through social comparison
(in the past) or through interpersonal communication as was the
case in the high school, and so forth. Social comparison and the
internal standard function in a kind of complementary way, in the
sense that violations of an internal standard become more marked
for a person if there are others in his psychological environment
that are treated differently. This complementary functioning of
both types of justice standards is shown in e.g. O'Malley's
study. Subjects, identifying themselves with a person who is paid
less than expected, rated the situaion as less fair when others
in that situation were paid according to or more than expected,
and 'overpaid' subjects rated the situation as fair when others
in that situation were 'overpaid' too. The mean fairness ratings
of the four situations obtained in our interview study (Chapter
VII) show this complementary relation, too.
With respect to the notion of internal standard we, finally,
want to suggest that there is a correspondence between this
concept and the procedural justice notion. The way the internal
standard is operationalized in our study, as well as in Weick's
research and in O'Malley's and Austin et al.'s experiments,
refers, in fact, to procedures prescribing how much should be
paid for a given contribution (time, type and duration of a task,
and so forth). Violations  of the internal standard in these
studies are always deviations from these agreements or, so to
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speak, represent breaches of contracts. These 'contracts' can be
implied in the type of exchange relationship, as is the case in
Schwinger's approach to injustice fSchwinger, 1982) or embodied
in a formal contract, such as the faculty rules in our study, or
they can develop in the course of the exchange interaction. The
internal standard seems to be, in our opinion, a linking concept
between the study of procedural justice and the study of distrib-
utive justice.
2.2 The Relevance of the Comparison Person and Injustice
Perception
In the preceding paragraph, social comparison of inputs and
outcomes provides the basic elements used in the exchange evalua-
tion, namely: the perceived and reflected relative value-in-
exchange. In this paragraph we will discuss the role of social
comparison processes in the evaluation of the exchange. We made a
distinction between the locomotion tendencies and the non-
locomotion tendency (see page 45). Locomotion refers to the
tendency of the person to change his position relative to the
position of comparison persons. These tendencies, resulting in a
person's striving toward a comfortable, relatively superior posi-
tion vis-&-vis a comparison person on a relevant dimension,
operate as long as the comparison relation constitutes the most
impo rtant aspect  of the interpersonal situation. These tendencies
are overruled by the person's concern for justice at the moment
the exchange partner and, hence, the exchange relationship
becomes the dominant aspect of the situation, i.e. at the moment
that validation or non-validation by the exchange partner is
brought about. We argued that the non-locomotion tendency or the
tendency to compare remains 'active' in the exchange context, and
that it is an important determinant of the relevance of the com-
parison standard in the evaluation of (in)justice. Some of our
results reported in Chapter VI and in the field study support
this view.
In Experiment 13 (Chapter VI) it was shown that the tendency
to compare' with another person increased with an increasing
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input-similarity between person and other. This relation was most
clear in equitable situations, less clear in overpayment situa-
tions and absent in underpayment situations. We found, too, that
people tend to compare themselves with others more in equitable
than in inequitable situations. Equitable and inequitable situa-
tions do not differ only with respect to the degree of injustice
but, by the very nature of injustice, they differ with respect to
their complexity, as well. A situation where relative contribu-
tions parallel exactly the relative outcomes of the comparison
partners is much less complex than a situation where by defini-
tlon this exact parallelism is lacking. It might well be the case
that a person's tendency to compare with others is influenced by
the ease with which the comparison is made. It has been shown
that situations where the comparison is difficult to make are
perceived as more just than complex comparison situations (Von
Grumbkow and Wilke, 1978). The fact that a person's attention is
drawn to the inequitable relationship with his exchange partner
in unjust situations and not in Just situations is another
plausible reason for the low tendency to compare with others.
In  studies  lB  and  1C in Chapter  VI, we examined   the  mode r---   --
ating effect of the tendency to compare on equity judgments and
comfort ratings. In support of our predictions, we found that
inequitable situations were judged more unfair, the more a person
tended to compare himself with the other, and that equitable
situations were judged fairer the higher the tendency to compare.
In the field study (Chapter VIII), it was shown that within the
group of unfavorably dissonant and consonant comparers justice
judginents were significantly negatively correlated with the
measure of comparison tendency, indicating that the higher the
tendency to compare, the more unjust a work situation was judged.
We were not able to replicate these findings in a laboratory
experiment. A few remarks need to be made with respect to the
tendency to compare. In line with Festinger's theorizing we
hypothesized the tendency to compare to be a function of the
similarity between person and other on the relevant comparison
dimension. Wheeler et al. (1969) suggest that persons will choose
someone else on the basis of overall similarity. Zanna, Goethals
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and Hill (1975) sllow that people prefer to compare with others
who belong to the same category for the evaluation of their
ability. Membership was not defined in terms of ability-
similarity. In line with our reasoning 'about the relation between
the relevance of the social comparison and justice experience,
one should expect that persons who compare themselves with others
who are similar to them on other than contribution characteris-
tics will judge unJust situations as more unjust than persons who
compare themselves with dissimilar others. In our field study we
were able to make a distiriction between employees comparing them-
selves within their own sex category and those comparing them-
selves with members or the other sex group. The mean justice
scores of both groups were conpared for unfavorably dissonant,
favorably dissonant and consonant comparers, separately. The
results of these tests (t-tests for uncorrelated means) are
presented in Table _30.
Table 30
Mean Justice Scores for Three Types of Comparisons with




Comparison Type N Mean N   Mean       t
Unfavorably Dissonant 138 33.39    40 37.35 -2.07*
Consonant 105 39.92    43 42.79 -1.991
Favorably Dissonant    17 41.29 7 40.43 .23
*   p < .05
The differences between tlle corresponding means are in the ex-
pected direction, but only the differences for unfavorably disso-
nant and consonant comparers are significant (p < .05)· These
data indicate that comparisons with the same sex others are more
relevant for the persons than comparisons with members of the
opposite sex group. Other factors than ability similarity or
similarity on non-ability dimensions may influence the degree of
comparison tendency. In one of Rijsman's experiments, an in-
creased comparison tendency was induced by having the experimen-
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ter physically present in the comparison situation, prohibiting
the subjects to escape from comparison (Rijsman, 1974). A more
elaborate analysis of factors influencing the relevance of com-
parison persons (or otherwise stated, the comparison tendency)
might contribute to the analysis of the concept of tendency to
compare. This brings us to our second remark. In the study of
motivational effects of social comparison, such as the studies
done by Rijsman and his colleagues ahd the experiment reported in
Chapter V, the tendency to compare is assumed to be in operation.
In the course of designing a field study in which one tries to
measure the tendency to compare, the investigator is forced to
find a (valid) operationalization, to find a good question and to
think about valid indicators for that concept. We have chosen to
ask people about their comparison frequency, assuming that the
more frequently another is chosen for comparison, the more rele-
vant this other person is. Although we think that this is a valid
operationalization, we are fully aware that this is only one of
the possibilities, and that other questions might have been
equally or more valid and plausible, thus leaving us with
dissatisfaction. It is extremely difficult to define the concept
of comparison tendency, by referring to some behaviors which are
supposed to be indicative for it, such as the frequency of
looking at someone, the wish to take someone's position, and so
forth. In order to avoid post hoc statements about the
functioning   of the comparison tendency   and   to   avo id assumptions
about its functioning, a conceptual clarification is needed. The
best definition that we could give is 'relevance of the (chosen
or given) person for the comparer'.
2.3 Injustice, Dissatisfaction and Discomfort
Unjust situations are experienced as less comfortable than
just situations; people are less satisfied in unjust than in Just
situations, and unjust situations are less pleasant than just
ones. (Patchen, 1961; Wicker and Bushweiler, 1970; Homans, 1953;
Klein, 1973; Pritchard, Dunnette and Jorgenson, 1972; Yuchtman,
1972; Giles and Barrett, 1971; Van Kreveld and Bouwhuis, 1977;
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our studies in Chapter VI and Chapter VIII). We found significant
correlations between injustice experience and expressed
discomfort and dissatisfaction. The results of the field study,
however, show that satisfaction with the job can not be equated
with feeling justly treated. The regression analysis indicates
that the social comparison of contributions and outcomes (degree
of consonance of the comparison) is significantly related to
injustice experience and not to dissatisfaction. Although the
discomfort ratings correlate with the injustice ratings (studies
111 and -1.Q in Chapter VI), we found that discomfort was related
more to the absolute amount of own outcomes than injustice.
Employees' satisfaction with pay is significantly correlated with
the heigth of the monthly salary (-r(458) -·18, -2 <·01), while
monthly salary is not significantly correlated with their justice
scores (11(347) -.07)· On the other hand there is a strong posi-
tive correlation between injustice and pay satisfaction (r(345)
=.55, p <.01).                 
                -
Injustice experience and dissatisfaction are different
concepts. Satisfaction and dissatisfaction represent persons'
attitudes toward situations, that need not be defined in terms of
interpersonal relations. A worker can feel dissatisfied about the
content of his job, or about the non-social work conditions as
well as about his colleagues, his supervisor, his pay and so on.
Injustice on the other hand necessarily contains an interpersonal
aspect. An employee does not feel 'unjust' with respect to the
content of his job, unless he expresses that he is unjustly
treated by his boss who gave him that boring, or dirty, or not
challenging work. Discomfort and dissatisfaction are, to our
opinion, feelings or (negative) attitudes accompanying the in-
justice experience, but as contrasted with injustice experience
they lack the dynamic aspect (Locke, 1976; Lawler, 1971).
2.4 Injustice and Interpersonal Conflict
The relation between interpersonal conflict and injustice is
not an unusual topic in psychology. Until now, justice has been
considered mainly as one of the possible norms that is used in
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conflict resolution (Worchel and Cooper, 1983, pp· 399 ff.;
Pruitt, 1972). We do not think in the first place of justice as a
conflict resolution device. In the interpersonal conception of
injustice, injustice, which is the violation of a just rule, is
essentially an interpersonal conflict between the exchange
partners. Raven and Kruglanski (1970) define an interpersonal
conflict as a 'tension between two or more social entities
(individuals, groups, or larger organizations) which arise from
imcompatibility of actual or desired responses' (1970, p.70).
Thomas(1976) defines a conflict in operational terms as ' a
process which includes the perceptions, emotions, behaviors, and
outcomes of the two parties', 'which begins when one party per-
ceives that the other has frustrated, or is about to frustrate,
some concern of his' (1976, p. 891). Our definition of inter-
personal injustice as the perception of a mismatch between the
relative value-in-exchange a person ascribes to himself and the
relative value-in-exchange of that person, reflected in the judg-
ment of the exchange partner, is not in contradiction with the
above given definitions of interpersonal conflict
We can only refer to indirect evidence supporting our view
on injustice, being an interpersonal conflict. The conflict
concept was introduced for explaining the unexpected results of
the experiment described in Chapter VII. We assumed that the
subjects in the unjust situations decided to solve tlie problem
through direct contact with the unjustly behaving assistant,
depending on the number and the quality of arguments they had at
their disposal. In the condition where they could refer only to
the fact that their colleague was favored (without being dis-
favored themselves), they probably decided not to go to the
assistant. In the situation where they could refer to the viola-
tion of the faculty rule and to the violation of the equality
(comparison) rule, they most likely decided to contact their
employer. The interview data support this analysis. Other, in-
direct evidence is found in the studies done by Ross, Thibaut and
Evenbeck (1971), Lawler (1975) and Lawler and Thompson (1978),
where unJustly treated individuals formed revolutionary coali-
tions against their unjustly behaving leader or protested against
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the unjustly behaving management. The way people react to situa-
tions is an expression of the meaning they give to that situa-
tion. Negotiating with the employer, protesting against him or
for'ming revolutionary coalitions are indicative for interpersonal
conflict experience.
Kelley (1979) makes a distinction between coordination
conflicts and exchange conflicts. On the surface, one is inclined
to categorize injustice in the exchange conflict category. Solu-
tions of exchange conflicts are rather simple. It is sufficient
that at least one of the conflicting parties 'gives in', e.g.,
that one of the parties raises the outcomes of the other. In-
justice, conceived of as the lack of qorrespondence between one's
own appraisal and the appraisal by a relevant other person, is
not solved by the mere increase of one's material or immaterial
outcomes. In our theoretical analysis (Chapter I to III) we
established the link between the concept of justice and Rijsman's
concept of social validation. Being unjustly treated is similar
to being devalidated, which in Rijsman's analysis, corresponds
with the impossibility to coordinate one's action tendencies
toward oneself with the action tendencies of the devalidating
person toward the perceiver. We are more inclined to class in-
justice in the coordination conflict category of Kelley. If a
person feels unjustly treated he accuses his exchange partner
(implicitly or explicitly) of committing an unjust  act   towa rd
him. Redress of injustice implies that the unjustly behaving
party in the conflict 'pleas guilty', and re-established the
other's relative personal worth.
2.5 And What about Overpayment ?
Injustice, as distinguished from Rijsman's social validation
concept, refers to -what is traditionally labeled
- situations of
underpayment  as  well as situations  of ove rpayment. Overpayment
and interpersonal conflict seem to be in apparent contradiction
to each other. It is unlikely that an employee who perceives his
salary as compared with that of his colleagues as high comes into
conflict with his employer, or that a child who receives more
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candies than his friends will dislike his benefactor. Effects of
overpayment on production behavior of employees in the 'qualifi-
cation attack' studies have been re-interpreted by Andrews and
Valenzi (1970) in terms of reactions of these employees to
devalued self-esteem. Twenty out of the 36 studies on overpayment
mentioned in the Adams and Freedman-bibliography (1976) are
liable to Andrews and Valenzi's criticism. Only 6 out of the
remaining 16 studies show overpayment effects, in accordance with
inequity theory,   but  most of these are piece-rate ove rpayment
studies (Andrews, 1967; Lawler, Koplin, Young and Fadem, 1968;
Pritchard, Dunnette and Jorgenson, 1972; Wiener, 1970; and
Garland, 1973). The decrease in production under piece-rate over-
payment conditions is explained by Von Grumbkow and Wilke (1978)
as  a striving toward an equitably, hourly pay. In hourly over-
payment situations the inequity reduction effect is seldom
observed.
As far as we have examined overpayment situations, they
constituted a larger problem for us than for the subjects or the
respondents in our studies. Only 7.75% of the employees in our
field study compared themselves in a favorably dissonant way, and
only 6.4% of the sample received a justice score that was indi-
cative for 'overpayment perception'. The post-hoc analyses  per-
formed on the last five subjects of each condition in the experi-
ment reported in Chapter VI reveal that underpaid subjects were
less motivated than the justly paid and overpaid subjects. On the
other  hand, we observed that hypothetical ove rpayment situations
were rated significantly less fair than just situations, and that
subjects who received more pay than their colleagues gave a more
distinct judgment about the unfairness of the situation than
those who were paid less than others (Chapters V and VI).
The lack of overpayment reduction effects can be explained
by referring to the higher threshold for overpayment. People can
more easily justify for themselves and for others that their
exchange partner overpaid them, by e.g., pointing to his generos-
ity, or by referring to their superiority and so forth. Still, it
is worthwhile to ask the question about the meaning of over-
payment for the person being overpaid. One may assume that, as is
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the case with underpayment, overpaid persons will try to under-
stand why a reward allocator gives them more than they deserve.
Leventhal (1976) states that reward allocators can have different
goals or intentions, such as being fair, controlling group
membership, maximizing production, preventing conflict between
the receivers of outcomes, provoking high quality work and so
forth. Gouldner (1960) suggests that 'overpaying' someone is
useful  for  the  rewa rd distributor since this gives him credit  and
puts the other person in debt. Overpayment is thus a means of
gaining power over others, which can be used by the reward allo-
cator to get things done by the receiver, or to force him to
help. Overpayment experience can be related to the pe rcep tion of
loss of power and can represent a kind of anticipatory reaction
to a coming interpersonal conflict (Brehm and Cole, 1966;
Schopler and Thompson, 1968).
Overpayment, especially in zero-sum situations, often im-
plies that others are underpaid, relative to oneself. Reactions
to overpayment can be interpreted as reactions to underpayment of
the other person, with whom one compares. Overpayment experiences
in this sense,  are  a  kind of 'vicarious unde rpayment experi-
ences', or instances of what is called by Weick 'other in-
equity' . Other inequity forms a threat to the personal contract
(Lerner, 1977): the overpaid person perceives in others what can
happen to himself. There is little evidence supporting these
views on overpayment injustice. In a recent unpublished study
done by Caminada (1983, Note 1), subjects were asked to judge
advantageous and disadvantageous social situations. Preliminary
analyses on the data of his study show a large lack of agreement
about the fairness judgments of advantageous situations. OnlY 32%
to 65% of his subjects (depending on the situation represented)
rated the advantageous situations as unfair (against 78% to 89%
for the disadvantageous situations). Eight to 32% rated the
advantageous situations as being fair (against 1% to 5% for the
disadvantageous situations). Advantageous situations were diffi-
cult to judge by 37% to 46% of the subjects (against 10% to 20%
for the advantageous situations). The most important reason for
their difficulties was that the advantage for self was often
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related to the other's disadvantage, so that it seemed difficult
to respond unequivocally to that ambiguous situation. Only a very
few subjects responded about disadvantageous situations in a
similar  (but  reve rsed)  way.
We think that it is premature to cross out the concept of
overpayment in the context of injustice, but the aforementioned
analysis of overpayment suggests that it is worthwhile to con-
sider it not as opposite to but as distinct from underpayment.
3. Reactions to/in Unjust Exchange Situations
Reactions to or in unjust situations are attempts to solve
the interpersonal conflict. The immediate behavioral reactions of
the unjustly paid individuals in the experiment described in
Chapter VII express unce rtainty. The subjects were apparently
looking for information about what was happening to them. They
were in search of a meaning for the situation. In O'Malley's
study (1983), the experimenter was instructed to answer the ques-
tions and remarks made by the subjects in a standardized way. In
a personal communication to this author, O'Malley (1983, Note 3)
mentioned that the underpaid subjects asked more questions or
made more remarks than the others. Unfortunately these questions
and remarks were not systematically examined.
Besides looking for information, unjustly treated persons
will try to reduce or eliminate the injustice, i.e. they try to
solve the interpersonal conflict. We assume that, in the first
place, people will do this in face-to-face contact with the un-
justly behaving exchange partner, alone or together with other
unjustly treated colleagues. The results of the interview study
(Chapter VII) provide some support for this view.
Other ways of reacting to unjust situations are conceived as
substitutes for the direct negotiation. We have seen that sub-
jects who were less likely to contact the employer-assistant left
the situation earlier than the others, and lowered their atten-
tion. We found a significant relation between the perception of
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injustice at work and the degree to which the employees consid-
e red looking for another job. Three studies report significant
relations between turnover and injustice experience (Dansereau,
Cashman and Graen, 1973; Finn and Lee (1972); Telly, French and
Scott (1971). The self-depriving behavior of subjects, as in the
study by Leventhal, Allen and Kemelgor (1969) and by Leventhal
and Bergman (1969), can be considered as indirect signs of the
wish to terminate the exchange. In the study done by Valenzi and
Andrews (1971), 27% of the underpaid subjects left the experi-
ment, while none of the others did so. Fight-flight reactions
seem to be typical reactions to injustice in exchange relations.
Since injustice is seen as a characteristic of the relation
between the person experiencing the injustice and his exchange
partner, we hypothesized that reactions aimed at changing ele-
ments that primarily 'belong to' the comparison other are less
likely to occur than reactions aimed at changing the relation
with the exchange partner and at changing elements that 'belong
to' oneself. Some data of our field study support this predic-
tion. Contrary to our prediction, we found that perceived in-
justice was correlated with the tendency to increase the compar-
ison person's outcomes, too. This finding, which contradicts
inequity theory predictions as well, shows that there exists
solidarity instead of competition between unjustly treated
colleagues, as is found in some of the conditions in the experi-
ment and interview study in Chapter VII.
The interpersonal conflict interpretation of injustice needs
further development. It allows for the integration of concepts
like power, coalition formation and other interpersonal modes of
behavior into injustice research.
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Samenvatting
In dit proefschrift wordt een sociaal-psychologische analyse
van interpersoonlijke onrechtvaardigheidservaring gepresenteerd
(deel I) en gerllustreerd aan empirisch onderzoek (deel II). Als
uitgangssituatie voor deze analyse is gekozen voor de indirecte
ruilsituatie. Daarin worden drie partijen onde rscheiden:  de  per-
sonen, P en 0 die bijdragen leveren aan de ruil, en de ruilpart-
ner, J, die opbrengsten toewijst of verdeelt. De situatie wordt
geanalyseerd vanuit het standpunt van persoon P.
De twee theoretische pijlers waarop de interpersoonlijke on-
rechtvaardigheidsanalyse steunt, de Onbillijkheidstheorie (Adams,
1965) en het Sociale Competitie Model (Rijsman, 1983), worden in
Hoofdstukken I en II beschreven. De Onbillijkheids-theorie
(Hoofdstuk I) bevat vier onderdelen, die elk afzonderlijk worden
behandeld: 1) de definitie van de elementen van de ruil, de bij-
dragen en opbrengsten van de persoon P en de vergelijkingsper-
soon, 0; 2) de definitie van onbillijkheid; 3) de motivationele
assumptie die inhoudt dat mensen streven naar billijkheid, en 4)
de mechanismen die mensen kunnen hanteren om onbillijkheid te
elimineren of te reduceren. Een eenvoudige herordening van de
ruilelementen in Adams' definitie van onbillijkheid verlegt het
accent van de intra-persoonlijke naar de interpersoonlijke verge-
lijking van bijdragen en opbrengsten. Tevens wordt hierdoor een
duidelijk verband gesuggereerd tussen Onbillijkheid en Sociale
Competitie.
In Hoofdstuk II wordt na een korte schets van de Sociale
Vergelijkingstheorie (Festinger, 1954) uitvoeriger ingegaan op
het Sociale Competitie Model. Dit model beschrijft de dynamische
aspecten van de relatie tussen het individu en de door hem/haar
gecreberde sociale realiteit. Drie basisprocessen kunnen daarin
worden onderscheiden: 1) sociale attributle; 2) sociale verge-
lijking, en 3) sociale validatie. Deze processen houden in: 1) de
overgang van een complexe prikkelconstellatie naar een betekenis-
geving in termen van 'Ik' en 'Ander' ;  2) het streven naar een ge-
matigd superieure positie van het 'Ik' ten opzichte van de
'Ander', en 3) het streven naar erkenning van dit positieve zelf-
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beeld door anderen, hetgeen aan het subjectieve zelfoordeel meer
algemene geldigheid verleent.
In Hoofdstuk III wordt het interpersoonlijk onrechtvaardig-
heidsmodel opgebouwd, gebruik makend van elementen uit de Onbil-
lijkheidstheorie en van processen uit het Sociale Competitie
Model. Met betrekking tot de ruilelementen, bijdragen en opbreng-
sten, wordt een onderscheid gemaakt tussen de ' tekens' en de bij-
dragen- en de opbrengsten- 'betekenis', daaraan toegekend door de
persoon die de ruil evalueert. Deze betekenis wordt hier opgevat
als een oordeel over de bekwaamheid-in-b rede-zin of de ruilwaarde
van het individu. De persoon die de ruil evalueert maakt een oor-
deel over zijn relatieve ruilwaarde op grond van bijdragetekens
die hij/zij bij zichzelf en bij de andere (0) waarneemt. Dit ge-
beurt via een proces van 'comparative appraisal', binnen de
sociale vergelijkingsrelatie tussen P en 0. De bijdragenverhou-
ding is hiervan de uitdrukking. De opbrengstverhouding weerspie-
gelt de relatieve ruilwaarde van de persoon zoals die gereflec-
teerd worut in het gedrag van de ruilpartner, J. Sociale verge-
lijking van opbrengsten vindt plaats in een 'reflected appraisal'
proces. Essentieel aan opbrengsten is dat zij de teken-vorm aan-
nemen van belonend of straffend gedrag van de ruilpartner. Een
ruil wordt als onrechtvaardig beschouwd wanneer de gereflecteerde
relatieve ruilwaarde van P niet in overeenstemming is met de ge-
percipieerde relatieve ruilwaarde van P, of wanneer P's oordeel
over zijn/haar relatieve ruilwaarde niet gevalideerd wordt door
J's oordeel over zijn/haar relatieve ruilwaarde. De cognitieve
inconsistentie die daarmee gepaard gaat is de internalisatie van
een ervaren conflict tussen P en de ruilpartner J. Onrechtvaar-
digheidsreductie wordt opgevat als een poging tot het oplossen
van het conflict tussen de ruilpartners. Dit kan gebeuren in di-
rect contact van P met de ruilpartner J (onderhandeling, beln-
vloeding) of op een meer indirecte wijze.
Naast de mate waarin J's oordeel over P afwijkt van P's oor-
deel over zichzelf, zal ook de relevantie van de vergelijkings-
persoon 0 voor P de mate van onrechtvaardigheidservaring bern-
vloeden. Het sociale vergelijkingsstreven van P ten opzichte van
O daarentegen, wordt niet langer relevant beschouwd binnen de
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ruilrelatie P - J.
Hoofdstuk IV geeft een overzicht van theoretische diskussies
over enkele belangrijke onderwerpen in de onrechtvaardigheids-
literatuur. In deze diskussie wordt ook het interpersoonlijke
model van onrechtvaardigheid betrokken. De controverse met
betrekking tot de principes van rechtvaardigheid (billijkheid,
gelijkheid en behoefte) wordt in de interpersoonlijke benadering
getransformeerd tot een vraag naar de keuze van bijdrage-tekens
ter bepaling van de relatieve ruilwaarde van een individu. Pro-
portionaliteit wordt voorgesteld als het dominante rechtvaardig-
heidsprincipe.
Ten aanzien van de aard van het streven naar rechtvaardig-
heid blijken zowel de reactieve, als de proactieve en de strate-
gische benaderingen houdbaar. De keuze van een onderzoeker voor
66n  van deze interpretaties hangt samen  met   de   keu ze   van  het
onderzoeksparadigma (beloningsverdeling,input-outcome manipula-
tie). In het interpersoonlijk onrechtvaardigheidsmodel wordt
impliciet uitgegaan van een reactieve motivatie benadering.
Over de rol van sociale attributie in de context van on-
rechtvaardigheid zijn slechts weinig empirische studies bekend
die direct bijdragen tot het verhogen van inzicht hierin. In het
interpersoonlijk onrechtvaardigheidsmodel is ruimte voor de inte-
gratie van sociale attributie processen op twee momenten:1) bij
de opbouw van de ruilsituatie, en 2) bij de evaluatie van de ruil
( toeschrijving van intentionaliteit en verantwoordelijkheid aan
de ruilpartner).
De rol van de interne standaard en van de sociale vergelij-
king van bijdragen en opbrengsten als onrechtvaardigheidsmaatsta-
ven wordt bekommentarieerd. Studies hierover laten de conclusie
toe dat schendingen van de interne standaard meer invloed hebben
op de begeleidende emoties of attituden (satisfactie,gemak) en
dat schending van de sociale vergelijkingsnorm rechtstreeks de
ervaring van onrechtvaardigheid affecteert. De keuze van een ver-
gelijkingspersoon wordt opgevat als de operationalisatie van 're-
latieve bijdrage-positie' en van ' relatieve opbrengst-positie'
van een individu in een open vergelijkingssituatie. Tenslotte
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worden enkele studies gerapporteerd die steun geven aan de inter-
persoonlijke conflict-interpretatie van onrechtvaardigheid.
Deel II bevat een aantal empirische studies dat in zijn ge-
heel genomen opgevat dient te worden als een complexe illustratie
van het model en niet zozeer als een toetsing ervan.
In Hoofdstuk V is onderzocht welke de effecten zijn van be-
loningsvergelijking op prestatieverandering, hier beschouwd als
indicatie voor verandering in de motivatie. De resultaten van dit
experiment zijn analoog aan die van onderzoek naar effecten van
prestatievergelijking. De tendens tot het wijzigen van de rela-
tieve bekwaamheidspositie is afhankelijk van de relatieve hoogte
van de beloning en van de wijze waarop de beloning wordt aangebo-
den (individueel vs. categoriaal).
In Hoofdstuk VI worden enkele studies gerapporteerd waarin
het effect van de tendens tot vergelijken (de relevantie van de
vergelijkingspersoon) op de ervaring van onrechtvaardigheid en
ongemak is onderzocht. De hypothese dat bij een gelijkblijvende
bijdragen-opbrengsten verhouding de ervaring van onrechtvaardig-
heid toeneemt met een stijgende tendens tot vergelijken, wordt
enkel bevestigd wanneer personen hypothetische situaties dienen
te beoordelen naar onbillijkheid. Een nadere analyse van de com-
fort-beoordelingen (in de tweede studie) laat zien dat mensen on-
derlirig verschillen met betrekking tot de aard van de informatie
die zij gebruiken om een situatle te beoordelen en met betrekking
tot de wijze waarop zij deze informatie combineren.
Onrechtstreeks houdt deze studie een pleidooi in voor het gebruik
van schaaltechnieken (zoals hier de conjunct meettechniek) voor
de exploratie en descriptie van een theoretisch probleemgebied.
Het laboratoriumonderzoek (studie 3) levert geen steun aan de
tendens-tot-vergelijken hypothese. De post-hoc verklaring en
analyse suggereren echter dat onrechtvaardigheid slechts ervaren
wordt en tot prestatieverandering leidt wanneer binnen de
onderzochte populatie verwachtingen (een interne standaard)
bestaan over rechtvaardige beloningen.
De resultaten van het experiment beschreven in Hoofdstuk VII
zijn te verklaren onder de aanname dat onrechtvaardig behandelde
186
individuen deze onrechtvaardigheid willen oplossen in direct
contact met de bron van de onrechtvaardigheid, i.c. de
werkleider. De mate waarin direct contact met de we rkleider
gewenst wordt, is mede afhankelijk van de sociale
vergelijkingsstructuur van de onrechtvaardige ruilsituatie. In
een vervolgstudie, waarin studenten de experimentele situatie
beoordeelden, werd steun gevonden voor deze interpretatie.
In Hoofdtuk VIII wordt een veldstudle beschreven waarin de
relatie is onderzocht tussen   de   keu ze   van een vergelijkingsper-
soon, de beoordeling van de rechtvaardigheid van het salaris, de
tevredenheid met verschillende aspecten van het werk en van de
werksituatie en onrechtvaardigheidsreductietendensen. Werknemers
vergelijken zich met anderen die (net) hogere of gelijke posities
innemen op de salaris- en aan salaris gerelateerde vergelijkings-
dimensies. Verder blijkt dat deze werknemers zich in overwegende
mate op consonante en op ongunstig-dissonante wijze vergelijken.
De consonantie van de vergelijking is wel gerelateerd aan de on-
rechtvaardigheidservaring, maar niet aan de tevredenheid. Het
eerder veronderstelde verband tussen de tendens tot vergelijken
en de onrechtvaardigheidservaring is gevonden. De onrechtvaardig-
heidservaring is enkel significant gerelateerd aan reductieten-
densen, gericht op het veranderen van de eigen situatie, en is
niet gerelateerd aan tendensen tot veranderen van de situatie van
de vergelijkingspersoon.
In Hoofdstuk IX, tenslotte, worden enkele resultaten van het
onderzoek in hun onderling verband besproken. Aandacht is besteed
aan de relatie tussen de sociale vergelijkingsdynamiek, binnen de
relatie P - 0, en de onrechtvaardigheidsdynamiek, binnen de ruil-
relatie P - J. De interne standaard wordt beschouwd als een nood-
zakelijk element van de sociale context waarin interpersoonlijke
onrechtvaardigheid zich als een probleem voordoet. De operationa-
lisaties van het interne standaard-concept suggereren een verband
tussen dit concept en de procedurele onrechtvaardigheidsnotie.
Satisfactie, comfort enz. worden beschouwd als gevoelens of atti-
tudes die de onrechtvaardigheidservaring begeleiden. Zij missen
echter een dynamische component. Overbetaling is een probleem
voor de onderzoeker, en minder voor de onderzochten. Er worden
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twee interpretaties voorgesteld. De overbetalingservaring zou de
uitdrukking kunnen zijn van de anticipatie van een conflict met
een ruilpartner die tevens schuldeiser is. Men zou de overbeta-
lingservaring ook kunnen zien als een 'vicariant onderbetalings-
gevoelen'. De interpersoonlijke conflict interpretatie dient op
directere wijze getoetst te worden.
De empirische evidentie uit eigen onderzoek en onderzoek van
anderen geeft steun aan deze interpretatie van onrechtvaardig-
heid, die dit probleem transformeert van een puur intra-
persoonlijk tot een interpersoonlijk probleem.
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Summa ry
In this dissertation we presented a social-psychological
analysis of interpersonal injustice (part I) illustrated by
empirical research (Part II). Injustice is analyzed in an
indirect exchange situation, in which three parties are involved:
persons  P  and  0 who contribute  to the exchange,  and the exchange
partner J who allocates or divides the outcomes. This situation
is analysed from P's point of view.
The two theoretical framewo rks on which our analysis  of
interpersonal injustice has been based, namely Adams' Theory of
Inequity (Adams, 1965) and the Model of Social Competition
(Rijsman, 1983) are described in Chapters I and II. The Theory of
Inequity (Chapter I.) consists of four parts: 1) a definition of
the elements of an exchange, inputs and outcomes of person P and
of a comparison person 0; 2) a definition of inequity; 3) a
motivational assumption, which states that people strive toward
equity, and 4) a description of different mechanisms that people
use in order to eliminate or reduce inequity. A simple rearrange-
ment of the exchange elements in Adams' formulation of inequity
shifts attention from the intrapersonal to the interpersonal
comparison of inputs and outcomes. At the same time, a relation
between Inequity and Social Competition is clearly suggested.
After briefly sketching Social Comparison  Theo ry (Festinger,
1954), Rijsman's Social Competition Model is more elaborately
presented in Chapter II. This model describes the dynamic aspects
of the relation between an individual and the social reality.
Three basic processes are distinguished: 1) social attribution;
2) social comparison, and 3) social validation. These processes
contain: 1) the transition from complex stimuli to a cue for an
invariant unit of significance (the person) underlying the stimu-
li; 2) a person's striving toward a moderately superior position
relative to others; 3) a person's striving toward recognition by
others of this moderate superiority, which accords general vali-
dity to the subjective self-judgment.
In Chapter III, we present the interpersonal injustice
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model. With respect to the exchange elements, inputs and out-
comes, a distinction is made between input-signs and outcome-
signs on the one hand, and input- and outcome-meaning on the
other. The input-meaning and outcome-meaning (or significance) is
considered to be an individual's judgment about his/her 'ability-
in-a broad-sense' or his/her value-in-exchange. A person, evalu-
ating an exchange, judges his/her relative value-in-exchange on
the basis of input-signs belonging to him/her and to the compar-
ison person (0) (comparative appraisal). The relative value-in-
exchange is expressed in the input-ratio. The outcome-ratio
reflects the relative value-in-exchange as perceived by their
exchange partner, J. Social comparison of outcomes follows a
reflected appraisal process. An essential characteristic of out-
comes is that they necessarily take the form of reward or punish-
ment behavior of the exchange partner. An exchange is considered
to be unjust when the reflected relative value-in-exchange does
not correspond with the perceived relative value-in-exchange, or
in other words, when P's judgment about his/her relative ex-
change-value is not validated by J's judgment. The cognitive
inconsistency that attends this injustice experience is the
internalization of a conflict between person P and the exchange
partner, J. Injustice reduction is conceived of as an attempt to
solve the interpersonal conflict, in direct contact (negotiation,
persuasion) or in indirect ways. The degree of experienced in-
justice depends upon the degree of lack of correspondence between
P's and J's judgment about P's relative value-in-exchange, and
upon the relevance of the other person, 0, for social comparison.
Person's striving toward a moderately superior position within
the social comparison relation P-O i s overruled by P's striving
toward justice.
In Chapter IV a review is given of the main theoretical
controversies in the psychological literature on injustice. The
discussion about  the impo rtance of different justice principles
(equity, equality and need) is changed into the question about
the choice of input-signs for establishing one's relative value-
in-exchange. Proportionality is presented as the dominant justice
principle . With respect to the nature of the justice motive, the
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conclusion is drawn that the reactive approach, as well as the
proactive and strategic interpretation ate tenable.A researcher's
choice for one interpretation or another is related to the choice
of a particular research paradigm. The interpersonal injustice
model assumes a reactive interpretation of justice motivation.
Only a few empirical studies bear immediate relevance to the
relationship of social attribution and the problem of injustice.
In the interpersonal injustice model, the role of social attribu-
tion can be integrated at two points: 1) at the point of the
construction of the exchange situation; 2) at the point of ex-
change evaluation (intentionality and responsability attribution
to the exchange partner). Some comments are .given about  the  role
of an internal standard and of social comparison as standards for
injustice. Empirical research allows for the conclusion that
violating an internal standard affects accompanying emotions or
attitudes (satisfaction) and that violating a social comparison
standard affects the experience of injustice. The choice of ·a
comparison person is conceived of as an operationalization of the
relative input- and relative outcome-position vis-A-vis another
person, in an open comparison situation. Finally, some studies
are reported which support the interpersonal conflict interpre-
tation of injustice.
Part II contains a number of empirical studies which, taken
as a whole are seen as a complex illustration of our model,
rather than being a test of it.
The study reported in Chapter V examines the effect of
social comparison of rewards on changes in performance, indica-
tive for changes in motivation. The results of this experiment
confirm those obtained in studies on social comparison of perfor-
mances. A person's tendency to change his/her relative position
on an ability-dimension depends from the relative amount of pay a
person receives, and from the way in which the relative pay is
presented (individual vs. categorical feedback).
In Chapter VI some studies are presented in which the effect
of the relevance of a comparison person on injustice and comfort
experiences are examined. The hypothesis that for a given input-
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outcome ratio the experience of injustice increases with an
increasing tendency to compare is only supported when subjects
are asked to judge hypothetical work situations according to
inequity. An analysis of the comfort judgment (study 2) shows
that individuals differ with respect to the kind of information
used for judging a situation, and with respect to the way they
combine this information in order to make a judgment. This study
shows the usefulness of scaling techniques in descriptive and
explorative research. The same hypothesis was not supported in a
laboratory experiment (study 3). In a post-hoc explanation and
analysis, it is suggested that injustice experience only occurs
if people have developed expectations about fair payment.
The results of the experiment described in Chapter VII can
be explained by assuming that unjustly treated individuals try to
reduce injustice by means of direct negotiation with their un-
justly behaving exchange partner, i.e. the assistant. The degree
to which such a direct contact is wanted is partly dependent upon
the social comparison structure of the exchange situation. This
interpretatiob has been tested and supported in a follow-up study
in which students were asked to Judge the experimental situation
presented to them as a hypothetical worksituation.
In Chapter VIII a field study is described, examining the
relations between the choice of a comparison person, the in-
justice experience with respect to pay, the satisfaction with
work and worksituation, and tendencies to reduce the experienced
injustice. Employees compare themselves with others who occupy
superior or equal positions on the dimension 'pay' and on
dimensions related to pay. They compare themselves mostly in a
consonant or in an unfavorably dissonant way. The degree of con-
sonance of the comparison is related to experienced injustice,
but not related to satisfaction. The hypothesized relation
between the tendency to compare and injustice experience is
replicated. The experience of injustice is only related to reduc-
tion tendencies, aimed at changing  one' s own situation,  and  is
not related to tendencies aimed at changing the comparison
person's situation.
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In Chapter IX, some of the results of our empirical work are
discussed. Attention is given to the relation between the
dynamics of social comparison (within the P-0 relationship) and
the injustice dynamics (within the P-J exchange relationship).
The internal standard is considered to be a necessary element of
the social context in which injustice occurs as an interpersonal
problem. The way an internal standard is operationalized in a
number of studies, suggests some correspondence between this
concept and the notion of procedural Justice.
Satisfaction, comfort etc. are emotional states or attitudes
accompanying the experience of justice and injustice. They lack,
however, a dynamic aspect.
Overpayment is experienced as a problem by the researcher
and not by the overrewarded subjects. We have put forward two
different interpretations   for  the ove rpayment experience. First,
overpayment experience could be an expression of an anticipatory
conflict between the individual and the exchange partner - who is
at  the  same  time a creditor. Second, ove rpayment experience  can
be  conceived  of  as  a  of kind vicariously experienced  unde r-
payment.
Thusfar, the interpersonal conflict interpretation is only
indirectly supported. It seems worthwhile to design a research
program aimed at a direct test of this interpretation, which




Adams, J.S. Toward an understanding of inequity. Journal of
Abno rmal and Social Psychology,  1963, 67, 422-436.(a)
Adams, J.S. Wage inequities, productivity and work
quality.Industrial Relations, 1963,1, 9-16.(b)
Adams, J.S. Inequity in social exchange. In L. Berkowitz
(Ed.),Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 2).
New York : Academic Press,1965.
Adams, J.S. Effects  of ove rpayment: Two comments on Lawler's
paper. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1968,
10, 315-316.
Adams, J.S., and Freedman, S. Equity theory revisited: Comments
and annotated bibliography. In L. Berkowitz and E. Walster
(Eds.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol 9.).
New York: Academic Press,1976.
Adams, J.S., and Jacobsen, P.R. Effects of wage inequities on
work quality. Journal  of  Abno rmal and Social Psychology,
1964, 69, 19-25·
Adams, J.S., and Rosenbaum, W.B. The relationship of worker
productivity to cognitive dissonance about wage inequities.
Journal of Applied Psychology, 1962, _4..6, 161-164.
Albert, S. Temporal comparison theory. Psychological Review,
1977, 8-4, 485-503.
Alessio, J.C. Another folly for equity theory. Social Psychology
Quarterly, 1980, 43, 336-340.
Ande rson, N.H. Equity judgments as information integration.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1976, 13, 291-
299.
Ande rson,  N.H. , and Farkas, A.J. Integration theory applied  to
models of inequity. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 1975, 1, 588-591.
Anderson, B., and Shelly, R.K. Reactions to inequity II: A
replication of the Adams experiment and a theoretical
reformulation. Acta Sociologica, 1970, 11, 1-10.
Andrews, I.R. Wage inequity and Job performance: An experimental
study. Journal of Applied Psychology, 1967, 51, 39-45.
Andrews, I.R., and Valenzi, E.R. Overpay inequity or self-image
as a worker: A critical examination of an experimental
induction procedure. Organizational Behavior and Human
Performance, 1970, 5, 266-276.
194
Austin, W. Equity theory and social comparison processes. In J.M
Suls and R.L. Miller (Eds.), Social comparison theory:
Theoretical and empirical perspectives. Washington:
Hemisphere Publishing Corp., 1977.
Austin, W., and Hatfield, E. Equity theory, power, and social
justice. In G. Mikula (Ed.), Justice and social interaction:
Experimental and theoretical contributions from psychological
research.   Bern: Hans Huber Pub lishers,   1980.
Austin, W., McGinn, N.C., and Susmilch, C. Internal standards
revisited: Effects of social comparison and expectancies on
judgments of fairness and satisfaction. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 1980, 161, 426-441.
Austin, W., and Susmilch, C. Comment on Lane and Messd's
confusing clarification of equity theory. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 1974, 30, 400-404.
Bales, R.F.. and Strodtbeck, F.L. Phases in group problem-solving. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1951, 46,
485-495·
Berger, J., Zelditch, M. Jr., Anderson, B., and Cohen, B.P.
Structural aspects of distributive justice: A status value
formulation. In J. Berger, M. Zelditch Jr., and B.
Anderson.Sociological theories in progress (Vol. 2). New
York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972.
Berkowitz, L. (Ed.). Advances in experimental social psychology
(Vol. 2). New York: Academic Press, 1965.
Bol.len, M. Beschrijving van de werksituatie. Een vertaling,
toepassing en evaluatie van de Job Descriptive Index voor het
meten van arbeidstevredenheid. Unpublished master thesis,
University of Leuven, 1970.
Branthwaite, A., Doyle, S., and Lightbrown, N. The balance
between fairness and discrimination. European Journal of
Social Psychology, 1979, 2, 149-163.
Branthwaite, A., and Jones, J.E. Fairness and discrimination:
English versus Welsh. European Journal of Social Psychology,
1975, 1, 323-338.
Brown, W. Social determinants of pay. In G.M. Stephenson and C.J.
Brotherton (Eds.), Industrial relations: A social
psychological approach. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1979.
Brehm, J.W. and Cole, A. Effect of a favor which reduces
freedom. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1966,1, 420-426.
Bruner, J.S., Goodnow, J.J., and Austin, G.A. A study of
thinking. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1956.
195
Caddick, B. Equity theory, social identity, and intergroup
relations. In L. Wheeler (Ed.), Review of personality and
social psychology (Vol. 1). London: Sage Publications, 1980.
Calahan-Levy, C.M., and Mess&, L.A. Sex differences in the
allocation of pay. Journal of Personality and Socialpsychology, 1979, 17, 433-446.
Codol, J-P. Semblables et differents.Unpublished doctoral
dissertation, University of Aix-en-Provence, 1979.
Cohen, R.L. Mastery and justice in laboratory dyads: A revison
and extension of equity theory. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 1974, 29, 464-474.
Cohen, R.L. Perceiving justice: An attributional perspective. In
J. Greenberg and R.L. Cohen (Eds.), Equity and justice in
social behavior. New York: Academic Press, 1982.
Commins,  B., and Lockwood, J. The effects of status differences,
favored treatment, and equity on intergroup comparisons.
European Journal of Social Psychology, 1979, -2, 281-289.
Cook, K.S. Expectations, evaluations, and equity. American
Sociological Review, 1975, 40, 372-388.
Cook, K.S., and Yamagishi, T. Social detemninants of equity
Judgments: The problem of multidimensional inputs. In D.M.
Messick and K.S. Cook (Eds.), Equity theory: Psychological
and sociological perspectives. New York: Praeger Publishers,
1983.
Coombs, C.H., Dawes,   R. M.,  and  Tve rsky, A. Mathematical
psychology: Elementary introduction. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice Hall, 1970.
Daniel, W.W. Applied nonparametric statistics. Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Company, 1978.
Dansereau, F., Cashman, J., and Graen, G. Instrumentality theory
and inequity theory as complementary approaches in predicting
the relationship of leadership and turnover. Organizational
Behavior and Human Performance, 1973, -10, 184-200.
Deci, E.L. The psychology of self-determination. Lexington,
Mass.: Lexington Books, 1980
Deci, E.L., Reis, H.T., Johnston, E.J., and Smith, R. Toward
reconciling equity theory and insufficient justification.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 1977, 3, 224-227.
Delafield, G.L. Social comparisons and pay. In G.M. Stephenson
and C.J. Brotherton (Eds.), Industrial relations: A social
psychological approach. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1979.
196
Deutsch, M. Equity, equality, and need: What determines which
value will be used as the basis of distributive justice ?Journal of Social Issues, 1975, 11, 137-149.
Donnenwerth, G.V., and T8rnblom, K.Y. Reactions to three types ofdistributive injustice. Human Relations, 1975, 28, 407-430.
Eckhoff, T. Justice: Its deter'minants in social interaction.
Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1974.
Evans, M.G., and Molinari, L. Equity, piece rate overpayment, and
job security: Some effects on performance. Journal of Applied
Psychology, 1970, 54, 105-114.
Everitt, B. Cluster analysis. London: Heinemann, 1974.
Festinger, L., Schachter, S., and Back, K. Social pr es sures ininformal groups. New York: Harper, 1950.
Festinger, L. A theory of social comparison processes. Human
Relations, 1954, 1, 117-140.
Festinger,  L. A theory of cognitive dissonance. Evans ton,  Ill.:
Row Peterson , 1957.
Finn, J.D. A general model for multivariate analyses. New York:
Rinehart and Winston , 1974
Finn, J.D., and Mateson, I. Multivariate analysis in educational
research: Applications of the Multivariance program. Chicago:
National Educational Resources , 1978
Finn, R.H., and Lee, S.M. Salary equity: Its determination,
analysis, and correlates. Journal of Applied Psychology,
1972, 56, 283-292.
Foa, U.G. Interpersonal and economic resources. Science, 1971,
171, 345-351.
Foa, E.B., and Foa, U.G. Resource theory: Interpersonal behavior
as exchange. In K.J. Gergen, M.S. Greenberg, and R.H.Willis(Eds.), Social exchange: Advances in theory and research. New
York: Plenum Press,1980.
Friedman, A., Goodman, P. Wage inequity, self-qualifications, and
productivity. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance,1967, 2, 406-417.
Garland, H. Effects of piece-rate underpayment  and ove rpayment  on
job-performance test of equity theory with a new inductionprocedure. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 1973, 1,
325-334.
Garrett,  J. , an Libby,  W.L.  Role of intentionality in mediating
responses to inequity in the dyad. Journal of Personality andSocial psychology, 1973, 28, 21-27.
197
Gartrell, C.D. On the visibility of wage referents. Canadian
Journal of Sociology, 1982, 1, 117-143.
Gergen, K.J. Exchange theory: The transient and the enduring. In
K.J. Gergen, M.S. Greenberg and R.H. Willis (Eds.), Social
exchange: Advances in theory and research. New York: Plenum
Press, 1980
Giles, B.A., and Barrett, G.V. Utility of merit increases.
Journal of Applied Psychology, 1971, 55, 103-109.
Gineste, M-D. Incertitude sur la performance et choix d'un
partenaire de travail. Ann&e Psychologique,  1973, 11,  555-
564.
Goodman, P.S. An examination of referents used in the evaluation
of pay. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 1974,
12, 170-195.
Goodman, P.S., and Friedman, A. An examination of quantity and
quality of performance under conditions of overpayment in
piece rate. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance,
1969, ll, 365-374.
Goodman, P.S., and Friedman, A. An examination of Adams' theory
of inequity. Administrative Science Quarterly, 1971, -16, 271-
288
Goodman, P.S., and Friedman, A. An examination of the effect of
wage inequity in the hourly condition. Organizational
Behavior and Human Performance, 1968, 1, 340-352
Gouldner, A.W. The norm of reciprocity: A preliminary statement.
American Sociologlcal Review, 1960, 25, 161-178.
Greenberg, J. Equity, equality, and the protestant ethic:
Allocating rewards following fair and unfair competition.
Journal of Experimental Social psychology, 1978, 14, 217-226.
Greenberg, J. Protestant ethic endorsement and the fairness of
equity inputs. Journal of Research in Personality ,  1979,  11,
81-90.
Greenberg, J. Attentional focus and locus of performance
causality as determinants of equity behavior. Journal of
Personality and Social Psycholohy, 1980, il, 579-588.
Greenberg, J. On the apocryphal nature of inequity distress. In
R. Folger (Ed.), The sense of injustice: Social psychological
perspectives. New York: Plenum, 1983 (in press).
Greenberg, J., and Cohen, R.L. Why justice? Normative and
instrumental interpretations. In J. Greenberg and R.L. Cohen
(Eds.), Equity and justice in social behavior. New York:
Academic Press, 1982.
198
Gruder,   C.L.   Cho ice of comparison persons in evaluating oneself.
In J.M. Suls and R.L. Miller (Eds.), Social comparison
processes: Theoretical and empirical perspectives.
Washington: Hemisphere Publishing Corp. , 1977.
Grumbkow, J. von. Experimenten met onbillijk betaald werk.
Personeelsbeleid, 1977, 13, 649-652.
Grumbkow, J. von. Sociale vergelijking van salarissen.
Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Tilburg University, 1980.
Grumbkow, J. von, and Tigchelaar, L. Openbaarheid van
inkomensinformatie. Mens en Onderneming, 1976, 30, 143-159.
Grumbkow, J. von, and Wilke, H. Sociale uitwisseling en
billijkheid. Toetsing en evaluatie van de
billijkheidstheorie. Nederlands Tijdschrift voor de
Psychologie, 1974, 29, 281-316. (a).
Grumbkow, J. von, and Wilke, H. Lage dn hoge saillantie van een
vergelijkingsander in een overbetalings- en onderbetalings-stukloon-situatie: een toets van de equitytheory. HeymansBulletins, 1974b, HB-152-EX. (b).
Grumbkow, J. von, and Wilke, H. Extreme underpayment in a simpleand conplex comparison situation. European Journal of SocialPsychology, 1978, 8, 129-133.
Guiot, J.M. Some comments on social comparison theory. Journalf'or the Theory of Social Behaviour, 1978, 3, 29-43.
Hakmiller, K.L. Threat as a determinant of downward comparison.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1966, Supplement
1, 32-39.
Harris, R.J. Handling negative inputs: On the plausible eq ui tyformulae. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1976,
12, 194-209.
Harris, R.J. Pinning down the equity formula. In D.M. Messick and
K.S. Cook (Eds.). Equity theory: Psychological and
sociological perspectives. New York: Praeger Publishers,
1983.
Harris, R.J., Messick, D.M., and Sentis, K.P. Proportionality,
linearity, and parameter constancy: Messick and Sentis
reconsidered. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology.
1981, 17. 210-225.
Harrod, W. Expectations from unequal rewards. Social PsychologyQuarterly, 1980, 43, 126-130.
Harvey, J.H., Ickes, W., and Kidd, R.F. (Eds.), New directions in
attribution research (Vol. 1). Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates, 1976.
199
Harvey, J.H., Ickes, W., and Kidd, R.F. (Eds.), New directions in
attribution research (Vol. 2). Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates, 1978.
Hays, W.L. Statistics for the social sciences. (2nd Ed.)
Eastbourne: Holt Saunders, 1972.
Hazewinkel, A. Werkclassificatie als meetinstrument. In P.J.D.
Drenth, P.J. Willems, and Ch.J. de Wolff (Eds.),
Bedrijfspsychologie: onderzoeksevaluatie. Deventer: Kluwer,
Van Loghum Slaterus, 1970.
Heider, F. The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York:
John Wiley and Sons, 1958.
Hills, F.S. The relevant other in pay comparisons. Industrial
Relations, 1980, 1.9, 345-351.
Hinton, B.L. The experimental extension of equity theory to
interpersonal and group interaction situations.
Organizational Behavior and Human Performance. 1972. 8. 434-
449.
Hollander,  M., and Wolfe D.A. Nonparametric statistical methods .
New York: Wiley and Sons. 1973-
Homans, G.C. Status among clerical workers. Human Organization,
1953, 12, 5-10.
Homans, G.C. Social Behavior: Its elementary forms. New York:
harcourt Brace and World, 1961.
Homans, G.C. Commentary. In L. Berkowitz, and E. Walster (Eds.),
Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 9). New
york: Academic Press, 1976.
Hull, C.H., and Nie, N.H. SPSS Updata 7-9. New York: McGrawHill,
1981.
Huppertz, J.W., Arenson, S.J., and Evans R.H. Application of
equity theory to buyer-seller exchange situations. Journal of
Marketing Research, 1978, 15, 250-260.
Jaques, E. Equitable payment. London: Heinemann, 1961.
Jones, E.E., and Davis, K.E. From acts to dispositions: The
attribution process in person perception. In L. Berkowitz
(Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology. (Vol. 2)
New York: Academic Press, 1965.
Jones, E.E., and Gerard, H.B. Foundations of social psychology.
New York: WIley, 1967.
Jones, E.E., and Nisbett, R.E. The actor and the observer:
Divergent perceptions of the causes of behavior. In E.E.
Jones, D.E. Kanouse, H.H. Kelley, R.E. Nisbet, S. Valins, and
B. Weiner (Eds.), Attribution: Perceiving the causes of
200
behavior. Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press, 1972.
Kayser, E. , and Lamm, H. Input integration and input weighting in
decisions on allocations of gains and losses. European
Journal of Social Psychology, 1980, 10, 10-15.
Kayser,  E.,  and Lamm, H. Causal explanations of performance
differences and allocations among friends. Journal of Social
Psychology, 1981, 115, 73-81.
Kayser, E., and Schwinger, T. A theoretical analysis of the
relationship among individual Justice concepts, layman
psychology and distribtion decisions. Journal for the Theoryof Social Behavior, 1982, 12, 47-51.
Kelley, H.H. Attribution theory in social psychology. In D.
Levine (Ed.), Nebraska symposiwn on motivation. Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1967·
Kelley, H.H. Personal relationships: Their structures and
processes. Hilsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1979.
Kelley, H.H., and Michela, J. Attribution theory and research.
Annual Review of Psychology, 1980, 11, 457-501.
Kessler, J.J., and Wiener, Y. Self-consistency and inequity
dissonance as factors in undercompensation. Organizational
Behavior and Human performance, 1972, 8, 456-466.
Klein, S.M. Pay factors as predictors to satisfaction. A
comparison of reinforcement, equity and expectancy. Academy
of Management Journal, 1973, 16, 598-610.
Knippenberg, A. van. Status differences, comparative relevance
and intergroup differentiation. In H. Tajfel (Ed.),
Differentiation between social groups. Studies in the social
psychology of intergroup relations. European Monographs in
Social Psychology (Vol. 14). New York: Academic Press. 1978.
Knippenberg, A. van, Wilke, H., and Vries, N.N. de. Socialcomparison on two dimensions. European Journal of Social
Psychology, 1981, 11, 267-283.
Knippenberg, A. van, Wilke, H.A.M., and Vries, N.N. de. Sociale
vergelijking op twee bekwaamheidsdimensies. In J.B. Rijsman
and H.A.M. Wilke (Eds.), Sociale vergelijkingsprocessen:
Theorie en onderzoek. Deventer: Van Loghum Slaterus, 1980.
Krantz, D.H., and Tversky, A. Conjoint-measurement analysis of
composition rules in psychology. Psychological Review, 1971,
7-8, 151-169.
Kreveld, D. van, and Beemen, E.K. van. Distributing goods and
benefits: A framework and review of research. Gedrag, 1978,
6, 361-401.
201
Kreveld, D. van, and Bouwhuis, P.L.M. Verschillende vormen van
equity, beoordeeld op rechtvaardigheid, comfortabiliteit en
tevredenheid. Nederlands TLJdschrift voor de Psychologie,
1977, 12, 483-493.
Kuyper, H. About the saliency of social comparison dimensions.
Unpublished doctoral dissertation, State Universitv of
Groningen, 1980.
Lamm, H., and Kayser, E. The allocation of monetary gain and loss
following dyadic performance: The weight given to effort and
ability under conditions of low and high intradyadic
attraction. European Journal of Social Psychology, 1978, -8,
275-279.
Lamm, H., Kayser, E., and Schanz, V. An attributional analysis of
interpersonal justice: Ability and effort as inputs in the
allocation of gain and loss. Journal of Social Psychology,
1983, 119, 269-281.
Lamm, H., and Schwinger, T. Norms concerning distributive
justice: Are needs taken into consideration in allocationdecisions ? Social Psychology Quarterly, 1980, 43, 425-429.
Lane, I.M., and Messd, L.A. Distribution of insufficient,
sufficient, and oversufficient rewards: A clarification of
equity theory. Journal of Personality and Social Pychology,
1972, 11,228-233·
Larwood, L., Levin, R., Shaw, R., and Hurwitz, S. Relation of
objective and subjective inputs to exchange preference for
equity or equality reward allocation. Organizational Behavior
and Human performance, 1979, 13, 60-72.
Latan&, B. Studies in social comparison: Introduction and
overview. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1966,
Supplement 1, 1-5.
Lawler, E.E., III. Effects of hourly overpayment on productivity
and work quality. Journal of Personality and Socialpsychology, 1968, 10, 306-313. (a)
Lawler,  E.E., III. Equity theory as a predictor of productivity
and work quality. Psychological Bulletin, 1968, 10, 596-610.
(b)
Lawler, E.E., III. Pay and organizational effectiveness: A
psychological view. New York: McGraw Hill, 1971.
Lawler, E.E., III, Koplin, C.A., Young, T.F., and Fadem, J.A.
Inequity reduction  over   time   in an induced ove rpayment
situation- Organizational Behavior and Human Performance,
1968, 3, 253-268.
Lawler, E.E., III, and O'Gara, P.W. Effects of inequity produced
by underpayment on work output, work quality, and attitudes
202
toward work. Journal of Applied Psychology, 1967, 51, 403-
410.
Lawler, E.J. An experimental study of factors affecting the
mobilization of revolutionary coalitions. Sociometry, 1975,
38, 163-179.
Lawler,  E.J., and Thompson, M.E. Inpact of leader responsibility
for inequity on subsequent revolts. Social Psychology, 1978,
4:1, 264-268.
Lemaine, G. In&galit&, comparaison et incomparabilit&; Esquisse
d'une thdorie de l'originalit6 sociale. Bulletin de
Psychologie, 1966, 20, 1-9.
Lemaine, G. Social differentiation and social originality.
European Journal of Social Psychology, 1974, 4, 17-52.
Lemaine, G., and Kastersztein, J. Recherches sur l'originalit6
sociale: La diff&rentiation et l'incomparabilit&. Bulletin de
Psychology, 1971, 25, 673-693.
Lerner, M.J. The justice motive in social behavior: Introduction.
Journal of Social Issues, 1975, 11, 1-19.
Lerner, M.J. The justice motive in social behaviour: Some
hypotheses as to its origins and forms. Journal of
Personality, 1977, 4.5, 1-52.
Lerner, M.J. The belief in a just world. New York: Plenum Press,
1980.
Lerner, M.J. The justice motive in human relations: Some thoughts
on what we know and need to know about justice. In M.J.
Lerner and S.C. Lerner (Eds.), The justice motive in social
behavior. New York: Plenum Press. 1981.
Lerner, M.J., and Miller, D.T. Just world research and the
attribution process: looking back and ahead. Psychological
Bulletin,   1978, -85, 1030-1051.
Lerner, M.J., and Whitehead, L.A. Procedural justice viewed in
the context of Justice motive theory. In G. Mikula (Ed.),
Justice in social interaction: Experimental and theoretical
contributions from psychological research. Bern: Hans Huber
Publishers, 1980.
Leventhal, G.S. The distribution of rewards and resources in
groups and organizations. In L. Berkowitz and E. Walster
(Eds.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 9).
New York: Academic Press, 1976.(a)
Leventhal,'G.S. Fairness in social relationships. In J.W.
Thibaut, J.T. Spence, and R. C. Carson (Eds.), Contemporary
topics in social psychology. Morristown, N.J.: General
Learning Press, 1976.(b)
203
Leventhal, G.S. What should be done with equity theory ? New
approaches to the study of fairness in social relationships.
In K.J. Gergen, M.S. Greenberg, and R.H. Willis (Eds.),
Social exchange: Advances in theory and research. New York
Plenum Press, 1980.
Leventhal, G.S., Allen, J., and Kemelgor, B. Reducing inequity by
reallocating rewards. Psychonomic Science, 1969, 1.4, 295-296.
Leventhal, G.S., and Bergman, J.T. Self-depriving behavior as a
response to unprofitable inequity. Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology, 1969, .5, 153-171.
Leventhal, G.S. , and Michaels, J.W. Extending the equity model:
Perceptions of inputs and allocations of rewards as a
function of duration and quantity of performance. Journal of
personality and Social Psychology,1969, 1.2, 303-309·
Leventhal, G.S., and Michaels, J.W. Locus of cause and equity
motivation as deter'minants of reward allocation. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 1971, 11, 229-235.
Leventhal, G.S., Weiss, T., and Long, G. Equity, reciprocity, and
reallocating rewards in the dyad. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 1969, 11, 300-305·
Leventhal, G.S., and Whiteside, H.D. Equity and the use of reward
to elicit high performance. Journal of Personality and Socialpsychology, 1973, 25, 75-83.
Locke, E.A. The nature and causes of job satisfaction. In M.D.
Dunnette (Ed.)', Handbook of industrial and organizational
psychology. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1976.
Major, B., and Deaux, K. Individual differences in justice
behavior. In J. Greenberg and R.L. Cohen (Eds.), Equity and
justice in social behavior. New York: Academic Press, 1982.
MacCrimmon, K.R., and Messick, D.M. A framework for social
motives. Behavioral Science, 1976, 21, 86-100.
Martens, R., and White, V. Influence of win-loss ratio on
performance, satisfaction, and preference for opponents.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1975, 11, 343-362.
McClintock, C.G. Social motivation - A set of propositions.
Behavioral Science, 1972, 17, 438-454.
McClintock, C.G., and Keil, L.J. Equity and social exchange. In
J. Greenberg and R.L. Cohen (Eds.), Equity and Justice in
social behavior. New York: Academic Press, 1982.
Mess&, L.A., and Lane, I.M. Rediscovering the need for multiple
operations: A reply to Austin and Susmilch. Journal of
personality and Social Psychology, 1977, 10, 405-408.
204
Messick, D.M., and Sentis, K.P. Fairness and preference. Journalof Experimental Social Psychology, 1.979, 11, 418-434.
Mettee, D.R., and Smith, G. Social comparison and interpersonal
attraction. In J.M. Suls and R.L. Miller (Eds.), Social
comparison processes: Theoretical and empirical perspectives.
New York: Hemisphere Publishing Corporation, 1977.
Middlemist, R.D., and Peterson, R.B. Test of equity theory by
controlling for co-workers' efforts. Organizational Behavior
and Human Performance, 1976, 15., 335-354.
Mikula, G. (Ed.). Justice and social interaction: Experimental
and theoretical contributions from psychological research.
Bern: Hans Huber Publishers, 1980.
Mikula, G. On the role of justice in allocation decisions. In G.
Mikula (Ed.), Justice and social interaction: Experimental
and theoretical contributions from psychological research.
Bern: Hans Huber Publishers, 1980.
Mikula, G. On the nature of experiences of injustice: Reflexions
and preliminary data. Berichte aus dem Institut fur
Psychologie, Karl-Franzens-Universitat, Graz, 1983.(a)
Mikula, G. Concerns for justice and motivation for control. Paper
presented at the Conference of the Social Psychology of
Interpersonal and Social Justice, Graz, May 1982. (b)
Miller, R.L., and Suls, J.M. Affiliation preferences as a
function of attitude and ability shnilarity. In J.M. Suls and
R.L. Miller (Eds.), Social comparison processes: Theoretical
and empirical perspectives. Washington: Hemisphere Publishing
Corp., 1977.
Moschetti, G.J. Calculating equity: Ordinal and ratio criteria.
Social Psychology, 1979, 42, 172-175.
Ng, S.H. Equity theory and the allocation of rewards between
groups. European Journal of Social Psychology, 1981, 11, 439-
443.
Nie, N.H., Hull, C.H., Jenkins, J.G., Steinbrenner, K., and Bent,
D.H. SPSS. Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (2nd.
ed.). New York: McGraw Hill, 1975.
Oldham, G.R., and Miller, H.E. The effect of significant other's
job complexity on employee reactions to work. Human
Relations, 1979, 12, 247-260.
O'Malley, M.N. Interpersonal and intrapersonal justice: The
effect of subject and confederate outcomes on evaluations offairness. European Journal of Social Psychology, 1983, 11,
121-128.
205
Patchen, M. The choice of wage comparisons. Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1961.
Pettigrew, T.F. Social evaluation theory: Convergences and
applications. In D. Levine (Ed.), Nebraska symposium on
motivation. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1967.
Poppe, M. Social comparison in two-person experimental games.
Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Tilburg,
1980.
Poppe, M., and Rijsman, J. Effecten van social vergelijking:
Effecten van prestatievergelijking. In J.B. Rijsman and
H.A.M. Wilke (Eds.), Sociale vergelijkingsprocessen: Theorie
en onderzoek. Deventer: Van Loghum Slaterus, 1980.
Pritchard, R.D. Equity theory: A review and critique.
Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 1969, 1, 176-
211.
Pritchard, R.D., Dunnette, M.D., and Jorgenson, D.0. Effects of
perceptions of equity and inequity on worker performance and
satisfaction. Journal of Applied Psychology, 1972, 56, 75-94.
Pruitt, D.G. Methods for resolving differences of interest: A
theoretical analysis. Journal of Social Issues, 1972, -28,
133-154.
Rabbie, J.M., and Horwitz, M. Arousal of ingroup-outgroup bias by
a chance win or loss. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 1969, 11, 269-277.
Raven, B.H., and Kruglanski, A.W. Conflict and power. In P.
Swingle (Ed.), The structure of conflict. New York: Academic
Press, 1970·
Rijsman, J. Factors in social comparison of performance
influencing actual performance. European Journal of Social
, psychology, 1974, 4, 279-311.
Rijsman, J. Social psychologie.   In   H.   Duy ker (Ed.), Psychologie
vandaag. Deventer: Van Loghum Slaterus, 1978.
Rijsman, J. Over het sociaal psychologisch eigenbelang van mensen
in economische situaties. Sociale Wetenschappen, 1979, 22,
285-302.
Rijsman, J.B. Social motivatie. In R. van der Vlist and J.
Jaspars (Eds.), Sociale psychologie in Nederland I: Het
individu. Deventer: Van Loghum Slaterus, 1980.(a)
Rijsman, J.B. Social vergelijking. Een theoretische analyse. In
J.B. Rijsman and H.A.M. Wilke (Eds.), Sociale
vergelijkingsprocessen: Theorie en onderzoek. Deventer: Van
Loghum Slaterus, 1980.(b)
206
Rijsman, J.B., and Wilke, H.A.M. Sociale vergelijkingsprocessen:
Theorie en onderzoek. Deventer: Van.Loghum Slaterus, 1980.
Rijsman, J.B. Distributive justice and personal identity: An
integration. Paper presented at the Conference on the Social
Psychology of Interpersonal and Social Justice, Graz, May
1982.
Rijsman, J. The dynamics of social competition in personal and
categorical comparison-situations. In W. Doise and S.
Moscovici (Eds.), Current issues in European social
psychology (Vol. 1). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1983.
Rijsman,  J., and Poppe, M. Power difference between players  and
level of matrix as determinants of competition  in  a  MDG.
European Journal of Social Psychology, 1977, 1, 347-367.
Romer, D. Limitations in the equity theory approach: toward a
resolution of the "negative-inputs" controversy. Personalityand Social Psychology Bulletin, 1977, 1, 228-231.
Ross, M., and McMillen, M.J. External referents and past outcomes
as deter'minants of social discontent. Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology, 1973, 1, 437-449.
Ross, M., Thibaut, J., and Evenbeck, S. Some deter'minants of the
intensity of social protest. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 1971, 1, 401-418.
Samuel, W. On clarifying some interpretations of social
comparison theory. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,
1973, 1, 450-465.
Samuel, W. Suggested amendments to "New directions in equity
research". Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 1976,
2, 36-39.(a)
Samuel, W. In further support of the Adams ratio: A reply to Dr.
G. William Walster. Personality and Social PsychologyBulletin, 1976, 2, 45-47.(b)
Samuel, W. Toward a simple but useful equity theory: A comment on
the Romer article. Personality and Social PsychologyBulletin, 1978, -4, 135-138.
Sampson, E.E. On justice as equality. Journal of Social Issues,
1975, 11, 45-64.
Sayles, L.R. Behavior of industrial work groups: Prediction and
control. New York: Wiley and Sons, 1958.
Schopler, J., and Thompson, V.D. Role of attribution processes in
mediating amount of reciprocity for a favor. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 1968, 10, 243-250.
207
Schwarzwald, J., and Goldenberg, J. Compliance and assistance to
an authority figure in perceived equitable and nonequitable
situations. Human Relations, 1979, 12, 877-888.
Schwinger, T. Just allocations of goods: Decisions among three
principles. In G. Mikula (Ed.), Justice in social
interaction: Experimental and theoretical contributions from
psychological research. Bern: Hans Huber Publishers, 1980.
Schwinger, T. Zwei Untersuchungen zur Gerechtigkeit der Vergabe
von Geld und Zuneigung nach drei Transaktionsprinzipien in
unterschiedlichen Sozialbeziehungen. Mannheim:
Sonderforschungsberelch 24, Universit t Mannheim, 1983·
Schwinger, T. Two empirical strategies for testing contract
theory of justice. Paper presented at the Conference on the
Social Psychology of Interpersonal and Social Justice, Graz,
May 1982.
Schwinger, T. , and Nahrer, W. Die Zuordnung von Prinzipien
gerechter Ressourcenvergabe zu unterschiedlichen Arten von
Sozialbeziehungen. Mannheim: Sonderforschungsbereich 24,
Universit&t Mannheim, 1983.
Schwinger, T. , Nahrer, W., and Kayser, E. Prinzipien der
gerechten Vergabe von Zuneigung und Geld in verschiedene
Sozialbeziehungen. Mannheim: Sonderforschungsbereich 24,
Universitdt Mannhe im,   1982.
Shaver, K.G. An introduction to attribution processes. Cambridge,
Mass.: Winthrop Publishers, Inc., 1975.
Smith, P.C., Kendall, L.M., and Hulin, C.L. The measurement of
satisfaction  in  work and retirement. Chicago: Rand McNally,
1969.
Stephenson, G.M., and Fielding, G.T. Experimental study of
contagion leaving behavior in small gatherings. Journal of
Social Psychology, 1971, 84, 81-91.
Stouffer, S.A., Suchman, E.A., DeVinney, L.C., Star, S.A., and
Williams, R.M. Jr. The American soldier (Vol. 1). Adjustment
during army life. Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1949.
Suls, J. and Miller, R. (Eds.). Social comparison processes:
Theoretical and empirical perspectives. Washington:
Hemisphere Publishing Corp. 1977
Syroit, J., and Grumbkow, J. von. Hoe billijk is billijk ?
Toetsing van een sociaal vergelijkingsmodel van billijkheid.
Nederlands Tijdschrift voor de Psychologie, 1977, -32, 471-
482.
Syroit, J., and Rijsman, J. Effecten van sociale ve rgelijking:
Effecten van beloningsvergelijking. In: J.B. Rijsman and
208
H.A.M. Wilke (Eds.), Sociale vergelijkingsprocessen: Theorie
en onderzoek. Deventer: Van Loghum Slaterus, 1980.
Syroit, J., Rijsman, J.B., and Grumbkow, J. von. De dynamiek van
het scorekeuzegedrag in onderzoek naar de voorkeur voor
vergelijkingsanderen. In: J.B. Rijsman and H.A.M. Wilke
(Eds.), Sociale vergelijkingsprocessen: Theorie en onderzoek.
Deventer: Van Loghum Slaterus, 1980.
Syroit, J., and Sleijpen, J. Inter- en intrapersoonlijke
vergelijking van bijdragen en opbrengsten als maatstaven voor(on)billijkheld. Gedrag, 1981, 2, 326-340.
Taillieu, T. Some effects of reward systems and feedback methods
on individual decisions to allocate group resources.
Unpublished doctoral dissertation. Carnegie-Mellon'
University, 1975.
Tajfel, H. Social justice in social psychology. In P. Fraisse
(Ed.), La psychologie du futur. Paris: Presses Universitaires
de France, in press.
Telly, C.S., French, W.L., and Scott, W.G. Relationship of
inequity to turnover among hourly workers. Administrative
Science Quarterly, 1971, 16, 164-172.
Thibaut, J. and Walker, L. Procedural justice: A psychological
analysis. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1975.
Thomas, K. Conflict and conflict management. In: M.D. Dunette
(Ed.), Handbook of industrial and organizational psychology.
Chicago: Rand MeNally, 1976.
Thornton, D.A., and Arrowood, A.J., Self-evaluation, self-
enhancement, and the locus of social comparison. Journal of
Experiemntal Social Psychology, 1966, Supplement 1, 40-48.
Tornow, W.W. The development and application of an input-outcome
moderator test on the perception and reduction of inequity.
Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 1971, A, 614-
638.
Turner, J. Social comparison and social identity: Some prospects
for intergroup behavior. European Journal of Social
Psychology, 1975, 5, 5-34.
Turner, J. Social categorization and social differentiation. In:
H. Tajfel (Ed.), Differentation between social groups.
London: Academic Press, 1978.
Utne, M.K., and Kidd, R.F. Equity and attribution. In: G. Mil<ula
(Ed.), Justice and social interaction: Experimental and
theoretical contributions from psychological research. Bern:
Hans Huber Publishers, 1980.
Van Avermaet, E. Equity: A theoretical and experimental analysis.
209
Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of California,
Santa Barbara, 1975.
Van Avermaet,  E. , Billijkheid: Een autonome behoefte of een
sociale strategie. In: Claeijs, W., De Cock, G., De Keijser,
C.C., d'Ydewalle, G., Eelen, P., Jansen, J., Leus, W.
Vandendriesche, G., and Wielemand, W. (Eds.)., Gedrag:
Dynamische relatie en betekenis wereld. (Liber Amicorum, J.R.
Nuttin). Leuven: Universitaire Pers Leuven, 1980.
Van Ave rmaet,   E. , McClintock,   C., and Moskowitz, J. Alternatieve
approaches to equity: Dissonance reduction, pro-social
motivation and strategic accomodation. European Journal of
Social Psychology, 1978, f, 419-437.
Valenzi, E.R., and Andrews, I.R. Effect of hourly overpay and
underpay inequity when tested with a new induction procedure.
Journal of Applied Psychology, 1971, -55 22-27·
Walster, G.W. Reply to Dr. William Samuel: Suggested amendments
to new directions in equity research. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 1976, 2, 40-44.
Walster, E., Walster, G.W., and Berscheid, E. Equity: Theory and
research. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1978.
Walster, E., Berscheid, E., and Walster, G.W. New directions in
equity research. Journal of Personality and Social
psychology, 1973,25, 151-176.
Walster, E., Berscheid, E., and Walster, G.W. New directions in
equity research. In: L. Berkowitz and E . Walster (Eds.),
Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 9). New
York: Academic Press, 1976.
Walster, G.W. The Walster, et al. (1973) equity formula: A
correction. Representative Research in Social Psychology,
1975, 6, 63-64.
Ward, J.H. Hierarchical grouping to optimize an objective
function. Journal of the American Statistical Association,
1963, 58, 236-244.
Webster, M., and Smith, L.R.F. Justice and revolutionary
coalitions: A test of two theories. American Journal of
sociology, 1978, 84, 267-292.
Weick, K.E. Reduction of cognitive dissonance through task en
enhancement and effort expenditure. Journal of Abnormal and
Social Psychology, 1964, 68, 533-539.
Weick, K.E. The concept of equity in the perception of pay.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 1966, 11, 414-439.
Weick, K.E. The social psychology of organizing (2nd Ed.).
Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979.
210
Weick, K.E., Bougon, M.G., and Maruyama, G. The equity context.
Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 1976, 11, 32-
65·
Weick, K.E. , and Nesset, B. Preferences among forms of equity.
Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 1968, 1, 400-
416.
Weiner, B., Frieze, I., Kukla, A., Reed, L., Rest, S., and
Rosenbaum, R.M. Perceiving the causes of success and failure.
In: E.E. Jones, D.E. Kanouse, H.H. Kelley, R.E. Nisbett, S.
Valins, and B. Weiner (Eds.). Attribution: Perceiving causes
of behavior. Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press, 1972.
Wheeler, L., Shaver, K.G., Jones, R.A., Goethals, G.R., Cooper,
J., Robinson, J.E. Gruder, C.L., and Butzine, K.W. Factors
determining choice of a comparison other. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 1969, 5, 219-232.
Wicker, A.W., and Bushweiler, G. Perceived fairness and
pleasantness of social exchange situations: Two factorial
studies of inequity. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 1970, 11, 63-75·
Wiener, Y. Efferts of task-oriented and ego-oriented performance
on 2 kinds of overcompensation inequity. Organizational
Behavior and Human Performance, 1970, 1, 191-208.
Wilke, H. A.M., Kuyper, H., and Lewis, C. Partnerselectie. Socialevergelijking op &en bekwaamheidsdimensie. In: J.B. Rijsman
and H.A.M. Wilke (Eds.), Sociale vergelijkingsprocessen:
Theorie en onderzoek. Deventer: Van Loghum Slaterus, 1980.
Wilke, H., Kuyper, H., Rouwendal, J., and Visser, G. Preference
for prospective interaction. European Journal of Social
psychology, 1978, 4, 377-382.
Wilke, H., and Steur, T. Overpayment: Perceived qualifications
and financial compensation. European Journal of Social
Psychology, 1972, 2, 273-284.
Wilson, S.R., and Benner, L.A. The effects of self-esteem and
situation upon comparison choices during ability evaluation.
Sociometry, 1971, 14, 381-397.
Winer, B.J.. Statistical principles in experimental design, (2nd
Ed.). New York: McGrawHill, 1971.
Wishart, D. Clustan-2: User manual. Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University , 1978.
Wittig, M.R., Marks, G., and Jones, G.A. The effect of luck
versus effort attributions on reward allocation to self and
other. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 1981, 7,
71-78.                                                                                                             _
211
Wood, I., and Lawler, E.E. Effects of piece rate overpayment on
productivity. Journal of Applied Psychology, 1970, -54, 234-
238.
Woodworth, R.S., and Schlossberg, H. Experimental psychology
(Rev. Ed.). New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1954.
Worchel,  S. , and Cooper, J. Understanding social psychology.
Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1983
Yuchtman, E. Reward distribution and work-role attractiveness in
the Kibbutz. Reflection on equity theory. American
Sociological Review, 1972, 37, 581-595.
Zanna, M.D., Goethals, G.R., and Hill, J.F. Evaluating a sex-
related ability: Social comparison with similar others and
standard setters. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,
1975, 11, 86-93·
Zuckerman, H. A comment on the equity formula by Walster,
Berscheid, and Walster (1973). Representative Research in
Social psychology, 1975, -6 63-64.
212
REFERENCE NOTES
1) Caminada, H. Personal communication, September, 1983.
2) Grumbkow, J. von. Personal communication, December, 1983.




APPENDIX A, POST-EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE  (CHAPTER V)
1) During the examination I did/did not exert myself :
very much 1  2  3  4  5 6 7 not at all
2) I think I did better/worse than the other person :
better 1  2  3 4 5  6  7 worse
3) The experimenter was:
friendly 1  2  3  4  5 6 7 unfriendly
4) I think that the other person did better/worse than I :
better 1  2  3  4  5 6 7 worse
5) I think that the other person was paid :
too much 1  2 3 4  5  6  7 too little
6) The financial reward is :
just 1  2  3 4 5  6  7 unjust
7) I think that I was paid
too much 1  2  3 4 5  6  7 too little
8) The experimenter acted :
unfairly 1  2  3  4  5 6 7 fairly
9) How many guilders did you deserve after measuring 100 reaction
times ?
10) How many guilders did the other person deserve after measuring
100 reaction times ?
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APPENDIX B. SUMMARIES OF THE ANALYSES PERFORMED ON THE DATA OF
STUDIES lA, 1B, AND lc (CHAPTER VI)
Summaries of the analyses of variance on the equity- and comfort
ratings  (2 x 5 design with repeated' measures )
Source SS Df MS      F      p
Comfort
Error A 21483.0 27 796.0
Equity (A) 363.0 1 363.0 <1. n.s.
Error B 26204.0 108 243.0
Relative Inputs (B) 9483.0 4 2371.0 9.77 <.01
Error A x B 21635.0 108 200.0
Interaction A x B 356.0 4 89.0 <1. n.s.
Equity
Error A 1619.0 27 60.0
Equity (A) 260.0 1 260.0 4.34 <.05
Error B 17000.0 108 157.0
Relative Inputs (B) 23321.0 4 5830.0 37.04 <.01
Error A x B 34606.0 108 320.0
Interaction A x B 2155.0 4 539.0 1.68   n.s.
Summary of the analysis of variance on the tendency to compare ratings
Source SS Df MS      F      p
Error A 2212.0 27 82.0
Equity (A) 693.0 2 346.0 4.23 <.05
Error B 1885.0 108 17.0
Relative Inputs (B) 395.0 4 99.0 5.65 <.01
Interaction A x B 780.0 8 97.0 5.59 <.01
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APPENDIX B - CONTINUATION
Mean comfort and equity ratings of the 15 hypothetical situations
and significance of differences between means of corresponding
situations (two-tailed t-tests, Df = 54)
Situation Comfort Equity         p<
Underpayment
Very Inferior 30.68 31.04 n.s.
Inferior 28.11 19.00 .05
Equal 29.79 10.64 .01
Superior 35.21 11.54 .01
Very Superior 43.68 33.21 .10
Equitable Payment
Very Inferior 63.21 79.25 .05
Inferior 76.04 86.07 .05
Equal 90.54 99.04 .01
Superior 84.86 85.18 n.s.
Very Superior 78.79 81.21 n.s.
Overpayment
Very Inferior 30.14 35.75 n.s.
Inferior 28.71 12.82 .01
Equal 35.86 12.54 .01
Superior 38.11 21.89 .01
Very Superior 46.11 32.07 .05




Very Inferior 9.9 8.4 9.6
Inferior 6.1 15.3 9.1
Equal 8.7 19.7 12.6
Superior 7.6 16.1 12.1
Very Superior 11.1 9.7 8.4
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APPENDIX B - CONTINUATION
Tests of simple effects for Relative Input Level (Newman-Keuls)
Comfort
q.p(r,108)456MSerrorB
I       VI      E       S VS r .99 .95
I  ------- 112.0 246.9 463.9t 922.9tt 5 548.9 456.8
VI ----- 134.9 351.9 810.9tt 4 524.4 430.0
E                    ----- 217.0 676.Ott 3 489.4 391.5
S                           ----- 459.Ott 2 431.1 326.3
Equity
E       I      S VS VI r q.p(r,108) 456MSerrorB-
.99 .95
E  ------- 242.0 287.0 1179.Ott1221.Ott 5 442.2 368.0
I           ----- 44.9 936.9tt 978.9tt 4 422.4 346.4
S                    -----    890.5tt 932.5tt 3 349.3 315.4
VS ------ 42.0 2 347.3 262.8
t  p<.05
tt P<.01
VI : very inferior; I : Inferior; E : equal; S : Superior;
VS : very superior
218
APPENDIX B - CONTINUATION
Tendency to compare : Summary of tests for simple effects(F ratios)
Relative Underpaid vs. Underpaid vs. Equitably paid
Inputs Equitably paid Overpaid vs. Overpaid
Very Inferior <1.0 <1.0 <1.0
Inferior 13.94tt 1.48 6.33+
Equal 19.93tt 2.51 8.30+t
Superior 11.9 Ot 3.34 2.64
Very Superior 1.0 1.0 1.0
Df (1,93)  (Satterthwaite approximation)
t   p<.05
tt P<.01
Tendency to compare : Test of simple effects (F (1,108) - ratios)
comparisons
VI VI VI VI I I I E E S
Equity      I     E     S     VS E S   VS S VS VS
Underpaid  4113 <1.0 1.52 <1.0 1.94 <1.0 7.16 <1.0 1.65 3.51
Equitable 13.64 36.71 16.98 <1.0 5.54 <1.0 8.98 3.71 28.64 11.73
Overpaid <1.0 2.57 1.79 <1.0 3.50 2.57 <1.0 <1.0 5495 3-:22
----: P <.05
-:: P <.01
VI : Very Inferior; I : Inferior; E : Equal; S : Superior;VS : Very Superior
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APPENDIX C. SUMMARIES OF THE CLUSTER ANALYSIS AND THE CONJOINT
MEASUREMENT ANALYSES ON THE COMFORT RANKINGS (CHAPTER VI)
Hierarchical Cluster Analysis (Ward's procedure, Euclidean Distance,
Nearest Neighbour Linkage)
CLUSTER I (N = 12 ; Ss:1,27,28,33,34,51,5'3,55.57,60.67,72)
Variable F ratio         T Mean S.D.
alb3
.1819 .7097 13 1.44
a5bl
.3631 .5721 11 2.21
a2b 3
.4225 .5827       13          2.22
alb2
.2460 -.6540        4           1.53
a3bl .5
415 .2534       12          2.14
a 3b 3
.2321 .5664       12           1.64
25b 3
.2080 -.2848        8          1.62
albl
.1640 -.8722        7          1.30
a4bl
.4769 .6470 13 2.21
aSb 2
.4264 -.3617        3          1.38
a4b 2 .
2537 -.2646        3            .79
a3b 2 .
3539 -.1745        2          1.23
a2bl
.3713 -1.1200        8           1.56
a2b 2
.2923 -.1934        4          1.09
a 4b 3
.2613 -.1689        9           1.72
Estimations of Row (ai) and Column (b ) parameters
a           -1.106      b     .00207
1                                         1
a -1.281 b    -.99999
2                                   2
a           -2.897      b     .00234
3                                      3
a           -1.285
4
a          -2.8955
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CLUSTER II (N =6;S s: 2,9,23,30,39,63)
Variable F ratio        T Mean S.D.
alb3 1.6740 -.6272        8          4.36
a5bl 1.2032 -.2463        8          4.02
a2b 3 .8405 -1.7154        5           3.13
alb2 1.0545 2.0000 12 3.16
a3b 1 .1778 .1674 12 1.22
a3b 3 .7573 -1.5361        5          2.97
a5b 3 .4339 -1.6891         3          2.35
albl .0161 1.4594       15            .41
a4bl .8472 -.4473       10          2.94
a5b2 2.3319 .3880        5          3.22
a4b2 1.2909 1.9054        6           1.79
a3b2 2.5618 2.4837        7          3.31
a2bl .6930 .7953 13 2.14
a2b2 .5358 2.6246        9           1.47
a4b 3 .0850 -1.8003        3           .98
Estimations of Row (a.) and Column (b.) parameters1 J
a 6.125 bl    -.9901
a 4.833 b2    -.1372
a         .8463                    b 3    -·019
a         .675
4
a         .117
5
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CLUSTER III (N = 11; Ss: 3,15,20,35,41,42,47,48.62.69,70)
Variable F ratio        T Mean S.D.
alb3 .
3145 .8627        13           1.89
a5bl
.1461 -.2504         8           1.40
a2b 3 .4319
.6627 13 2.24
alb2 .1495 -.5113         
4           1.19
a3bl .185
4 -.9750         8          1.25
a 3b 3 .2379 .7575        
13           1.66
a5b 3 .1018
.9536 12          1.14
albl .314
6 -.8628         7           1.80
a4bl .18
31 -.7978         9          1.37
a5b 2 .305
8 .0006          4           1.17
a4b 2 .1
907 -.2887         3           .69
a b .1529 -.3210         1           .81
4,1 .7532 -. 8             9              2.23
a2b 2
.1124 -.6229         3           .67
a4b 3 .0608 1.143
4 13 .83
Estimations of Row (ai) and Column (b ) parameters
a        -1.648      b      .179
1                                 1
a -2.100 b2    -.6622
a        -2.094      b      .7283                              3
a        -1.9494
a        -1.648
5
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CLUSTER rV (N = 20; Ss: 4,5,6,7,17,18,19,22,24,25,31,32,37
45,49,59,64,66)
Variable F ratio       T Mean S.D.
alb3 .6606 -.8847         7          2.74
a5bl .6054 -.8419         6          2.85
a2b 3 .7182 .3333 12 2.89
alb2 .2342 -.1777         5          1.49
a3bl .7895 .2879 12 2.58
a3b3 .5245 .5468 12 2.47
a5b 3 .4175 .2348         9          2.30
albl .5237 -.3385         9          2.33
a4bl .6585 .2823 12 2.59
a5b2 .6703 .1039         4          1.73
a4 b 2
.5297 .0318         3          1.15
a3b2 .0117 -.4726         1           .22
a2bl .6166 .3928 12 2.02
a2b2 .1946 -.2183         3           .89
a4b 3 .3195 .6715 12 1.91
Estimations of Row (ai) and Column (b ) parameters
a        .000        b      .083
1                                 1
a -1.775 b     -.529
2                            2
a      -4.248        b      .844
3                            3
a       -.001
4
a        .000
5
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CLUSTER V (N = 10; Ss: 8,16,21,36,38,43,50,54,68,71)
Variable F ratio       T Mean S.D.
alb3 .1226 -.5282         9          1.18
a5bl
.1687 1.2723        13          1.51
a2b 3
.2534 -.4441        10          1.72
alb2 .727
6 -.3725         5          2.63
a3bl .0738 .9592      
  14            .79
a 3b 3
.2639 -.5973         8          1.75
a5b 3 .2279 -.7061         6    
      1.70
albl .26
74 .2366        11          1.66
a4bl .1955 .9076        14        
  1.41
a5b2 .68
76 -.4643         3          1.75
a4b 2 2.0439 .1270         3    
      2.25
a 3b 2
.4568 .0832         2          1.40
a2bl .0607 .5486
12           .63
a2b 2
.3874 -.2928         3          1.25
a4b 3 .
1457 -.6929         7          1.29
Estimations of Row (a.) and Column (b.) parameters
1                     J
a        -1.455      b      .314
1                                    1
a -1.455 b     -.912
2                              2
a        -1.551      b      .264
3                              3
a        -1.489
4
a        -1.499
5
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CLUSTER VI (N = 13; Ss: 10,11,12,13,26,29,40,44.46,56,58,61,65)
Variable F ratio         T Mean S.D.
alb3 .2444 .6716        13          1.66
25bl .9160 .1140         9          3.51
a2 b 3 .6819 -.4780         9          2.81
alb2 .8868 .6741         8          2.90
a3bl 1.5501 -.6669         9          3.62
a3b 3 .5815 -.8365         7          2.60
a
5b3 1.5910 .4174        10          4.49
albl .1611 1.2004         14          1.29
a4bl 1.0841 -.8481          8          3.33
25b2 2.1847 .3516          5          3.12
a4b2 .3258 -.5374         2           .90
a3b2 .4462 -.0506          2          1.38
a2bl .9261 .2909 12 2.47
a2 b2 .7419 .0553         4          1.73
a4b 3 .7264 -.4807         8          2.87
Estimations of Row (a.) and Column (b.) parameters1                     J
a        -5.902      b     .710
1                                       1
a -3.672 b2   -.0012
a          .004      b     .7043                              3
a          .004
4
a        -3.651
5
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APPENDIX D, ADDITIONAL DATA OF THE INTERVIEW STUDY (CHAPTER VII)
1. Description of the Situation Given to the Respondents
Before starting the interview, I would like you tocarefully read
the following description of a situation, which students of this
faculty have been through, recently. You must try to picture the
scene as lively as possible, while putting yourself in the position
of the student indicated by 'you'. The other student who plays
a role in that situation is one of your colleagues. You hardly
know him/her. You only met him/her once in a while during lessons.
-- ------
At the beginning of this school-year a faculty member asked
for job students to assist in coding questionnaires, gathered in
a large field study. Several students have applied for the job,
and so did you.
During the first meeting with the assistant, he explained you
that he ran out of financial means to pay for the job, but that
he received permission from the dean's office to 'pay' the job
students with credit points for experimental participation
according to the faculty rules. He specified, further, that he
needed a large number of students, each working for two consecutive
hours, in order to guarantee high quality work.
Since you were in need of credit points, you agreed and made
an appointment about the day and time you could do the job. A
few days later, you received a reminder telling that you had to
come  on  day  b,   to  room  P401 in building  P.   You  had  to  work   from
9.00 a.m. until 11.00 a.m. That day you will have classes only at
3.30 p.m.
On day 3  you arrive at 9.00 a.m. sharp in P401. There you meet
with another student who you hardly know. You are introduced by the
assistant. The coding instructions consists of a type written text.
The assistant asks to carefully read it. Meanwhile he is checking
his papers. The coding forms are missing, and he announces that
he has to look for the forms at the University's Computer Centre.
The job consists of transcribing the answers in the questionnaires
to optical reader forms. After 10 minutes, both of you have read
the instructions, and you start talking about the first year
study in psychology. The assistant returns only after half an hour.
He asks if the instructions are understood, collects the credit
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point cards, and shows you to your desk in the same room. He
escorts the other student to another room, somewhere in the
same building. You start working. The job is not to difficult, but
it demands all your attention. After a while you notice that it
is impossible to finish the whole pile of questionnaires before
11.00 0'clock.
After half an hour working - it is now 10.00 a.m. - the other
student enters your room. You have just finished the 19th questionnaire.
He/She asks how the work is going, and gives you the following
message: "The assistant  just  came  into my room and  told me  that he
urgently had to leave for an important meeting at Utrecht University,
and that he would not come back to the university, today. He told
me that we could continue our work. When we are ready, we have to
fill out a small questionnaire about the job and what we think
about it, so that he has some information about setting up
similar jobs in the future. The assistant has already filled out
and signed our credit point cards.Here is yours."
Your colleague gives you a large, open envelop containing the
questionnaire, and a small, closed one containing your credit point
card. As the student is about to leave your room, he/she turns
his/her head and says:" Eh...by the way, the assistant put 8 points
on my card.", and than he/she leaves.
You take a quick look at the questionnaire, open the small
envelop, and you see that the assistant has filled out f points on
your card and has signed it.
-------------
The experimental conditions were created by replacing the '2'
and '6' points by the appropriate numbers, as indicated in the
design given in Table 11 ·
--------------
227
APPENDIX D - CONTINUATION
1. How would you feel in that situation ?
Answers to this question were categorized into a positive/neutral
and a negative category.
ExamFles of positive/neutral answers, are: surprised, strange,something
is going wrong.
Examples of negative answers are: I feel neglected, angry, disfavored,
unjustly treated, fooled, trapped, cheated.
Table Dl
Number of positive/neutral and negative answers
in each of the four conditions
Conditions
Category OE-CE OE-CI OI-CE OI-CI
negative           8 11 15 20
positive/neutral 4543
Chi-square (3) = 10.57, p <.02 (Hays,1972, p. 737).
2.  Ilhat  do you think about  the  way the assistant behaved  ?
Answers to this question were categorized into three groups:
1) unfairly, e.g.,does not stick to the agreement, unfair, dishonest,
treacherous,blamable, wrongful,...
2) impolite/slovenly, e.g.,chaotical,careless,disorderly,slovenly,
unproperly, not correct,'. . .
3) other, e.g., strange, awkward, nothing special,...
Table D2
Number of different responses in each of the
four conditions
Conditions
Category OE-CE OE-CI OI-CE OI-CI
unfair         0       4       3       8
impolite       9       8      14      11
other          3       4       4       4
Chi-square (6) = 9.21, p <.20
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3. What would you do in such a situation ?
The respondents'answers were of two main types: 1) referring to
the task, and 2) referring to contact someone.
Task related answers were grouped into four categories::
1) I would finish my job; 2) I would work for the time I am paid
for; 3) I would work a little longer and leave, and, 4) I would
immediately leave the work situation.
Some of the respondents said that they would contact the
assistant. Only a few said that they would look for their colleague.
Table D3
Number of different task related and contact
related answers in the four conditions
Conditions
Categories OE-CE OE-CI OI-CE OI-CI
Related to the task
finish the job 9 15       12       14
work for pay       0        0       6       7
leave earlier      3        1       1       0
leave immediately  0        0       0       2
Looking for someone
the assistant      0        8 11 11
the student        0        2       1       0
Respondents who said that they would like to meet the assistant
were asked what they would say to him or ask him if they were to
meet him. Their answers were categorized into three groups:
1) asking for an extra credit point; 2) asking for explanations
about the payment and the organization of the job, and 3) venting
onels spleen.
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Table D 4




Category OE-CI OI-CE OI-CI
extra credit point  6        9        12
explanation 11        3        15
complaining         0        2         3
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APPENDIX E, QUESTIONNAIRE USED IN THE FIELD STUDY (CHAPTER VIII)
1. QUESTIONNAIRE
Description of the chosen comparison person




























7) How frequently do you compare yourself and your work situation
with the other person and his/her work situation ?
very often - often - now and then - seldom - almost never
----------
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8) How satisfied are you with your job ?
9) how satisfied are you with your work situation ?
10) How satisfied are you with your promotion opportunities ?
11) How satisfied are you with your supervisor ?
12) How satisfied are you with your colleagues ?
13) How satisfied are you with your pay ?
(very satisfied 1--2--3--4--5 very dissatisfied)
----------
14) What' do you think about your pay, if you compare your performances
with the other person's performances ?
15) ... your age with the other person's age ?
16) ... your seniority with the other person's seniority ?
17) ... your job experience with the other person's job experience ?
18) ... your educational level with the other person's educational
level 7
20) ... your abilities with the other person's abilities ?
2 1)  . . . the quality of your performance with the quality of the
other person's performance ?
22) ... the effort you put into your job with the effort the other
person puts in his/her job ?
24) ... your work situation with the other person's work situation ?
25) ... your family situation with the other person's family situation 7
26) What do you think about your pay compared to the pay of the other
person ?
27) What do you think about your pay compared to the pay of others
having the same job as you have ?
28) What do you think about your pay compared to the pay of others
in a comparable job outside this company ?
29) What do you think about your pay compared to the average Dutch pay ?
19) ...your job level with the other person's job level ?
23) ...the difficulty of your job with the difficulty of the other
person's job 7
(My pay is too low - low - right - high - too high)
----------
30)Do you complain about your job or your work situation ? (A)
31)How do you find your job ? (B)
32) Have  you ever considered  to  work  less  hard  ?   (A)
33)Have you ever thought you only would be satisfied if you were
paid more 7 (A)
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34) Have you ever considered to work harder ? (A)
35) Have you ever thought you would be satisfied even if you
were paid less 7 (A)
36) Have you ever considered to make others work harder ? (A)
37) Have you ever considered to ask for a pay increase ? (A)
38) How often have you been absent from your work ? (A)
39) Have you ever considered to tell your boss that others
are paid too little ? (A)
40) Have you ever considered to stay home without good reason ? (A)
41) Have you ever considered to look for another job ? (A)
42) Have you ever considered to tell your boss that others do not
work hard enough ? (A)
43) Have you ever considered to advise others to look for another
job ? (A)
44) Have you ever considered to tell your boss that others are
paid too much ? (A)
45)  Have you ever considered to advise others to work less hard ?  (A)
46) Have you ever considered to advise others to ask for a pay -
increase ? (A)
(A) very often 5--4--3--2--1 never
(S) very interseting 5--4--3--2--1 very boring
233
APPENDIX E - CONTINUATION
2. INTERNAL CONSISTENCY OF THE SCALES
2.1. Input scale (N = 418)
Intercorrelations
Item Mean S.D. (3) (4) (2) (5) Scale
Age (3) 3.16 .93 -
-- .03 .12 .43 .31
Education (4) 3.44 .79 --- .45 .14 .26
Job level (2) 3.69 .79 .40--    .30
Seniority (5) 3.39 1.16                           ---     .4
4
Alpha coefficient : .561
Split-half reliability, corrected: .657
2.2. Justice scale (N = 316)
Means and Standard deviations of the 16 items of the justice scale
item  M S.D. item M S.D. item  M S.D. item  M    S.D.
14 2.18 .85 18 2.45 .82 22 2.32 .85    26 2.36 .79
15 2.26 .82     19 2.40 .78 23 2.50 .87 27 2.29 .80
16 2.35 .81 20 2.37 .81 24 2.48 .83 28 2.18 .83
17, 2.32 .82 21 2.33 .82 25 2.40 .80    29 2.17 .85
Alpha coefficient : .954
Split-half reliability, corrected: .925
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Intercorrelations between the Justice scale items
item numbers
15  16  17  18  19  20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 Scale
14 .72 .62 .62 .61 .65 .62 .66 .62 .55 .54 .56 .65 .53 .53 .51 .78
15     .76 .68 .63 .57 .64 .63 .62 .59 .58 .61 .65 .51 .56 .51 .80
16          .74 .61 .57 .64 .57 .55 .59 .58 .59 .62 .49 .52 .50 .78
17              .66 .55 .68 .59 .56 .58 .56 .58 .60 .48 .49 .49 .76
18                 .60 .63 .58 .51 .53 .49 .51 .52 .43 .47 .43 .71
19                      .63 .65 .58 .66 .60 .58 .62 .53 .52 .50 .76
20                           .76 .63 .62 .56 .52 .58 .46 .47 .46 .77
21                             .69 .62 .57 .57 .60 .45 .49 .47 .77
22 .66 .60 .58 .57 .41 .42 .45 .73
23                                       .69 .55 .60 .50 .45 .47 .75
24                                           .61 .60 .49 .46 .48 .73
25                                                .60 .44 .45 .47 .71
26                                                    .59 .52 .46 .75
27                                                     .67 .57 .65
28 .65 .66
29 .64
2.3 Satisfaction scale (N = 388)
item    M     S.D. intercorrelations
8      9 10 12 11 13 Scale
(8) 4.01 .88 --- .55 .44 .35 .33 .24 .56
(9) 3.85 1.01 .44 .54 .30 .69.46
(10) 3.26 1.21 .28 .38 .51--   .19
(12) 4.10 .91 .09 .39.35
(11) 3.79 1.15 --- .25 .50
(13) 3.13 1.05 ---    ·36
Alpha coefficient : .757
Split-half reliability, corrected : .749
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3. MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF ALL VARIABLES AND THEIR INTER-
CORRELATIONS
Variables                       N          M         S.D.
Input scale (IS) 418 3.56 .66
Outcome -ratio (OR) 428 4.08 .82
Justice scale (JS) 361 37.38 10.13
Satisfaction (SA) 388 22.14 4.19
Comparison tendency(CT) 436 3.18 .97
Injustice reduction indices
Underpayment Self (US) 496 2.60 1.22
Other(UO) 496 2.77 .97
Overpayment Self (OS) 496 5.06 1.77
Other(00) 496 2.99 1.06
Consonance of Comparison (CC) 413 4.48 .81
Injustice reduction items
item ar 30 482 2.47 .86
31 480 3.65 1.19
32 488 2.11 1.18
33 484 2.59 1.20
34 487 1.69 .85
35 487 1.35 .74
36 486 2.71 1.31
37 487 2.30 1.30
38 488 1.69 .70
39 485 1.69 1.08
40 489 1.21 .59
41 486 2.35 1.17
42 482 1.62 .93
43 487 1.80 .98
44 481 1.19 .58
45 486 1.45 .79
46 485 1.65 .97
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Intercorrelations between variables
item IS OR JS SA CT US OS UO 00 CC
30 .04 .03 -.20 -.46 .04 .33 -.52 -.05 -.10 .00
31 -.04 -.10 .04 .29 -.01 -.27 .32 .01 -.12 .08
32 -.15 -.07 -.10 -.14 .07 .28 -.42 -.04 -.07 -.04
34  -.02 -.09 .01 -.09 .04 -.20 -.11 -.06 -.05 .06
35 -.10 -.12 .10 .07 -.05 -.26 .06 -.06 -.11 .03
33 .02 .06 -.49 -.36 .16 .56 -.57 -.12 .05 -.03
37 -.01 .09 -.43 -.32 .11 .51 -.58 -.18 -.13 -.09
38 .01 .05 .04 -.05 .05 .08 -.18 -.01 .00 -.06
40 .00 -.05 -.02 -.10 .02 .10 -.27 -.13 .03 .05
41 -.07 .10 -.38 -.48 .10 .39 -.59 -.25 -.05 -.17
36 -.06 .01 -.07 -.03 .06 -.01 .03 .20 -.68 .06
42 .02 .08 -.08 -.09 .18 .13 -.14 .26 -.60 .18
45  -.16 -.08 -.02 -.06 -.01 .06 -.16 -.45 -.07 -.01
39 -.13 .01 -.22 -.10 .03 .13 -.12 -.42 -.16 .03
46 -.16 .01 -.25 -.14 .08 .23 -.30 -.50 -.16 .08
44 -.03 .09 -.14 -.16 .04 .16 -.14 -.08 -.28 .04
43 -.14 .07 -.11 -.08 .10 .03 -.14 -.04 -.58 .10
Df (approximately)
400 420 350 380 420 480 480 480 480 400
IS --- .42 .16 -.06 -.06 .03 .00 .07 -.01 .38
OR 413  --- -.25 -.12 .03 .11 -.10 .06 -.08 -.67
3S 350 354 --- .38 -.20 -.40 .42 .06 .03 .39
SA 353 358 311  --- -.08 -.34 .55 .10 .08 .07
CT 418 428 356 364 --- .17 -.15 .03 -.13 -.07
US 418 428 361 388 436  --- -.42 .01 .10 -.08
OS 418 428 361 388 436 496 --- .24 .12 .10
UO 418 428 361 388 436 496 496  --- -.01 .00
00 418 428 361 388 436 496 496 496 --- .08
CC 411 421 356 388 429 388 388 388 388  ---
r > .10, p <.05




item30    31   32   34   35   33   37   38   40   41   36   42   45   39   46
44 43 rTi
Z
30  --- -.11 .22 .10 .00 .18 .22 .12 .06 .33 .10 .14 .10 .04 .17 .04
.12 0
X
31  472 --- .06 -.07 .06 -.11 .06 -.08 -.07 -.16 .23 .07 .03 .12 .08 .00 .07 m
32 478 477 --- .03 .15 .19 .20 .01 .15 .13 .07 .15 .26 .11 .19 .12 .20
34 479 476 483 --- .14 .07 .07 .08 .14 .17 .03 .05 .11 .09 .10 .04 .08            g
35 487 476 483 484  --- -.10 -.09 .00 .15 .09 .14 .00 .22 .17 .12 .04 .25           0
33 476 476 480 481 482 --- .01 .00 .05 .31 .01 .07 .09 .14 .18 .15 -.03           zC
37 478 476 483 484 484 481  --- _.02 .07 .38 .16 .19 .13 .26 .43 .18 .12
3,
-1
38 479 476 484 484 484 481 484 --- .10 .09 -.04 .04 .06 -.04 .05 -.02 .06 0L
40 479 476 484 483 483 480 483 484 --- .24 -.04 .01 .10 .25 .16 .09 .17
41 476 474 481 480 480 478 480 481 484 --- .05 .06 .26 .26 .33 .13 .28              3
-J
36 477 476 482 483 483 481 483 483 482 480
--- .41 .11 .34 .27 .14 .41
42 475 471 478 479 478 475 479 478 480 470 477
--- .07 .17 .16 .24 .32
45 479 462 482 483 482 480 482 482 484 482 483 480
--- .23 .30 .17 .32
39 476 474 481 480 480 478 482 481 483 481 480 478 482
--- .55 .36 .43
46 477 475 481 481 481 479 481 481 483 481 483 478 484 481
--- .34 .41
44 473 472 478 477 476 474 477 477 479 477 477 475 480 478 478
--- .26
43 480 477 483 484 483 481 483 483 485 483 483 481 486 483 484 480  ---
Stellingen behorend bij: Syroit, J.E.M.M. Interpersonal 6. Laboratoriumonderzoek op het gebied van de Arbelds- en Orga-Injustice: A Psychological Analysis Illustrated wlth Empirical nisatlepsychologle is qua zijn relevantle voor toepassingenResearch. Katholieke Hogeschool Tilburg, juni 1984. gelljkwaardig aan veldonderzoek op dat gebled.
(Flanagan, M.F., and Dipboye, R.L. Research settings in
industrial and organizational psychology: Facts, fallacies,
and the future. Personnel Psychology, 1981, lt, 37-47.)1. De 'outcome expectancy rule' houdt in dat eqn procedute
slechts als fair waargenomen wordt, indien *erwacht wordt dat --000--
het resultaat binnen aanvaarde grenzen ligt. Deze regel dient
als  zevende  aan  de  zes door Leventhal geformuleerde  rege 15 7. In geval van zeer grote machtsafstand zullen meer-machtigenvoor procedurele rechtvaardigheid te worden toegevoegd. die hoog scoren op een valide machiavellianisme-schaal meer
(Leventhal, G.S. What should be done with equity theory ? New gebruik maken van particlpatieve besluitvormlng dan meer-approaches to the study of fairness in social relationships. machtigen  die laag scoren  op deze schaal.
In K.J. Gergen, M.S. Greenberg, and R.H. Willis (Eds.), (Mulder, M. Het spel om de macht. Meppel: Boom, 1970,
Social exchange. Advances in theory and research. New York:
Plenum Press, 1980.) stelling 8.Bagchus, P. Persoonlijke mededellng. s.d.)
--000-- --000--
2. Het score-keuze paradigma, gebruikt in onderzoek naar de 8.  Het op 'democratlsche' wij ze nemen van besluiten aan unive r-keuze van vergelijkingspersonen, levert resultaten op dle sitelten en hogescholen, in tijden van economische recessleverklaard kunnen worden zonder beroep te doen op sociale leldt tot een administratieve wanordd die op korte termijn
motieven van de kiezer. Het ls derhalve geen valide procedure functioneel is voor alle betrokken partijen (studenten, staf,ter toetsing van Hypothese 3 van Festinger's sociale verge- bestuursorganen  en ove rheid),  maar  die op middellange  en11Jkingstheorie. lange termiJn schade toebrengt aan het academlsch onderwiJS
(Syroit, J., Rijsman, J.B., and Grumbkow, J. von. De dynamiek en onde rzoek.van het scorekeuzegedrag in onderzoek naar de voorkeur voor
vergelljklngsanderen. In J.B. Rijsman and H. Wilke (Eds.), --000--
Sociale vergelijkingsprocessen: Theorie en onderzoek.
Deventer: Van Loghum Slater™us, 1980.) 9. De impasse waarin het onderzoek naar lelderschapseffectivi-
teit zit, is te wijten aan het ontbreken van een fundamentele
--000-- theorie hierover.
3. De aard van het verdeelprlnclpe dat door ruilpartners wordt --000--
gehanteerd, bepaalt het karakter van hun relatie.
(zie bv. Greenberg,  J.  Equi ty and equality as clues  to the 10. Problemen verbonden aan 'Taakverpleglng' kunnen volledlger
relationship between exchange participants. European Journal opgelost worden door middel van de invoering van een systeemof Social Psychology, 1983, 11, 195-196.) van  ' Integrerende Verpleegkunde'  dan door de oprichting  van
een 'Dienst Patientenbegeleidlng'.
--000-- (Koene, G., Grypdonk, M., Rodenbach, M. Th., and Windey, T.
Integrerende Verpleegkunde:Wetenschap in praktijk.Lochem: De
4. Loonnlvelleringsmaatregelen, ingevoerd met het doel de totale TiJdstroom, 1982.loonkost van een organisatie te verkleinen, missen hun doel. Keirse, M. en Peers,J.Patientenbegeleiding als een
--000--
georganiseerde ziekenhulsdienst. Lochem: De Tijdstroom,1976.
--000--
5. Onbillijkheld is een bijzonder geval van status incongruen-
tie. Niet elke status incongruentle is onbillijk. 11. Het grootste verschil tussen Belgen en Nederlanders 11gt
hierin dat Belgen overleg plegen wanneer ze in de knoel
--000-- zitten en Nederlanders totdat ze in de knoel zitten.
--000--
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